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ABSTRACT
Cities are complex social environments representing a convergence of many
physical and human processes which influence how young people form their identities
and plan for their futures. The role of urban environments on social processes has
received substantial attention. However, significantly less attention has been focused on
how urban youth are impacted specifically as political actors. Youth are particularly
exposed to feeling the impacts of historical and on-going geopolitical issues in and
surrounding their urban environments. Amman, Jordan is a compelling location to
examine urban impacts on young political actors because of the clear geopolitical
changes taking place in and around the city. Amman has nearly doubled in size following
recent instability in neighboring Iraq and Syria, which has deeply affected
neighborhoods, the makeup of the city’s population, and daily experiences of being
Ammani.
This study furthers our understandings of how youth are experiencing and
managing urban processes across the local, regional, and global scales. How young
people are responding to increasing neoliberal pressures and challenges felt throughout
their daily lives provides insights for academics, policy makers, and other stakeholders
focusing on youth and their social movements. By applying a critical geopolitics
theoretical framework to a young urban population and introducing the concept of
situated citizenship, this study illuminates previously unexplored adaptations and
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applications of urban citizenship which may offer value applicability to other young
urban populations.
In Chapter 1 I summarize the historical events which have created contemporary
Amman’s unique situation. In Chapter 2, I review the critical urban citizenship and
critical youth geopolitical literatures which frame my work. Then in Chapter 3 I outline
my methodological approach to my research. I present a cultural mapping of Amman in
Chapter 4 to detail how the three most dominant regions of the city add specific cultural
layers to youth’s daily lives. In Chapter 5, I outline how the city itself serves as a place of
exclusion within the shared mental mapping of Jordanian-ness. Specifically, I argue that
young people experience a situated citizenship based on historical geographies and multiscalar relationships. In Chapter 6, I focus on the impacts of increasing regional pressure
and decreasing opportunities which are compelling young people to decide whether to try
and leave Amman for the chance to secure their futures or whether they will stay and try
to fight for their rights to make the city. In Chapter 7, I review Jordan’s original social
contract and how recent events have been testing the validity of this social contract for
Amman’s youth. Then in Chapter 8, I highlight transformations within the city which are
allowing youth to begin claiming Ammaniness as both an identity and strategy. Finally, I
conclude with opportunities for future research and my closing thoughts.
My ethnographic approach to young people in the Middle East demonstrates how
this understudied population is interconnected and urgently requires further examination.
This dissertation contributes to filling this gap in knowledge about a critically important
and growing population which is often misunderstood. Particularly, presenting stories of
Ammanis across the socio-economic spectrum allows us to better understand the variety
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of ways urban youth are adapting to on-going social changes. This analysis of youths’
daily small political acts can assist in our understanding of larger social movements,
which can promote greater effectiveness in future decisions about youth geopolitics.
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INTRODUCTION

AMMANI YOUTH: IN THE EYE OF THE STORM
This dissertation explores the new challenges and changes urban youth in Amman
are facing due to regional pressures testing their confidence in their ability to remain in
Jordan. Their desire to potentially leave Amman has implications on local and regional
stability in the post-Arab Spring era. A key feature of the Arab Spring was the
participation of young people who took to the streets across the region to express their
discontent with a status quo that has provided little opportunity for youth to express their
opinions or to achieve their goals. Although young Jordanians participated with their
peers across the region in calls for reform, the main impact of the protests in Amman was
increased instability, which compounded problems, created by political crises in Iraq and
Syria. Newly closed borders in Iraq, waves of refugees from Syria, and complex
relationships with Palestine and Israel combine to constrain young Ammanis, causing
them to increasingly look elsewhere to pursue their dreams.
All socio-economic classes in this generation witnessed the Arab Spring, an event
widely viewed by scholars as a defining, watershed moment in the lives of young people
who were born between the years 1977-2000. This group represents approximately one
third of the 400 million Arabs and according to Cole, they are significantly more urban,
literate, wired and secular than their parents (Cole, 2014, 2). Scholars credit the collective
attempt to overthrow once seemingly invincible regimes with creating a “New Arab,”
1

whose political experiences and expectations diverge from those of their parents’
generations because they lived under authoritarian regimes during their youths (ibid,
2014). But the young people I interviewed explained that their initial hopes for reform in
Jordan, as protests rippled through the Arab World, had quickly turned to fear as Syria
plunged into instability. Young people who used to visit Syria for lunch now wondered
when the chaos and bloodshed would finally end, allowing Syrians to return home and
their own lives to return to normal.
Like other countries in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region, Jordan’s
population is quite young. The UN estimates that more than 70 percent of the country’s
citizens younger are than thirty years old. Further, nearly half of Jordan’s estimated 9
million citizens live in Amman. Despite their large share of the population, the current
generation of urban youth face marginalization by the state and society. Whether in terms
of exclusion from public spaces, the political sphere, or the labor market, Ammani youth
do not feel heard. A combination of the security state, tribal systems, and cultural norms
coalesce in highly controlled urban spaces to limit the voices of Amman’s youth.
A key goal of this research is to provide a platform for Ammani youth to share
their perspectives. I argue this is especially important as Amman is in the midst of several
pivotal transformations. The first transition I explore is that of Jordanians transitioning
from being subjects (who rely on the government for employment) to global neoliberal
citizens (who are expected to act entrepreneurially in the private sector): this transition
leaves young people to try to provide their own opportunities. However, most young
people do not have the resources to create their own jobs through entrepreneurialism, as
structural deficiencies as well as cultural expectations also limit self-employment.
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Meanwhile, the public sector, which has traditionally been reserved for JordanianJordanians1 not only continues to shrink but fails to offer opportunities in line with youth
career expectations. The public sector is unable to absorb the excess of highly educated
and unemployed young people. Crucially, they are also the first generation since the Arab
Spring to feel the full impact of the stress to Jordan’s original social contract, which is
accelerating their transition from royal subjects able to depend on royal patronage to
neoliberal citizens who must provide more for themselves.
To understand how the transition from royal subjects to neoliberal citizens
unevenly impacts Ammanis it is important to contextualize citizenship within three
historical processes: Jordan’s project of nationalism, tribalism’s role in shaping belonging
to the nation, and the impact of Palestine on Jordan from its founding in 1921. National
identity and legal citizenship have become deeply intertwined since the 19th century; but
national identity and citizenship do not map perfectly on each other, particularly in
Amman since who or what can be considered Ammani is itself political. The tension
between nationhood and citizenship can be seen in societies where cultural identities are
key markers of political division. With some scholars questioning Jordan as a country,
since the borders were drawn only recently, and others introducing the question of
whether Amman is even a city since it was also only recently re-inhabited, the tensions
between who is Jordanian and who is Ammani swirl. Being Jordanian has salience
throughout the country but being Ammani has meaning in certain circumstances and in
other instances is negated. Thus, urban citizenship in Amman is rife with political
1

Jordanian-Jordanians or ‘East Bankers’ are the terms most frequently used by my
interlocutors to refer to Jordanians who trace their heritage to particular Jordanian tribes.
These terms are used to distinguish “Original Jordanians” from Palestinian-Jordanians or
‘West Bankers.’
3

tensions. For Jordan’s urban youth being Ammani is not just an identity, it is also an act
of urban citizenship used strategically to open economic, professional, social, and
political opportunities.
While Ammanis change from royal subjects into neoliberal citizens, the city itself
is undergoing rapid demographic transformation. Mass movements of new migrants from
neighboring countries, which were accelerated by instability in Syria and Iraq following
the Arab Spring, are driving this physical transformation. Between 2010 and 2015
Amman's population doubled from approximately 2,000,000 to 4,000,000 residents, and
it is still growing (Nieberg, 2017). The UNHRC estimates 85% of refugees who have
arrived in Jordan since 2010 live outside of refugee camps making them difficult to
accurately count (Saswan, 2017). However, the number of Syrian refugees in Jordan is
estimated at 1.3 million, which adds to the nearly 150,000 Iraqis who have also moved to
Jordan since 2010 (ibid, 2017). This unplanned population growth underlies Amman’s
rapid transformation and exacerbates questions of urban belonging.
Scholarly literature on citizenship has been undergoing a critical transition from
studying belonging based on purely national citizenship, towards a critical model which
evaluates belonging through the study of daily experiences in urban spaces. Three key
theoretical innovations in the study of citizenship provide a more nuanced way to analyze
my research population. These innovations are: (1) access to rights mediated by various
identities, i.e. citizenship is not a universal status; (2) citizenship not just rights but also a
broader construction of belonging in a body politic/community, so is therefore shaped
and constrained by cultural notions of who ‘we’ are; (3) contestation and negotiation of
citizenship is an everyday thing, not just a ‘government’ thing; hence, we look at cities as
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key sites of citizenship debates and claims. Scholars talk about urban citizenship as the
methods and ways societies apply unwritten rules of belonging in the city.
However, understanding the diverse ways in which young Ammanis are impacted
by ties that cross local, regional, and national scales demands a new way to think about
their urban citizenship. I thus introduce the concept of situated citizenship to describe the
paradox wherein the city is the social and political site within which young Ammanis
construct their political ideas of belonging, and yet Ammani citizenship, belonging to the
city, is situated by the cultural expectation to define oneself using geographies outside of
the city, with links to paternal lineages. Designating identity as "Ammani" is not socially
accepted by other Jordanians who complicate/minimize this identity by requiring a
separate connection to another space instead of Amman 2. Because the concept of situated
citizenship embraces these scalar paradoxes, it can aid scholars examining other cities
with similarly complex populations.
The multiscalar considerations embedded in the concept of situated citizenship
also addresses a weakness in the literature on urban citizenship: the debate in traditional
citizenship literature focuses on the dichotomy between national citizenship’s
"universalist" approach and critical citizenship literature’s "particularistic" approach. The
critical turn in the citizenship literature thus examines how specific cultural norms
privilege certain individuals over those from minority groups. Yet, within the political

2

These geographies include traditional territories within Jordan as well as areas from
neighboring countries, ie Palestinian-Jordanians or Lebanese-Jordanians. Amman has
complicated inheritances of belonging since people have various levels of relative insider
status. For example, a Lebanese-Jordanian would have greater belonging to Amman than
I would be able to claim. This could be based on cultural, religious, and linguistic ties
between these countries, but also recognizes the legacy of other groups being in Jordan
for a longer period of time.
5

and geographical context of Jordan, the entire city of Amman is marginalized: Ammanis
are thus socially required to maintain claims to geographies beyond the city. This social
hierarchy is based on Amman’s “short" history and Jordan’s strong tribal system. 3 The
case of Amman can therefore expand contemporary citizenship literature by
incorporating processes not currently included in the study of urban belonging.
Furthermore, while urban citizenship literature allows us to consider Amman’s
cultural hierarchy of citizenship (instead of only legal definitions), Amman is a city that
does not neatly align with these theoretical approaches because the entire city was
repopulated roughly 100 years ago after a long period of dormancy. When it was reborn it
was branded as extraterritorial space within the shared mental mapping of Jordanian-ness,
which imagines Jordanians from rural or secondary cities as having more authentic
connections to tribally based Jordanian belonging, due to the city’s lack of a large
indigenous and politically connected tribal population. The concept of situated
citizenship thus also embraces the ways in which Ammani urban citizenship and
belonging are rooted, in part, in tribalism which situates Ammanis as simultaneously
Jordanian and somehow less Jordanian than citizens from other locations within Jordan.
Since youth without tribal connections who live in Amman face marginalization in civic,
political, and economic spheres, youth distrust the circumstances of life in the city. This
research contributes to the wider discussions of understanding young peoples’ senses of
belonging and identity across multiple scales.
Indeed, the scalar impact of tribes is a second process which shapes belonging in

3

I explore this in more detail in later in the chapter. However, Amman was essentially a
dormant city until the Mandate Period and is often referred to as a ‘new city’ relative to
other Arab capitals.
6

the city. In Jordan, tribal membership is the most powerful and common frame with
which people distinguish social groups, through tribal membership is complicated by the
legacies of migration and war. My first encounter with tribalism in Jordan completely
defied my prior notions of tribes. Indeed, prior to even beginning my formal interviewing
process I witnessed and engaged with Jordan’s modern tribal system when I first
observed a young man at an upscale coffee shop in West Amman. He pulled up next to
the coffee shop along the crowded street and with music blaring out of his open
convertible he called out and asked someone sitting at the café to move a car so he could
park. His authority was interesting and I asked the waiter to tell me about him. His reply,
“he is from a prominent tribe and gets what he wants.” Although I witnessed opulent
displays of tribalism while in the United Arab Emirates, when the young man climbed
out of his sports car wearing a leather coat, t-shirt, and jeans, it was my first experience of
seeing this version of being urban tribal in Amman. However, I saw modern tribalism
play out among Ammani youth many times after this in similar ways.
Membership in a tribe offers young people a place at the top of Jordan’s social
hierarchy. This practice predates the defeat of the Arab armies by the Israeli forces when
Transjordan absorbed roughly one-third of the 700,000 displaced Palestinians and the
hierarchy was amongst tribes even then (Alon, 2007). Therefore, since Amman became
the capital of the nascent state of Jordan, Palestine and Palestinian-Jordanians have not
only shaped the city but also the ways in which the state sees and interacts with Amman.
This third element of Amman’s history—the impact of integrating Palestinians while
simultaneously maintaining their right to return home - began almost immediately during
repopulation.
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As I explain in Chapter 5, the Palestinian cause and subsequent Jordanian Civil
War were the primary generational challenges of Amman’s previous two generations of
residents. Historically, the divisions between East bank/West bank Jordanians were felt
most strongly in the city since rural areas are mainly home to Transjordanians. In 1970
the simmering tensions between the Palestinians and Jordanians exploded in a Civil War,
called Black September, which played out on the streets of Amman and ended with
thousands dead and a city wracked by shelling. With support from a Nasserist Pan-Arab
movement and the backing of the Arafat’s PLO in the West Bank, the fedayeen
(Palestinian fighters) attempted to assassinate or overthrow King Hussein and to seize
control of the government. Despite the fedayeen successfully high-jacking three civilian
aircraft to call attention to their cause, the Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) was able to
extinguish the majority of the rebellion before October. King Hussein regained firm
control of the Government of Jordan and set about systematically eradicating threats from
within the borders of his country. This included: formally disengaging from the West
Bank and a Jordanization program meant to cleanse the Government of Jordan and JAF
of potential threats. Following the battle of Black September, the Government of Jordan
firmly “Jordanized” public sector work and Palestinians were treated with suspicion.
Palestinians were now considered too risky to be trusted to work within sensitive parts of
the government and were expelled from the security forces. These social events deeply
impacted the city.
Indeed, since Amman’s rebirth starting in 1921 the entire city has been made
largely by and for migrants and refugees. Its relative lack of autochthonous residents
makes it a space of marginalization on the social scale of Jordanian-ness. Although
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official statistics are not published, Amman's unofficial statistics “place up to 80% of the
city’s population” as Palestinian-Jordanian (Khirfan, 2018, 204). The ways Amman’s
residents, who are both Jordanian and yet not fully Jordanian, experience their sense of
identity through their daily urban citizenship thus calls for further analysis.
By embracing the critical turn away from legal definitions of citizenship and
toward processes of cultural and political belonging operating at multiple scales, my
project recognizes that multiculturalism, supranationalism, and cosmopolitanism are
creating new forms of identity. Therefore, I examine how young individuals and groups
create, experience, and negotiate sometimes-conflicting dimensions of identity, issues
that are especially important for youth because they are building Jordan’s future.
While Ammanis are still Jordanians, many have additional connections to other
regional identities. Jordan is important because it is a regional node, as evidenced by:
Jordan’s interconnectedness with regional instability and violence; its relatively stable
status since the Arab Spring; serving as a home for waves of migrants from nearby states;
and the ways in which globalization and urbanization are changing the processes of
political and cultural belonging. Jordan is important because it is especially here where
regional connections and consequences are so dramatically present in the ways in which
young people think about their attachment to this country over the long term. As Jordan’s
largest city, Amman is home to roughly 4 million people (Nieberg, 2017). Yet due in part
to the cultural practice of identifying with towns of origin (rather than town of residence),
and to the relative recentness of migrations to Amman, most people do not identify as
being from, or "of" Amman (for a discussion of a similar process in Istanbul, Turkey, see:
Mills, 2010, 2). Yet, in Chapter 8 I highlight how despite the disincentives to claiming an

9

Ammani identity, some youth have begun to claim an identity as Ammani through
everyday, micro-political acts.
Young Ammanis strategically perform and claim their identities to different
groups based on perceived advantages. It is a political act to claim Ammaniness or assert
claims as Palestinian-Jordanians, Lebanese-Jordanians, or Jordanian-Jordanians. 4 These
place-based aspects of identity are being shaped within an urban context heavily
influenced by state-authored discourses about youth. For example, Jordanian state
discourses which seek to transform young people into neoliberal global citizens
encourage them to become peacemakers or activists (although only for particular
approved topics, e.g. environmental issues or gender rights), or entrepreneurs (explored
further in Chapter 7). These new discourses often serve as push factors for youth to
emigrate, because they imply that young people are unable to reach their dreams in
Amman and should instead seek their futures elsewhere, even if they are welcome to
return home over the long-term. Even after the high level of participation of young
people in the MENA region in the political movements surrounding the Arab Spring, this
group remains an understudied population in scholarly literature. While citizenship
literature has begun to consider youth as active political agents (instead of viewing them
as ‘citizens in the making’), this research focuses predominantly on the Global North. My
work contributes to filling this gap by including Middle Eastern youth in the emerging
literature on critical youth geopolitics.
My urban focus provides another contribution to this new literature, as
cocontemporary youth geopolitical studies are typically located in schools or other spaces

4

Or any other variety of hyphenated Jordanian.
10

of civic education. While these spaces are important geographies of youth identity
formation, we must also consider the informal spaces where youth develop and perform
their identities amongst one another without explicit formal supervision. In this way, this
research builds on and adds to the scholarship examining youths’ multiple identities at
the city level. Although my study takes place at the scale of the city, the concept of
situated citizenship explicitly recognizes the ways in which this generation of young
people connect and identify with one another across multiple scales. Situated citizenship
incorporates how notions of political and social belonging in the city are formed through
relational attachments to multiple locations and also to Jordan's past and future (Massey,
1995). I highlight how young Ammanis perhaps unknowingly support a system which,
due to a failing social contract, implicates them as paradoxical urban citizens: as both
Jordanian and simultaneously less Jordanian due to living in the city.
I analyze the making of belonging to argue that the city, Jordanian culture, and
the state all work together to deemphasize spaces and people in Amman, situating
Amman below other areas of Jordan. In Chapter 5 I identify four interrelated observations
about the relationships between historical geography and contemporary citizenship in
terms of how young Jordanians imagine their identities in relationship to others, or their
places in the world. I present these insights using a series of themes, and each theme is
supported with excerpts from transcribed qualitative data.
My first theme focuses on how young people in the city of Amman have a sense
of being Jordanian, but do not feel purely Jordanian. This duality is due at least in part to
the strength of Jordan’s tribes and a system of tribalism which ensures that the only
people who can be fully Jordanian are those with tribal roots. Everyone else falls lower
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on the scale of Jordanian-ness. 6 A person born and raised in the city of Amman is marked
as less Jordanian than those who identify or are identified by connections to their tribal
village. Urban identities are situated and can be paradoxical since Amman is not a tribal
center. To be “pure” Jordanian one must belong to a tribe. Non-tribal Ammanis born in
Jordan with full citizenship rights are situated lower on the scale of Jordanian-ness based
on not belonging to a tribe. Young people’s identity becomes confusing in part due to
political events that occurred when Jordanian national identity was being created. More
specifically, during Jordan’s modern founding, Emir Abdullah deliberately tried to create
ambiguity in geographical borders while trying to expand his kingdom (Frisch, 2002).
Next, I explore how paternal lineage is a determinant of identity for Ammani
young people. Since Amman is not a culturally acceptable place to identify family
origins, lineage is inherently linked to geographies outside of the city. Whether your roots
are from Jordan or not, you must identify as coming from somewhere other than Amman.
Indeed, geographies other than Amman situate the citizenship of Ammani youth. If an
Ammani young person’s paternal ancestors come from tribal villages in Jordan, but
outside of Amman, he or she is considered highly Jordanian. But, if an Ammani young
person’s paternal ancestors come from outside Jordan, Palestine, for example, he or she is
considered less Jordanian.
The third theme which emerged from my research is the importance migration
plays in the character of Amman. As a city built by and for migrants, Amman serves as a
place of refuge and its population is highly attuned to the values of hospitality. Jordan’s
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As in the Arab Gulf, tribalism in Jordan centers on social affiliation and does not refer
to the Orientalist idea of a static or primitive society. Jordanians can be both tribal and
modern (Cooke, 2014).
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history of continual migrations causes a culture of hospitality which deeply influences
youth. Although the role of the native minority matters in Jordan, in Amman where most
residents descend from migrants, national allegiances are less important than the values
of hospitality.
Finally, I highlight the importance of multi-scalar belonging among Ammani
youth. Before the establishment of the nation-state, people within the Middle East North
Africa (MENA) region created their identities based on other scales of group belonging
including tribal scales. Group affiliations that have been forged since the founding of the
state of Jordan also operate at larger and smaller scales than the nation-state. Youth
identified themselves to me as belonging to transnational groups and to local groups
instead of prioritizing being Jordanian as their primary scale of belonging. The localized
scale of belonging for young Ammanis needs further interrogation, especially as
belonging to the scale of the city situates youth as less Jordanian. Section 5.4 examines
other scales of belonging which young people identified with more than national or urban
scales. The data I collected from my interviews provides new information about how the
built environment conditions Ammani youths’ identities, their sense of belonging, and
how they envision their futures as they navigate contemporary social movements and
increasing regional pressures.
THE URBAN CONTEXT: A BIFURCATING CITY
Amman is, in many ways, a bifurcated city. Amman was reborn in 1878 after a
long break in permanent settlement (Hacker, 1960; Shami, 2007), and became an official
town in 1903 and the capital city in 1921. Therefore, Amman’s modern rebirth includes
140 years of settlement, 115 years of urbanization, and 97 years of being the cultural and
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national capital of Jordan. Yet for much of these nearly 100 years the capital city has
struggled with a negative reputation including being declared: "Not a city" (Shami,
2007); "the third ugliest city in the world" (U.CityGuide, 2013); and "one of the five most
expensive Arab cities" (Forbes, 2017). Because of this negative reputation, most tourist
itineraries consider Amman merely an entry point in which travelers should barely pause
to see antiquities before getting out of the city. Indeed, the rapid repopulation and
unplanned nature of Amman’s growth has created many infrastructure problems which
create challenges in daily life. However, despite the challenges the city faces and being
decried as a ‘new city,’ Amman is more than just a transit point: it is a space where
nearly half of Jordanians live and many more work, thus playing a crucial role in the
processes shaping the future of the state as a whole. This future is inextricably linked to
the city's young history.
Despite having significant historical roots reaching back thousands of years,
Amman virtually disappeared off the map until just over 100 years ago. When the city
was reborn out of the ashes of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire, it began its new life as
a small village with just a couple of thousand inhabitants (Hacker, 1960). Situated in the
valley of one of the few bodies of water in the area, Amman was surrounded by seven
jibaal or hills. Even had the city’s new occupants wanted to lay out the nascent city on
legible and systematic patterns, the combination of a rapidly growing population and the
contours of these steep hills and valleys would have made it difficult. Instead, the city
organically grew in haphazard and unplanned ways to accommodate Amman´s growing
population.
Historically, the initial city residents were primarily people coming from the
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collapsing Ottoman Empire, along with merchants from surrounding countries (including
from Lebanon) who worked together to build the city. However, following the
Circassians and other Caucasians who migrated to Jordan (in the 1870s), massive waves
of immigrants have arrived in Jordan from Palestine (1948, 1967), Iraq/Kuwait (1991,
2003), and now Syria. These migrants have greatly expanded the population, size, and
socio-political diversity of Amman.
These historical developments, from the modern expansion of Amman as the
capital of Transjordan to the recent waves of immigrants, have made the city what it is
today. Thus, one of Amman’s central contradictions is that while it is a very old city, it
doesn’t fit into Orientalist models of the "Islamic City" which dominate urban literature
of the region (Abu Lughod, 1987). Instead Amman’s distinctiveness comes from its
diversity (Daher, 2011). Yet we have very little understanding of how the heterogeneity
of this increasingly cosmopolitan and rapidly growing city impacts the ways in which
young people form urban attachments to place.
What is known currently is that youth radicalization and apathy are flourishing.
Aware of this, the Government of Jordan has focused on young people as the key to
future state stability. Since the Arab Spring the Jordanian state has increased its
investments in internship programs as a way to address their high youth unemployment.
Additionally, on August of 2015 they hosted the UN’s “Global Forum on Youth, Peace
and Security,” which drew participation from 100 nations and resulted in the signing of
the Amman Youth Declaration. The Declaration is intended to present a “common vision
and roadmap towards a strengthened policy framework to support [young people] in
transforming conflict, preventing and countering violence and building sustainable
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peace” (United Nations, 2015). The choice of Jordan as the host for this convention
reveals that not only is the Government of Jordan attempting to proactively provide their
youth with positive interventions to avoid radical jihadism, but that the international
community also recognizes the pivotal role Jordanian youth hold in the stability or
instability of the region. This stability is affected by social hierarchies which prescribe
how these youths’ futures will unfold.
Talking to youth in their current place as citizens enables me to address warnings
from scholars to incorporate marginalized “cultural citizenship” to the fore to complicate
and add nuance to the Western-constructed category of youth (Abu El-Haj, 2007, 311).
This dissertation examines the experiences and perceptions of young people who may
feel too Ammani to be "fully Jordanian," but still have some sense of being Jordanian. 7
By bringing their voices into the conversation my hope is to provide a platform for their
greater inclusion. Indeed, as I delved into the geographies of inequality in Amman, I paid
attention to the historic paths along which Jordan’s minorities and the ruling regime have
traversed to arrive at the current construction of power.
My interviews with Ammani youth indicate that young people feel trapped by
rapidly diminishing economic opportunities; many also feel confined by regional tensions
and conservative cultural norms. This pattern can also be observed in other locations
through studies of youth as interconnected geopolitical agents who are being impacted by
local, regional, and global pressures (Hörschelmann, 2008; Benwell, 2016). According to
a Jordanian journalist, illicit drug use and suicide rates are climbing as youth struggle
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While the term “pure Jordanian" does not bear up under any critical analysis, it is the
term most frequently used by my interlocutors to describe national belonging to Jordan as
an identity.
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under the pressure of living in the “eye of the storm” (Saswan, 2017).
However, these hardships are not felt evenly throughout the city: youth from
families with higher income levels explain they are protected from the worst
consequences of regional struggles due to their educational opportunities and professional
paths. They further elucidate that competition for low salary jobs increased as large
numbers of Syrians, who are legally paid a lower minimum wage, now occupy these low
paying positions, which become socially coded as “foreign” jobs (McDowell, 2009). This
competition thus does not impact the educated and upper classes the same way as it
impacts middle and lower-class youth. However, this shift in the labor market means East
and West Amman continue to grow further apart in the mental mapping of the city as
many jobs in East Amman pay less than those in West Amman.
Palestinian-Jordanian residents of parts of East Amman face pressure to reflect a
commitment to returning to Palestine instead of demonstrating comfort within, and
commitment to, Amman. In these spaces, the urban landscape is intentionally left to show
signs of aging and disrepair instead of being continually improved. 8 These same parts of
the city are also disproportionately impacted by the post-Arab Spring arrival of Syrian
refugees to the city. This additional pressure on poorer neighborhoods in East Amman
increases the perceived cultural divide between the East and West sections of the city.
According to my interviews, the broad class divisions that divide Ammani youth are
mapped alongside the cultural divisions to create a general image of the city as divided
between a poor East Amman and a wealthy West Amman.
This bifurcated imagined geography does not accommodate the actual occasional
8

Although economic status may contribute to some East Ammanis decision or inability
to upgrade their homes, social pressures to retain the ‘right to return’ permeate.
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mixing in various parts of the city. However, mapping the cultural divisions in the city
onto East and West Amman does offer young people a way to visualize broad class
differences, and is how virtually all youth describe the city. Although I am taking care to
acknowledge nuances, including the middle-class families sprinkled throughout the city,
and including in the poorer parts of West Amman and the wealthy parts of East Amman,
the young people I interacted with universally share an imagined geography steaming
from Jordan’s historical roots and development that distinguishes a poor East Amman
and a wealthy West Amman.
This cultural mapping of class divisions has intensified with the experience of
uncontrolled urban expansion. The image of the city as divided is also exacerbated by the
city’s increasing global interconnectedness, an issue I explain in more detail in Chapter 7.
For the purposes of this dissertation, it is most important to note that there is not one
common Ammani youth experience, but that young people in Amman have multiple and
divergent experiences of the city. Regional tensions complicate the existing cultural
pressures youth in the city already experience.
CONTEMPORARY PRESSURES EXACERBATE CULTURAL TENSIONS
Regional Tensions
As the Jordanian government tentatively works to reopen commercial links with
Iraq and Syria, the berm (an extraterritorial space beyond the Jordanian border) has been
reinforced to prevent the spread of DAESH. DAESH is used in the MENA region as a
more locally acceptable acronym for Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) since it is both
an accurate acronym-- al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham (the Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant)-- and a play on the pejorative term da’ech, or bigot. I use DAESH
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throughout this project instead of ISIS. Since the Arab Spring, the changing regional
context and unpredictable geopolitical situation has transformed a neighboring country
from a place which urban youth thought of as site of educational, career, and leisure
opportunities into a threatening place. This changing perception reinforces the
Government of Jordan's ‘stability first’ discourse.
The majority of my 60 respondents report that the lesson they learned from the
Arab Spring was a negative one: they wish people had stayed home instead of protesting
since nothing good (indeed, according to them only harmful things) came from the
protests. Although Jordanians’ protest signs and chants called for reforms and not regime
overthrow, the actions of surrounding nations created regional instability that directly
impacts the daily lives of Jordanians (Schwedler, 2017). In addition to increased inflation
and competition for jobs, the threat of DAESH has seeped into the daily lives of many
Ammani youth.
The threat is not simply an external one: indeed, Jordan has steadily risen and is
currently ranked by the United States Government as the second highest exporter of
foreign fighters to DAESH (Sharp, 2017). Even as DAESH’s territorial control fades, the
ideological threats between moderates and extremists continues in both the online
realities and the daily lives of young Ammanis. Homegrown terrorism rocked the sense
of national a’man (security) which was previously considered unshakable, when
Jordanian fighters loyal to DAESH killed tourists in Karak Castle in December 2016.
This attack prompted the US State Department to issue a travel warning indicating the
threat against foreigners in Jordan has risen and cautioning Americans about travel to
Jordan. Further, the Center for Strategic Studies at University of Jordan released a report
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in 2017 highlighting the increasing number of Jordanians who feel that having refugees
outside the camps “highly threatens the security and stability of Jordan” (Saswan, 2017).
Another act of domestic terrorism rattled the kingdom in August of 2018, when
youth belonging to a local tribe (normally considered regime loyalists) detonated a bomb
under a vehicle belonging to the security forces who were on duty at a music festival in
Fuheis, a suburb of Amman (Hamed, 2018). The terrorist event extended to Salt, a city
north of Amman, the following day when security forces surrounded a building. The
news coverage of the building collapsing went viral and rumors on social media were
rampant.9 In the end, four members of the security services and three homegrown
terrorists died. While this event failed to register beyond the region, the specter of local
youth, particularly from the tribes, participating in domestic terrorism, continues to
reverberate in Jordan since it cannot be dismissed as the work of outsiders.
Beyond these security concerns youth also expressed frustration with the
ideological battle between typically more liberal Islamic values in Jordan, on the one
hand, and the more conservative Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the south and DAESH to
the north, on the other hand. Numerous youths stated that perceived shifts towards
conservative cultural norms negatively affect their daily lives, citing religious or
conservative restrictions as factors in their wanting to leave Jordan. Notably, a handful of
youth declared themselves to be agnostic or atheist and felt that they could not be openly
secular in Amman, particularly since the fallout from the Arab Spring, which they feel
allowed radical ideas influenced by DAESH to spread via Facebook and other social
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A deeper exploration of young Ammanis use of and daily encounters with social media
is a potential additional extension of this research topic but was not central to this
particular project.
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media outlets. Several respondents mentioned that they think more Jordanians are
covering their hair now than in the past, and I also observed many Christians wearing
necklaces with crosses to identify their faith. Symbols of an absence of faith would be
harder to identify but would be jarring in a society which prizes faith.
Several respondents reported that new “DAESHI" ideas have gained traction, and
that people they considered friends had supported a nightclub bombing during a New
Year’s celebration in Istanbul in 2017, saying, “Muslims out partying deserve to die.”
Social media provide young people new insights into ideological battles raging around
them, but also influences cultural norms within the city. Again, these new geopolitical
pressures are layering on top of existing cultural norms, which I turn to now.
Cultural Norms
Cultural norms this generation struggles to reconcile are being fervently tested in
Amman. Before delving into the tensions between what are broadly framed as "Western
popular ideas" and "local” conservative ideas it is important to examine the concept of
youth from a Jordanian cultural perspective. Having lived in Tunisia previously I was
aware of the cultural practice within many MENA countries of socially requiring youth to
live with their parents until marriage. From my research before arriving in Amman, I
knew this practice is also widespread in Jordan. However, it wasn’t until I became friend
with Jordanians in their mid to late 30s that the full impact of such an extended period of
youth and the resultant waithood it creates that I understood the need to include a much
broader coalition of young people in my study. Bayat supports this expansion by calling
our attention to the very categorization of “youth” being a Western construction coming
largely from cities, which he argues needs to be denaturalized and understood in a
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particular context of Muslim youth (2009, 29). Bayat further advocates for studying
young Muslims as political actors through a culturally contextualized lens instead of
through a normalized Western lens when he states, “Due to a combination of the shifting
moral politics at home, and the processes of globalization, youth cultures are developing
in novel and little understood ways” (Bayat, 2005, 60). He follows up this sentiment by
issuing a call for researchers to engage directly with young Muslims instead of simply
writing about them.
Indeed, it is critical to distinguish between Western cultural norms in which a
young person is considered independent and often encouraged to be self-sufficient at the
age of legal age of emancipation, after schooling is complete, or upon finding gainful
employment and local cultural norms. Societal expectations for youth to “launch” into
adulthood in the West contrast with Middle Eastern values which dictate that young
people typically stay with their parents until marriage. Youth is often extended in this
context as young people would be breaking cultural norms by “launching” out
independently. Based on the definition of adulthood being contingent on moving outside
of the family home, Ammanis typically don’t reach this marker until they are married: the
period of being "young" can thus be quite long.
The frustration from delayed social independence is a known and studied
phenomenon not only in the Arab World, but elsewhere in the Global South as
globalization deepens economic and social inequality (Honwana, 2014). This issue was
discussed almost exclusively by my female respondents, as the male respondents stoically
did not share this intimate part of their lives with me per cultural norms.
Throughout Jordan many marriages are traditional and based on family
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arrangements. Among the affluent population, most of whom have travelled abroad,
arranged marriages have been steadily declining. However, dating is still often part of an
intricate system of open secrets, as it can be frowned upon, even in cosmopolitan
Amman. Nearly a quarter of my informants mentioned they had a boyfriend or girlfriend,
and while their mothers are aware of the relationship, they can’t tell their fathers. The
period of “waithood” in Jordan is increasing and is among the highest in the world as
men are marrying at age 29 and women marry close to 25 (Ajaka, 2014). In this societal
context it is very rare for a young person to leave their parents’ homes until they are
married, and marriage can’t happen until the potential groom has the financial ability to
both pay for a costly wedding and to obtain housing for the newlyweds.
While I didn’t specifically ask about personal relationships, this issue surfaced
when I asked, “What is the largest challenge for Ammani youth?” Notably, several
wealthy and western educated female youth shared intimate details of their sex lives with
me, but only after asking me to use pseudonyms to protect their family names. Both
covered and uncovered women spoke about the burden placed upon them by having to
preserve their family honor and several shared difficult stories of having to wait for
marriage based on family circumstances. Although my male respondents did not share
frustrations about their sex lives (or lack of) with me, cultural restrictions are a large
factor in this lack of forthrightness about these frustrations, and it is likely this is as much
of a source of tension for them as it was for the female respondents. However, since this
wasn’t a critical portion of my research, I did not employ a male research assistant to
explore this in greater depth. It is worth noting however that increasing periods of
waithood put additional pressures on young peoples’ intimate lives.
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These cultural norms are increasingly creating tensions as young people encounter
Western ideals of being young and dating in popular media. Jordanians are exposed to
these concepts not just through films and television, but also in person, as many middle
and upper-class Jordanians travel to the West for University educations. Many youths
talked about the difficulties they experience once they have had the freedom of living
independently abroad, but then return home to an environment where they are
constrained by society. Examining the layering of new geopolitical pressures on top of
these cultural tensions is the basis for my inquiry into young Ammanis’ daily lived
experiences and their perspectives about their futures.
ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS
In Chapter 1 I summarize the historical events which have created contemporary
Amman’s unique situation. In Chapter 2, I review the critical urban citizenship and
critical youth geopolitical literatures which frame my work. Then in Chapter 3 I outline
my methodological approach to my research. I present a cultural mapping of Amman in
Chapter 4 to detail how the three most dominant regions of the city add specific cultural
layers to youth’s daily lives. In Chapter 5, I outline how the city itself serves as a place of
exclusion within the shared mental mapping of Jordanian-ness. Specifically, I argue that
young people experience a situated citizenship based on historical geographies and multiscalar relationships. In Chapter 6, I focus on the impacts of increasing regional pressure
and decreasing opportunities which are compelling young people to decide whether to try
and leave Amman for the chance to secure their futures or whether they will stay and try
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to fight for their rights to make the city. In Chapter 7, I review Jordan’s original social
contract and how recent events have been testing the validity of this social contract for
Amman’s youth. Then in Chapter 8, I highlight transformations within the city which are
allowing youth to begin claiming Ammaniness as both an identity and strategy. Finally, I
conclude with opportunities for future research and my closing thoughts.
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CHAPTER 1
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Jordan’s history prior to independence provides important temporal context for
this study, situating contemporary Amman within Jordan’s larger history. In the first
section of this chapter I lay out Jordan’s exit from the Ottoman Empire, an act which
resulted in becoming a British Mandate. Next, I describe how the Hashemites forged a
symbiotic relationship with Jordan’s tribes (explained more fully in Chapter 7) during the
Mandate Period. Following the introduction of the Hashemites as Jordan’s ruling family,
I outline Jordan’s transition from a Mandate to an independent state. I conclude by
describing how Jordan’s transition away from being a British protectorate involved
America becoming Jordan’s primary patron. This history is necessary to understand how
Ammanis’ citizenship became situated, why the social contract developed the way it did,
and the choices young Ammanis are making now- whether they seek their dreams
elsewhere or contest the social parameters of being Ammani.
1.1 BECOMING JORDAN: EMERGING FROM THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Prior to becoming an independent nation-state, the population on the land which
would become Jordan was primarily a confederacy of tribes loosely controlled by the
Ottoman Empire (Rogan; 1994; Alon, 2007). Generations of men within the region
earned money by protecting pilgrims heading to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj. The
construction of the Hijaz railway obviated this job but did not lead to other forms of
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investment or development, as Jordan did not offer any natural resources. Despite being
on the margins of the Empire, Jordan was at the center of the Great Arab Revolt in 1916,
which precipitated the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Emir Abdullah (who would become
the first King of Jordan) was a key figure rallying Arab tribesmen into an alliance with
the British against the Turks (Frisch, 2002). While some soldiers joined as mercenaries,
others were motivated by the Hashemite discourse, which highlighted the king’s
purported descent from the Prophet Mohammed, and which emphasized the need for a
unified Arab nation.
After leaving the disintegrating Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I,
Transjordan became a British Mandate. Despite adopting the new name Transjordan and
emerging as a newly bounded state, Jordan was not a blank slate on which to invent a
new nation. Pre-existing tensions and differences between tribes living on the land before
statehood came to impact both the built environment and efforts to form Jordan as an
imagined community (Salibi, 1998; Alon, 2007). While the territory may have been
sparsely populated, historic power struggles between people living in and moving
throughout the country left lasting imprints in the building, governing, and imagining of
community in Amman.
Although Jordan is acknowledged to have retained a large tribal structure within
both the government and within society, there is a tendency in Western literature to treat
Jordanian tribes as a homogenous group. In fact, Jordan’s population has long been
diverse. Contributing to this diversity have been Circassians, who sought safe-haven in
the Ottoman Empire after fleeing Russian expansion the 1860s, as well as dozens of
distinct Bedouin tribes with large differences particularly noticeable between the northern
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highland tribes and southern desert tribes.
1.2 THE BRITISH MANDATE PERIOD - BECOMING THE HASHEMITE
KINGDOM
The early alliances between tribal leaders and the British were struck between
weaker leaders who needed patronage and external support to survive, while stronger
leaders stayed out of the government as long as possible. Alon argues that, “Jordan’s
creation is commonly viewed as little more than a strategy to serve British interests.
However, it is more correct to understand it as the evolution of a separate and unified
political entity as a result of both British imperial interests and the moves taken by
Abdullah in conjunction with important segments of local society” (Alon, 2007, 40).
Although weak tribal leaders aligned with the British primarily in the middle of the
country, powerful Bedouin leaders in both the north and the south of the country each
aligned directly with Emir Abdullah. This geography of tribal alliances highlights how,
from the nation’s founding, the base of support for the Hashemite regime lay on polar
ends of the country, while being noticeably absent in the central section, where the city of
Amman is located.
The high level of autonomy Emir Abdullah enjoyed partially stems from his
desire to maximize the expanse of his potential Kingdom to include Syria.
Correspondences and speeches show his intent to use Transjordan as a springboard to
establish a larger kingdom (Alon 2007, 37). Additionally, since the Hashemite family did
not originate in the lands of Transjordan, it was in his interest to define a Transjordanian
quite loosely, as his legitimacy was not based upon birth within the new borders. As
Winston Churchill gave Abdullah control of the kingdom for a six-month trial period, the
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Emir moved quickly to secure the loyalty of the tribes. What emerged from his initial
attempts to form a government was “two almost separate systems of government” (Alon
2007, 41). While the settled population was controlled by the state government along
modern lines, the semi and nomadic tribes were controlled by Abdullah under traditional
lines, thus exacerbating the tensions between these populations.
Lacking the financial resources to buy their loyalty, Abdullah instead wrote into
the constitution and governmental organization mandates for representation from each
tribe. This dismayed the British, who were shocked when Abdullah continued in his
Bedouin ways, eschewing the palace to live in a tent. While privileged governmental
positions were established for the nomadic tribes, they were also exempted from taxes.
This placed a high burden on settled citizens who were not proportionally represented in
the government. This division continues in Amman today and intensifies as large
numbers of Palestinian-Jordanians settle in urban settings and pay high taxes but have
less representation in the government. Meanwhile “Original Jordanians” continue to
enjoy the privileges of their forefathers, which are ingrained in the government.
Based on this nuanced mapping of the diverse tribal hierarchies (as seen in Figure
1.1) which outlines locations and regions based on tribal names, it is possible to
understand how Amman was marginal to the country’s power structure from the
beginning, despite its central location. This marginalization of the city is also seen in
official political discourse, popular imaginations, and literature about Jordan, which relies
heavily on idealized imagery of Bedouin tribesmen. The prevailing national narrative
erases the population of Amman, whose settled tribal lineage is elided by the notion that
to be “a son of Jordan” is to trace one’s lineage to tribes whose power resides beyond the
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city. In the Bilad al Sham 10 nations, this phenomenon is unique to Jordan as notable
families did not direct citizenship through cities; instead the royal family directly bestows
citizenship (Ababsa, 2011). Indeed, in-grouping and out-grouping which predates the
founding of the nation continues to impact the city today through an “economics of
notables” which, although well understood locally, is notably absent from literature on
the city (Alon, 2007 50).

Figure 1.1 Tribal Map of Jordan before Colonization Peake, Frederick G., and Henry
Field. History and Tribes of Jordan. University of Miami Press, 17, 1958.
As mentioned previously, scholarship about Jordan typically uses statehood as the
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The historical area north of the Hejaz including Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and
the portions of Egypt and Turkey which touch the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean.
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as the starting point with which to understand contemporary issues. This leads to the
mistaken “blank slate” analysis which scholars of post-colonialism, including Alon, apply
to pre-colonial lands. Yet, even with low levels of built infrastructure in Amman, the
tribal hierarchies which predated statehood clearly demarcated who could use, move
through, and had rights, to land. Alon explicitly traces the definition of in and out groups
to tribal differences between settled and nomadic tribes (2007, 33). This hierarchy
erupted in Amman when the British were forced to pay attention to Jordan due to
incursions from the Sauds to the South and threats from Abdullah to annex France’s
Syrian mandate. To calm these potentially destabilizing actions, they created distinct
government programs which were then capitalized upon differently by diverse local
actors.
These programs were overseen by King Abdullah, who had a clear preference for
nomadic tribes and himself was a “natural Bedouin.” (Alon, 2007). One of the
aforementioned major programs launched by the British was the creation of the Arab
Legion, which would later evolve into the Jordanian military, creating a military officer
corps from the sons of notable sheiks. Although the Arab Legion was a national program,
it further solidified the importance of nomadic tribes by giving increased military
authority to southern tribes, ostensibly so they could fight off invasions from the south.
This act built the authority of nomadic tribes far from the capital into the government
structure. However, even as British flags were raised and uniforms distributed, the
allegiance of the people belonged firmly to the tribes. The second major government
program created during this time was one of the primary practices of the colonial exercise
- the privatization of land. Tribes in the north were co-opted through the land reform

31

program which allowed large swaths of land to be claimed through privatization, as the
British did not want the northern tribes to continue to threaten Syria. Yet this seemingly
simple plan to co-opt locals by dispersing the lands in Amman and the northern parts of
Jordan to tribes was complicated by tribal differences, largely ignored in scholarship
about the city.
The Adwan tribes registered large swaths of land in the north of the country and
traded their former fully nomadic lifestyles for semi-nomadic farming lifestyles. They
partnered with the British-led Reserve Force (later the Arab Legion) for security and
were able to counter raiding tribes from Syria without needing to maintain large tribal
defenses. With the acquisition of this land, they also secured vast water rights (Alon,
2007, 30). Conversely the Bani Sakhr tribes, also located in the north, but closer to
Amman, took the opposite approach and did not align with the British. They instead
imprisoned the British field officer when he attempted to collect taxes. This regional
divide reveals the level of difficulty the British faced when trying to form a centralized
government “on the cheap.” Their efforts resulted in the north remaining divided into two
main power centers. The exercise of land privatization unfolded quite heterogeneously.
The British achieved the most success in trying to form a central government in
the center of the country, where tribes had existing agreements and tradition did not
permit raiding amongst one another. This group of tribes largely continued to operate
under the Mandate as they did under Ottoman rule. Identity as a new state of Transjordan
was an easy transition among these tribes trading in nomadic life for agricultural and
more urban life caused very little tension in and around Karak. Although no taxes were
collected in this area, the British were pleased with how well the transition from nomadic
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lives to settled lives went in this region. The moderate success which occurred in the
middle of the country gave way to near anarchy in the south. In the south, the Ma’an
tribes consisted of heavily armed and rugged camel herders. Like the tribes located in the
center of the country, this confederacy of tribes was devoted to defining and defending
their land. However, it must be stressed again that Abdullah’s preference for the Northern
and Southern Bedouin tribes is intertwined in the fabric of the government. Despite the
settled tribes receiving compensation in the form of land to align with Abduallah, the real
strength in Amman lies not with land ownership but with tribal alliances tied to military
and government services. Taxation on land in Amman is much higher than in rural areas,
yet in terms of recognition within the Government of Jordan, it is worth much less. This
disconnect has been studied by scholars exploring identity issues in Jordan but is often
overlooked in analyses of the city.
The period of loose British control, with less than 20 field officers occupying the
country in the 1920s and 30s, was soon replaced by a larger force that tightly controlled
the establishment of infrastructure and government institutions. A massive migration to
Amman from the desert brought the growing Transjordanian new landed elite into the
capital to conduct government business. These powerful Sheiks and Emir Abdullah
shared similar goals focused on maintaining control of large amounts of land and their
favorable tax exemptions, despite becoming settled. “Establishing law and order and
protecting the agricultural communities was the first priority of the government” (Alon
2007, 73). This converged with British goals, as a less mobile polity was easier to
control, count, and tax. Although some hold-outs resisted a settled life and abhorred the
idea of being part of a census, a severe drought, lasting from 1929-1936, decimated their
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population. Livestock who survived had little arable land and the few remaining tribes
were further devastated by a historical locust swarm that nearly erased their livelihoods.
Seeing their weakened and vulnerable state, invading tribes from Saudi Arabia raided at
will.
The confluence of these events finally caused the tribes to appeal to Amman for
help. The British responded by sending the Royal Air Force (RAF) to repel the invading
forces. To bolster ground defenses, they began appointing sons of prominent sheiks to the
newly formed Desert Patrol. This entwined the fate of the Bedouin with the fate of the
Hashemite Kingdom, and the generous salaries saved the impoverished tribes. The
process of controlling the desert tribes in Jordan was unique in the former Ottoman
Empire as it was done with very little violence. The resistance caved internally as tribes
saw greater benefit in unifying with the new government than trying to survive alone. In
exchange for their loyalty, the tribes received unparalleled privilege within the
government. This entanglement was paramount to the land program that the British
started in earnest in 1927, which lasted until the 1950s (Alon 2007, 126). This historical
review of how land was privatized, prioritized, and planned offers several insights into
how Amman came to be divided up prior to, and just after, statehood.
It is essential to understand the original national divides based on tribal affiliation
in order to understand subsequent divides in the city based upon newer social layering
and codified laws. Historically, the initial city residents were primarily people coming
from the collapsing Ottoman Empire, along with merchants from surrounding countries
(including from Lebanon) who worked together to build the city. However, following the
Circassians and other Caucasians who migrated to Jordan (in the 1870s), massive waves
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of immigrants have arrived in Jordan from Palestine (1948, 1967), Iraq/Kuwait (1991,
2003), and now Syria. These migrants have greatly expanded the population, size, and
socio-political diversity of Amman. Scholars have very little understanding of how the
heterogeneity of this increasingly cosmopolitan and rapidly growing city influences the
ways in which young people form urban attachments to place today. My research
partially fills this knowledge gap by situating their contemporary attachments to the city
within a deeper historical context. Indeed, as I delved into the geographies of inequality
in Amman, I paid attention to the historic paths along which Jordan’s minorities and the
ruling regime have traversed to arrive at the current construction of power.
1.3 CONCLUSION: INDEPENDENT BUT STILL RELIANT
Transjordan gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1946. As part of
the independence movement, Transjordan’s name changed to The Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan and Emir Abdullah became King Abdullah. The planning of Amman became less
of an Anglo-Hashemite project, and more simply a Hashemite project. While Jordan was
able to become a fully independent country, it has been reliant on foreign aid since its
founding. Although the British ceased to control Jordan politically, a large conglomerate
of external donors continues to support Jordan financially. In 1946 when Jordan gained
independence from the British, who were weakened from fighting in WWII, the cost of
employing the majority of Jordanians in the government required new support. Internal
support came in the form of “loans” from the patrons to the Amir who covered his
personal shortfalls when British allowances were not enough or subsided. These were
effectively grants and not loans, as it was known they wouldn’t be repaid (Rogan, 1994).
External support previously provided by the British now came from a variety of
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donors including the United States, international organizations (including the World
Bank and other aid agencies), and countries from the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC). A
major shift from British sponsorship to American sponsorship was complete by 1951,
when the Eisenhower doctrine went into effect and the US began giving Jordan $1.4
million dollars of aid annually.
In addition to securing new financial support from outside sponsors, breaking
from Britain also required an anti-colonial identity. Massad argues that this new anticolonial identity was ready-made in the exclusionary new version of Bedouinism which
occupied the military, and which become the “true national identity” (Massad, 2001,
164). This exclusive national identity is partially supported by American military aid,
allowing the government to be independent, but remaining reliant on outside donor
support for financial support.
Outside support has also been shaping Amman's urban landscape since 1948,
when the first mass exodus of Palestinians crossed the Jordan River following the ArabIsraeli War. When the combined Arab forces lost to the Israeli army the subsequent loss
of Palestinian land resulted in many Palestinians fleeing their homes, forcibly and
voluntarily. Palestinians in large numbers sought refuge in neighboring countries
including Jordan and Lebanon. This influx of Palestinian refugees contributes to the
imagined geography of Amman as a divided city.
First, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) established Jabal
el Hussein Camp, a space just under a half square kilometer which has since swollen
from the original 8,000 refugees to today’s more than 32,000 registered refugees (AlHusseini, 2011). A secondary refugee camp was established in East Amman in 1955 by

36

the UNRWA and now over 50 years later it is still formally titled Amman New Camp.
However, it is locally known as al-Wihdat and plays a significant role in the popular
mapping of society in the city, as I outline further when discussing Amman’s famous
soccer rivalry in Chapter 6 (UNRWA, 2018). Wihdat is also slightly less than a half
square kilometer with a registered population of just over 57,000 refugees.
Both spaces were designed to be temporary housing solutions for those fleeing
violence, but who intended to return home when it was safe to do so. Although Jordan
was just one of the nations that absorbed fleeing Palestinians, when the West Bankers
settled in Amman, it reinforced Amman’s regional position as a space of refuge since its
modern reincarnation. Today UNRWA tents have been replaced by buildings which
conform to the Greater Amman Municipality’s (GAM) building codes requiring stone
facades; these structures are often built using informal methods of upgrading and
expansion.
The complex national and regional histories behind Amman's development and
bifurcation not only set the stage for young Ammanis' situted citizenship, but also
illuminate how the social contract in Jordan developed into one which currently provokes
many young to seek their dreams elsewhere.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW: URBAN CITIZENSHIP, YOUTH GEOGRAPHIES,
AND FEMINIST AND CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS
2. 1 INTRODUCTION
The concept of situated citizenship I present in this dissertation is based on an
integration of four related bodies of literature: urban citizenship, youth geographies,
critical, and feminist geopolitics. Situated citizenship conveys the complex simultaneous
belonging of people who live in Amman to the city and the nation of Jordan on one hand,
who by the virtue of living in Amman, need to on the other hand locate their heritage to
other locations outside of the city. This explanatory framework provides clarity for
understanding how Ammanis are culturally obligated to shift their performances of
identity based on the share mental mapping of belonging among Jordanians. While the
processes and performances of multiple identities play out across a variety of scales, my
work specifically examines the ways young people develop and apply their senses of
belonging and exclusion in terms of urban citizenship. The following sections address the
ways Ammani youth form their urban citizenship through daily political actions. I begin
by presenting an overview of how contemporary urban citizenship literature builds upon
and critiques the established literature on citizenship. Next, I review contemporary trends
in scholarship in youth geographies before discussing critical and feminist geopolitics. I
end with my argument for using these four literatures in combination, a new and
necessary approach to understanding urban youth in the Middle East.
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As an urban social geographer, I am examining the role of the city in the lives of
its young residents. This spatial lens necessarily incorporates an appreciation for the fluid
nature of place. 11 Amman in particular is a fluid location, due to large waves of migrants
rapidly transforming both the urban space and the urban culture. This dissertation
embraces fluidity by examining geopolitical pressures and their impacts on how youth are
claiming belonging and creating their identities within their daily lives and across their
broader communities.
Since simply claiming an Ammani identity is inherently a political act, any study
of young people strategically shifting their primary identities to best leverage their insider
status or decrease their outsider status demands incorporating feminist framings of micropolitics with youth geography. Following the work of Skelton (2010) and Benwell
(2016), I merge critical geopolitics with youth geographies to reveal how youth are acting
in inherently political ways which need different lenses than the state-centric nationalistic
focus of classical geopolitics. Further, foregrounding youth in the process of daily
resistance to their situated citizenship responds to scholarship that demands consideration
of youth as political actors instead of dismissing them as simply future citizens. By
combining these literatures, I retain a focus on the importance of place and everyday
spaces, while also incorporating youth perspectives and their spatial discourses on life in
the city. Indeed, young Ammanis participate in micro-scale political acts across local,
regional, and global scales. The city provides the spaces for the acts of inclusion,
exclusion, control, and resistance that play out in young people's everyday lives.
11

Dorren Massey argues against the concept of space as static. Instead she highlights
how places have multiple identities, are onoing processes instead of being frozen in time,
and are not clear enclosures, but are the spatial circumstances within which diverse
personal experiences occur (Massey, 2005).
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2.2 URBAN CITIZENSHIP
Critical citizenship literature emerged as a critique of traditional citizenship
literature’s narrow focus on the national legal definition of citizenship (Secor, 2004; Isin,
2008; Holston, 2008). Specifically, early theorizations of citizenship highlighted rights
and freedoms between the governed and their government within a clearly defined
nation-state context. In the last few decades, critical citizenship theorists have been
problematizing notions of citizenship by exposing the socially constructed nature of
national boundaries since borders’ meaning are imbued by society. Based on the social
construct of nationalism, they argue forms of citizenship based on social hierarchies need
further exploration separate from legal citizenship.
Literature on critical citizenship has proliferated with hundreds of articles and
books on different forms of citizenship: including post-national (Soysal, 1994; Jacobson,
1996; Feldblum, 1998), transnational (M. Smith and Guarnizo, 1998 and R. Smith, 1997),
dual (Spiro, 1997; Jones‐Correa, 2001) and multicultural (Kymlicka, 1995; Hooker,
2005). Contemporary circumstances of globalization and multiculturalism have inspired
this scholarship on new types of citizenship. Virtually all contemporary scholarship treats
citizenship as a perpetually evolving, non-linear process tied to both nation-states and to
current economic systems. While legal citizenship remains in crucial ways linked to the
territorial state, greater recognition that substantive access to rights and privileges which
are connected to race, gender, class, and places of origin is now being explored.
Hyphenated identities- like “Palestinian-Jordanian” or “African-American” require
understanding additional nuances of identity making than those based simply on a
singular bounded territorial space. Citizenship, in other words, is not a monolithic,
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universal category. It becomes meaningful through various forms of identity, through
membership in particular categories like race and gender (or tribe, in the case of Jordan).
Further, supranational group belonging in institutions like the European Union
exemplify the scalar dimensions of these process, as multiple overlapping memberships
exist within identity groups. Dependent on social circumstances (or desired goals) a
person could feel more or less European, or more or less of their particular ‘national’
identity. This critical turn recognizes that national identity is itself a social construct and
that while identity and citizenship are linked together, co-producing one another, they can
overlap, be in tension with one another, and also appear contradictory.
Both processes of citizenship and identity formation create senses of belonging
and exclusion but have amorphous borders based on cultural norms. Scholars now view
citizenship as extending beyond basic rights and responsibilities by including sociocultural identities that allow citizens to navigate social hierarchies with greater or lesser
ease. Understanding how people view themselves as they perform and claim multiple
layers of identities has become a fundamental element of the critical citizenship literature
(Secor, 2004; Isin, 2008; Holston, 2008). Critical citizenship brings both sides of the
citizenship equation into focus. Citizenship is, at one level, granted by a sovereign state,
but it is, at another level, claimed and negotiated by people in their relationships with the
state and with each other. The key point geographers make is that these processes are
grounded in the spaces of everyday life. The urban becomes the terrain on which people
claim belonging and membership and attempt to exclude others. Therefore, examining
urban citizenship illuminates not only how citizenship is imposed upon, or awarded to the
individual, but also understands citizenship as it is claimed/accessed individually.
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For example, in her groundbreaking work, Secor (2004) argues for viewing
citizenship as “logic of alterity” and as a set of discourses and practices translated
unevenly across social spheres instead of as just legal rights. Her work in Istanbul reveals
that people have fundamentally different ideas about what citizenship entails including
what rights and responsibilities people have to each other and to the national community.
As seen in her case study, people often have totally different understandings of what is
within the bounds of ‘citizenship’ and rights. These different interpretations of rights and
responsibilities typically emerge as debates around the use of urban space, and the way
people behave in that space. Secor’s work pushes us to new questions about citizenship
including: Is someone being more or less of a citizen by wearing a miniskirt or a hijab in
public? Should public parks ban homeless people or provide public spaces to them? Is it
legitimate for restaurants to serve alcohol when citizens may have religious beliefs
prohibiting alcohol? These basic questions about urban space become fraught with
meaning about who ‘we’ are and what our rights and obligations are to the state and to
each other.
This lens allows scholars to understand how diverse youth experience and
strategically apply both their “otherness” and their “insiderness” simultaneously while
creating their personal identities. In Amman this allows us to understand youth
performing their Ammaniness as part of both the insider and outsider group, depending
on their social circumstances. Among a group of Palestinian-Jordanians, being Ammani
is not exclusionary. However, among Jordanian-Jordanians, being Ammani could
indicate that you are not originally from Jordan, thus creating exclusion. Therefore, the
same identity would carry different weight/value/obligation, etc.) depending upon the
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context in which it was performed/claimed. These ideas are developed more in work by
others including Antonsich's creation of an analytical framework to understand belonging
(2010), Varsanyi’s exploration of undocumented citizens in the city (2006); and Lister’s
feminist approach to cultural citizenship (2017).
Geographers studying citizenship are also raising questions about the impact of
economics on urban citizenship and the use of public spaces. Variegated citizenship
implicates the process of citizens within the same political situation being subject to
different social citizenship based on their economic means, as they are afforded more
rights due to their capacity to invest funds in exchange for greater access than those who
are unable to contribute as much financially. This economic framing impacts our
understanding of social inclusion and exclusion across a variety of public settings.
Meanwhile the notion of space has been challenged by the concept of relational
citizenship.
Massey’s scholarship is at the forefront challenging us to think about how
relational accounts of space can be utilized in order to advocate new, normative and
potentially liberating spaces of political practice Massey (2004, p. 6). By looking at
young Ammanis who have not met their peers in other parts of the Arab World through a
relational citizenship lens it is possible to see how they can create a citizenship bond
which subverts the traditional geographies of citizenship.
Building on the notion of citizenship as a set of uneven practices and discourses,
Holston’s (2008) critical work in Brazil illuminates how urban residents resist the social
layering created by formal citizenship through constructing their own homes as spaces of
belonging. This “insurgent citizenship” focuses on the oppressed urban citizen who is
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fighting for equal social and legal rights through personal efforts to build informal
housing in the city (2008). However, in Amman belonging is most often situated by
claiming belonging to spaces outside of the city. Thus, building physical structures would
not help youth to advance in the social layers of the city, as the physical location within
the city is incongruous with identity claims situated in external sites.
Likewise, despite encouraging scholars to historicize citizenship as a form of
social control in the global south, the focus of Isin’s “Theorizing acts of citizenship” is to
ask, “who is the other?” in a particular space (2008). This enables us to understand the
spatial relativity of being “othered.” Someone who is generally considered an “other” can
actually be entitled, depending on the space in which they exist. This expansion upon the
traditional citizenship literature is applicable in many settings but doesn’t allow us to
fully understand the dynamics of Amman since the entire city is "othered" by the
collective Jordanian mental map. However, this key question speaks directly to Secor’s
“logic of alterity” since it examines the discourses surrounding who belongs in specific
social circumstances, and the fluidity of individuals’ actions to claim or hide their
identities. While the scale of the city is difficult to encompass, Isin (2008) argues that
locations within the city are better understood by asking whom is “othered” in a
particular space.
These contemporary theories of citizenship allow scholars to move beyond a
discussion of rights and into belonging based on multiple scales (Hobsbawm 1990;
Staeheli 2008). Additionally, scholars using a critical citizenship approach include
multiple theories about the role of community, evolving rights, and shifting duties.
Despite this richness and complexity, one commonality running throughout this
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contemporary body of theoretical work is an examination of how the intersection of
power, politics, and identity works to enable or to prevent people from accessing their
rights and claiming belonging. Another consistent theme among this body of literature is
a discussion of the contestation around what counts as a ‘right’ and what constitutes
belonging in the first place.
Citizenship creates a formal status which officially recognizes and defines
belonging, identity, rights, and responsibility. It also distinguishes between insider status
for those who have been given formal citizenship and outsider status for those who lack
that formal status. Harvey’s “Rights to the City” theory pushes the "us versus them"
dichotomy by interrogating the level at which individual urban residents have the ability
to shape their spaces, but it has become a fraught term used by policy makers, activists,
and a diverse array of stakeholders (Harvey, 2008). In Harvey’s original conception, the
Right to the City was a call for people to stake claims to urban spaces instead of allowing
capitalism to erase the human element of belonging to and shaping the spaces within the
city. Critics fear that Harvey’s initial communal component of space belonging to the
people has been lost due to the popularity of the phrase as a tool of urban movements.
Citizenship inherently means being defined as part of a particular community. Yet
contemporary scholarship illuminates the ways in which a person may belong to multiple
groups which can overlap, contradict, and be used strategically. Furthermore, the
boundaries of these communities can be either amorphous or quite sharply defined.
Belonging is complex.
Benedict Anderson’s (2006) notion of “imagined communities” provides the
dominant framework for understanding how citizens who haven’t met and likely will
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never meet can share a sense of belonging to the same community group. Anderson
argues that a common consciousness forms between individuals due to the pervasiveness
of cheap and ubiquitous mass communication as well as the spread of capitalism. These
modern systems allow vast numbers or people to “imagine” themselves as connected to
others through a common language, ethnicity, history, and culture. While this allows
people to imagine themselves as Jordanian on the one hand, it also allows them to belong
to the imagined communities of: global youth, Muslims, Christians, tribal members,
and/or Arabs. This emphasis on (or access) to the “imagined community” expanded
citizenship scholarship in multiple directions.
Other scholars moved from studying citizenship as part of particular political and
legal groups to a more personal and intimate understanding of citizenship, which impacts
individuals in their daily lives as they move through the city. Critical scholars interrogate
citizenship through the lens of daily life, including a focus on the “ordinary” through
ways “laws and social norms are entwined with the routine practices of daily lives”
(Staeheli, 2012, 5). For Ammani youth it is normal to claim belonging to a place they are
unlikely to ever see.
For my research this raises questions about the normalization of socially being
obligated to belong to places outside of young peoples’ daily lives. The social norms
which dictate tribal youth living in Amman must travel to their tribal seat to vote
structures and informs how they perceive and feel their routine practices of daily life.
Their daily home is excluded from this civic practice. Likewise, Palestinian-Jordanian
youth for whom the social norm is to talk about ‘the right to return’ to a place they have
never been to are also impacted by the routine practice of their elders reinforcing the idea
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of someplace else being home, creating a daily experience of not being home in Amman.
Further examinations of citizenship through lived experiences include looking at “Spaces
of freedom” encompassing spaces online and public spaces like Tahir Square (Fahmi,
2009, 100).
A critical urban view helps maintain the fluid and shifting nature of identity while
creating opportunities for the resistance against a hegemonic national scale of
identification. This approach allows us to understand different ways of seeing youth and
how they use micro-political acts to express their citizenship in a variety of ways which
do not conform to governmental or dominant social definitions. These types of
scholarship require deep ethnographic methods to engage people in places where they
experience their daily citizenship in subtle ways. My project builds on this approach by
looking specifically at my research population of young Ammanis’ urban citizenship
through lived experiences. The following section explains how the social processes of
developing and performing multiple citizenships directly impacts urban youth.
2.3 YOUTH LITERATURE
This dissertation merges the insights of youth geographic literature, where an
emerging subset of scholars treats youth as geopolitical actors, with an explicit review of
youth geopolitical literature. Until recently, geographers studied youth as presumably
disinterested or uninformed about political movements (Skelton, 2013). Youth were
coded as future political actors who had little long-term impacts on salient political issues
(ibid). Skelton is at the forefront of pushing geographers to understand how the “liminal”
positioning of young people between legal citizens and juveniles makes them interesting
political actors worthy of study (2010). In her 2010 article, "Taking Young People as
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Political Actors Seriously: Opening the Borders of Political Geography," she reviews the
last ten years of youth geographic literature to draw attention to the link between feminist
geographers and youth geographers, emphasizing how this alliance is producing relevant
work on liminal spaces, caring, and marginalization from adult male institutions. She also
addresses the main critique against contemporary youth geographers that their work is so
micro-level that it has limited ability to be scaled up. My work follows her cautionary
prescription to avoid this limitation by looking at youth as local, regional, and global
actors.
Although most of the critical geopolitical scholars do not explicitly address youth,
their critiques of power production run parallel with the writings of youth geographers.
Youth geography is an expanding field with scholars working to complicate and expand
traditional concepts of youth framed primarily in Europe and America. While a separate
subfield labeled critical youth geopolitics is not yet fully established, similar
deconstructions of power and assumptions about youth as political actors have been
occurring for at least the last decade.
Skelton and Valentine (2005) illuminate how even projects focusing on youth
have an inherent adult bias. Scholars including Aitken enter this conversation to
challenge assumptions framing childhood or youth as a natural and established time
period instead of being a culturally normative and socially defined period (2005). Skelton
explicitly argues that the nascent sub-field of “youth geography and critical geopolitics
should be “mined” in tandem to produce rich veins of research and new ways of seeing
young people as political actors (Skelton, 2013, 133). She further advocates for pairing
youth geography with another strong subfield, such as feminist geography in order to
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strengthen the new subfield as it examines how youth access and use the city. New
geographies of youth scholarship are opened up by this feminist pairing including skate
parks, bus stops, and interstitial spaces underutilized by adults.
Instead of feminist scholarship, Benwell states his intention to synthesizes the
efforts of scholars bringing together youth geographies with critical geopolitics. The
abstract of his anthology states it will address how:
“Young people, and in particular children, have typically been marginalized in
geopolitical research, positioned as too young to understand or relate to the adultdominated world of international relations. Integrating current debates in critical
geopolitics and political geography with research in children’s geographies,
childhood studies and youth research, this book sets out an agenda for the field of
children’s and young people’s critical geopolitics” (Benwell, 2015,1).
A primary focus of this scholarship is on how societies are framing and perceiving their
youth. Rech (2014), for example, studies at how youth are framed as both potentially
violent destabilizers and as likely recruits for military service by state actors.
Globalization due to its role in connecting youth in addition to spreading social and
economic changes is the key lens through which multiple scholars examine perceptions
of youth (Katz, 2004; Aitken, 2005; and Ruddick, 2003).
Given the youth ratio of the MENA region, youths’ recent participation in social
movements including the Arab Spring, and their potential to determine the future of the
region towards either further democratization or towards further extremism, youth within
the MENA should be a primary focus of this emerging field of study. Although youth are
an understudied group, their thoughts and actions provide a provocative perspective on
the future of the region. Skelton’s review article of ten years of youth geopolitical
scholarship offers some insights into youth political perspectives. Notably she details
scholarship of the boundaries governments around the world draw around youth’s actual
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and potential agency with activism and citizenship (Skelton, 2013). Her insight on the
prescribed types of activism governments are willing to allow young people to engage in,
is reflected by a key informant in Chapter 7 who describes how many unemployed
Ammani youth are spending their idea time as volunteers. Just as Skelton, this key
informant questions the efficacy of these efforts since they are constrained by
governmental actions.
Instead of a clear academic shift, like the one I will outline between geopolitics
and critical geopolitics, youth geopolitics is evolving as a subset of youth geographies as
scholars incorporate critical analysis into their research. Scholars including Weller note
with excitement an increase in work on youth geographies is taking place across both the
Global North and the Global South (Weller, 2006). However, even with the excitement in
the field about the move towards more critical analysis, several scholars are calling for
more nuanced understandings of youth as political actors. Bayat argues that youth should
be studied as a distinct category instead of being studied as part of another research
project since their experiences and motivations are unique and valuable in their own right
(Bayat, 2010). Cole meanwhile states that youth themselves are trying to correct this
slight by writing themselves in as the subjects instead of objects of youth movements
(Cole, 2014). Evans concurs with these conclusions but pushes further to argue that
western framings of youth need to be complicated by the realities on the ground in Global
South settings which have different associated rights and responsibilities as young
peoples’ access to education, expectations around work/family, and community often do
not align with western youths’ experiences (Evans, 2008). Using more critical analysis
similar to critical geopolitics for studying youth opens up areas of research for different
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methodological and theoretical approaches including: citizenship, education, political
actors, religion, lived experiences and social hierarchies.
One such rich case study of German students protesting the US led invasion of
Iraq in 2003 revealed a vibrant multiscalar level of political awareness and activism in
youth. Hörschelmann partially attributes this to the particular history and cultural
memory of Germans who carry the legacy of their nation perpetuating atrocities in World
War II which they seek to prevent from reoccurring (2008). The impact of how societies
experienced tragic events such as war on the political psyche of youth is an area which
needs further interrogation to have greater understandings of and possible predictability
for future youth social movements. In a later piece Hörschelmann further problematizes
conceptions of youth resistance to the status quos via protests or political organizing,
which are often portrayed by powerful stakeholders through a skeptical lens of either
criminality or inexperience (Hörschelmann, 2015). She argues, however, that resistance is
actually related to a specific catalyst or cause which first engages youth with politics,
instead of a lack of experience. Although Cole is not a geographer, his work aligns with
the trend in youth geography to deconstruct the uneven power dynamics that marginalize
youth and youth political action.
Cole envisions youth in the Middle East as developing a mindset distinctive from
that of their elders through a confluence of trends, including increased literacy rates,
social media connections, and the willingness to protest against broken social contracts
(Cole, 2014). In this way he challenges scholars and political commentators who attribute
the Arab Spring either to religiously extremism or youth disaffection. For Cole, although
religion is one element of life for the “New Arab” it is neither a homogenous nor
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determinant factor which explains the political activism of the youth who participated in
the Arab Spring (Cole, 2014). Instead he is able to show how access to social media,
global communications, and increased global connectivity has allowed youth to challenge
authoritarian political institutions that were considered immutable. By combining an area
studies approach with what I label a "critical youth geopolitics" approach, he is able to
portray young political actors with political goals that are not only distinct from their
parents, but also from one another. Indeed, although the older generations in Tunisia,
Egypt and Libya, were seemingly resigned to life under dictators, the youth in these
countries challenged the status quo to topple the governmental order that once appeared
invincible.
While Jordanian youth only tentatively participated in the Arab Spring, they are
nonetheless part of Cole’s generation of “New Arabs” who became political to challenge
existing power dynamics. Overthrowing the regime was not the intent of Ammani youth
who participated: instead, they sought to reform the traditional and tribalistic systems
which marginalize them. Although they were not actively seeking the same types of
changes as their peers in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria who risked civil war, their voices are
still worthy of bringing to the fore as their desires are underrepresented. The ways which
they envision their lives differently than how their parents envisioned their own lives has
enormous significance for the ways in which region is changing.
Both Bayat and Cole contextualize their work on youth geographies in the Middle
East. In this setting, the dichotomy of youth as “future citizens” versus youth as they
currently are frames them as either future opportunities or current threats. Bayat refutes
the assumptions which imagine youth in the Middle East as more exceptional than in
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other parts of the world due to their religion, culture, relatively high education and low
unemployment. The authors in his anthology argue that even the concept of youth is a
new mainly urban and modern idea since youth traditionally worked at much younger
ages, and this new category of youth are facing unique challenges based on their location
and revised social roles (Bayat, 2010). However, his book contends it is the presence of
authoritarian or religious regimes that do not accommodate youth movements that affords
youth in the region more transformative power than youth in other regions with greater
inclusion. Cole adds his perspective to these authors by concluding that youth in the
Middle East are a generation which has been “awakened” by their increased literacy,
education, skills and technological advances over their elders.
Like Cole, Bayat points to the polarization among highly observant and less
observant religious youth as one distinction which needs to be made so that scholars
avoid the temptation to envision the youth of the region as a homogenous group. Weller
synthesizes these perspectives and concludes that the lived hierarchies which youth
experience are erased by their framing as “future citizens” instead of viewing them as
they currently exist (Weller, 2003). My research with Ammani youth provides a platform
for bringing their experiences as current citizens within social hierarchies to the forefront.
Unseen young perspectives on how regional pressures intensify Amman's urban physical
and cultural changes are thus the focus of this explicitly youth centered project.
2.3 CRITICAL AND FEMINIST GEOPOLITICS
In this section I first review the emergence of critical geopolitics as a distinct
subfield from classical geopolitics so that I can then apply a feminist geopolitical framing
to youth in Amman. The scale of geopolitics is problematic for my case study, but we can

53

better view the micro-acts of politics which youth in Amman engage with daily by
tracing the movement of geopolitics through its critical phase to the application of
feminist geopolitics. Classical geopolitics is the study of statecraft and the ways that
geographical space (topography, physical features) affect relationships between states.
Yet, when citizens of the Global South began to question the inherent “goodness” of
western capitalism and the policies of the US in particular, this framing was exposed as
problematic (Agnew in Dodds, 2013).
Scholars of critical geopolitics intervened in this post-Cold War moment to
deconstruct the naturalized assumptions of state power, shifting the academic focus
towards the exercise of state power through discourses (Toal, 1996). Before critical
geopolitics could gain resonance within the academy, it was necessary to decouple it
from the stigma attached to German, Nazi-era geopolitical theories (Dalby in Agnew,
2008). A foundational scholar of critical geopolitics, Toal was able to shed this
association by shifting the emphasis from the ‘great game’ of international relations to an
examination of the discourses created by the state in order to make sense of the world and
to exercise power. Prior to his seminal work, Critical Geopolitics, the state’s power was
taken for granted: Toal is credited with solidifying critical geopolitics as a sub-discipline
which exposes how states make power. This reveals how states’ narratives of places
reflected political motivations rather than static, geographical truths. Toal demonstrated
that the entanglement between state power making and geographic representations was
elided in traditional international relations theories. His post-structural approach argued
for deconstructing naturalized geographies to study how power is embedded.
The shift from a multipolar global political system to a unipolar political system
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did little to erase underlying tensions about the world order. While some scholars and
policy makers anticipated a smooth transition of democracy within non-democratic
nations, democracy instead ricocheted in unexpected ways based on local pathdependencies. I will be paying attention to how western inspired democratization efforts
interacts with the blending of minorities into the existing Jordanian social hierarchy and
how this impacts Amman's youth, a process which was explored through critical
geopolitical analysis of minority issues in Eastern Europe (Deets, 2006). In Jordan, both
democracy and the rewriting of the social contract have proceeded in fits and starts,
instead of the idealistic smooth transition political scientists envisioned.
Much attention has been paid to US/European discourses about the Middle East,
but Middle East states also produce their own geopolitical discourses. Jordan imagines
itself as a place of refuge and moderation in the Arab world and beyond. Three
generations of Jordanian kings have followed the political adage, “a friend to all and an
enemy to none” when framing its relationships with its neighbors. Ordinary Jordanians
interpret and act upon these geopolitical constructs by enacting their roles as providers of
refuge and peacemakers. However, in my interviews young people question their
capacity to affect larger geopolitical issues and often spoke about larger actors pulling all
of the strings. These alternative geopolitical concepts place Jordan in a more passive role
than in the active leadership role which the government seeks to portray. This is
important because it undermines the narrative the Government of Jordan uses to solicit
donations and external support from outside sources that rely on Jordan as a critical ally
capable of affecting regional politics. If young Jordanians eschew this role and instead
seek to leave Jordan to pursue other opportunities instead of embracing the responsibility
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associated with the government's framing of the country, it will shape the future of not
only Jordan but also the region.
The critical geopolitics scholarly perspective is highlighted in Frisch’s scholarship
about Jordan, which analyses speeches made by each of the state’s Kings. Frisch uses
these speeches to argue that the State discourse is one of intentionally “fuzzy” national
identity (Frisch, 2002). Frisch illuminates how the Hashemite regime used scalar
language to articulate their vision of their kingdom in a way that included part of the
French Mandate in Syria. Through speeches given by the Kings, as well as written
interviews, it is possible to expose how the boundaries, as defined by the colonial powers,
were smaller than the ambitions imagined by the Hashemite regime. The discourse of a
“fuzzy” identity served the purpose of supporting the expansion of the state (Frisch,
2002). This emphasis on the discourses created by the state and state actors aligns with
Toal’s focus on discursive power, since Frisch extends his analysis to include speeches
from the leader of the nation as intentionally framing the official discourse with nuances
absent from state documents.
Scholars (Agnew, 2004; Gamlen, 2008) following Toal grounded these state
discourses in local experiences and popular discourses, instead of just official discourses,
in order to highlight how peoples’ experiences, differ from official rhetoric. This shifted
not only the scale from the state to the local, but also the methodology from official
documents to unofficial accounts and ethnographic work in order to study how citizens
feel the impacts of geopolitics distinctly from how states enact them. Scholars using the
embodied experiences approach demonstrate how the city becomes segmented and
ordered through negotiations of power by connecting what is happening on the ground in
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lived experiences to larger state processes.
Therefore, citizens’ discourses, which envision wealthy enclaves of consumerism
as liberating geographic imaginations, are connected to global processes of neoliberalism
via state discourses (Al Rabady, 2015; Daher, 2008, 2013). Geographers seek to
explicitly connect these local experiences to the global systems instead of allowing them
to remain disconnected, in order to demonstrate the power that global systems exert on
individual lives. Instead of viewing the power which created and sustains the global
social order as a benign power which simply exists, scholars view it through multiple
lenses to understand the why and how that power is intentionally constructed. By
examining the parties who benefit from the established world order, and those with a
vested interest in fixing the global power system, scholars are able to investigate the
intention behind the system. They couple this exploration with an understanding of the
means for continued ‘othering’ to create a holistic view that clearly identifies the
application of global power, and its eventual impact on the individual.
Another non-Western nuance which could be overlooked by using only traditional
geopolitical framings is highlighted by Oudat’s critical examination of the importance of
tribal allegiances in Jordan. He argues there is a misalignment between official
statements made in the “Jordan First” program and actual local understandings of said
program (Oudat, 2010, 65). Although his scholarship starts with a state-centric approach,
he also focuses more deeply to understand how the official doctrine and program is based
not on identity or defense or the nation, but instead on loyalty to the regime and tribal
identities. He is able to reach this conclusion because his extensive study explores the
discursive themes in historical references to support his scholarship of contemporary
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popular literature which includes newspapers, opinion pieces, and published tribal
statements from jurgas (Oudat, 2010).
Studies of popular discourses illuminate the rich layers of geopolitical power
circulating in the lived experiences and imaginations of citizens, which are overlooked
when looking only at state power. One such case study looks at the comic book hero
Captain America’s transition from an idealized American hero who defensively uses a
shield when defending American ideals from Nazism, to an aggressor as a contemporary
icon who in a post-9/11 world morphs to fight the evils of Islamic Terrorism (Dittmer,
2004). Similar critical methodologies explore how local actors are impacted by popular
discourses. Likewise, Hughes deconstructs the popular discourses created and naturalized
by the British icon, James Bond, as he evolves as a symbol of an idealized British
nationalist masculine character (Hughes in Dodd, 2013). Both scholars illuminate
naturalized power that would be overlooked by the limited perspective of classical
geopolitics on official state policy and documents. Following in the footsteps of these
scholars, I ask Ammani youth their perceptions about society’s representations of
contemporary Middle Eastern youth in popular media, political discourses, nationalist
ideas, and in the global context.
In addition to these examinations of popular discourses, scholars within this
second turn in critical geopolitics also interrogate the local lived experiences in order to
expand understandings of geopolitics beyond the scale of the state. They accomplish this
by conducting extensive fieldwork including observations and interviews. It is through
this turn towards local, lived experiences that feminist scholars were able to closely align
with critical geopolitics (Peake in Dodds, 2013). The analysis of these scholars furthered
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the social justice component of critical geopolitics. Indeed, radical critical geopolitical
thinkers emerged in part by expanding on the work of feminist and queer theorists by
seeking to propose “an alternate world view- a geopolitical imaginary that paid attention
to questions of social justice” (Mercille in Dodds, 2013, 131).
An example of this new methodological approach is provided by Swedenberg
whose collaboration highlights several case studies in the MENA (Swedenberg, 2007).
These case studies use field work and research with local informants to produce a more
accurate understanding of local issues than the misrepresented theoretical conclusions
proposed by traditional geopolitical analytical with its reliance on official discourses. One
such case study involves examining the political tensions between Iran and the West by
directly interviewing young Iranians. This research challenges the one dimensional and
fictionalized political versions of the youths typically presented by these opposing
governmental powers and reveals young peoples’ thoughts and actions. Varzi’s
interviews and observations do not align with the official rhetoric and instead show how
young people negotiate their daily lives with depth and nuance. These findings reveal the
importance of speaking directly to youth within the MENA to avoid conceptions which
portray them as either very pious and vulnerable to radicalization, or conversely
extremely open to westernization and ripe for increased democratization movements.
Of particular note is Varzi’s work in Iran which opens offers new understandings
of youth in Tehran and their previously missing political perspectives (Swedenberg,
2007). Her ethnographic fieldwork reveals youth interactions with religion and the state
which do not fit either the reification proposed by Iran or the version proposed by
western commentators. As the UN positions Jordanian youth as leaders for their new
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peace initiative and radical extremist groups target youth in the MENA for their terrorist
movements, I am seeking to complicate this dichotomous political framing with nuances
provided directly from Amman’s urban youth. Although both Oudat’s examinations of
“Jordan First” and Frisch’s review of speeches by Jordanian Kings’ offer a starting place
for moving beyond official state power to discourses of power, they do not engage
directly with Jordanians to understand their lived experiences of these discourses.
The role of human geographers is to combine the historical and cultural
contextualization provided by traditional area studies scholars with a critical spatial
approach. Research can then be grounded to theory in specific regional locations in order
avoid conclusions which are either too universalistic or too particularistic. Geographers
are also contributing by conducting ethnographic fieldwork combining backgrounds in
scholarly literature with personal interviews. While youth in the Middle East are
increasingly portrayed by nations as either objects of fear or the hope for the future, there
has been little substantive ethnographic work to treat them as subjects. My research
contributes to multiple emerging trends in social science research by combining elements
of area studies, with social science approaches, in a place-based framing.
My research project in Amman follows this contemporary critical geopolitical
approach by conducting ethnographic fieldwork in the neighborhoods of Amman in order
to reveal how local lived experiences are coproduced within larger international systems.
Instead of focusing on state level politics and international relations, I will be exploring
how Ammani youth are impacted by global systems, which discourses they respond to
and engage with, and how they find meaning in or use these discourses to explain their
own sense of place in the city. While the terminology “third world” morphed into
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“underdeveloped,” "emerging nations,” and currently the “Global South,” normalized
political and academic discourses still imagine youth from the MENA as situated
precariously in the contemporary global order. My goal is to denaturalize these
discourses and provide a platform for youth to express how they actually situate
themselves.
Urban scholars argue that cities are critical spaces within which national identities
and feelings of personal belonging are created (Lefebvre, 1991). How ideas come to have
power not through the state, but through popular ways of thinking about who we are is
being explored through lenses including how citizens self-segregate based on socioeconomic status, religion, and ethnicity (Deeb, 2006; Galonnier, 2015). By intentionally
conducting my ethnographic work across all regions within the city, I am paying attention
to the multiple experiences occurring within the city simultaneously (Fregonese, 2009).
Further, by exploring a region historically bounded by a complicated interplay
between colonial power and tribalism, I seek to expand urban studies knowledge of postcolonial identity formation in cities to re-center our understandings of the power of cities
(Roy, 2009). Urban scholars also make the case for linking the city to regional processes,
for example as Fregonese does in her work on Beirut. She argues for examining local,
national, and regional processes of “urbicide” engaging with local identities of Christians
and Muslims while also connecting with regional Pan-Arab ideologies and nationalist
Palestinian agendas (2009, 310). Given my emphasis on youth as the subjects of my
critical geopolitical study, it is imperative that I have an understanding of how
geographers have approached youth in the past and how they approach them now.
Bringing the focus of geopolitics to the feminist framing allows me to investigate youth
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actions at a scale which they expressed themselves to me in Amman.
FEMINIST GEOPOLITICS
Starting in the 1990s, conversations between feminist geography and critical
geopolitics began increasing and the merger of these two strains of geography has been
aimed to fill silences directed towards an explicitly feminist geopolitics. Staeheli,
Kofman and Peake’s well cited book in 2004 synthesizes many of the scholarship seeking
to demonstrate the myriad of ways gender affects political processes including the
politicization of space. After critiquing traditional geopolitical scholarship for its failure
to incorporate feminist perspectives, theses scholars apply these perspectives to diverse
settings. Then they apply feminist geopolitical framings to other topics typically studied
by geopolitics including: nationalism, migration, development, international relations,
elections, social movements, governance (2004).
Following this collaboration Hyndman seeks to revisit feminist geopolitics by
examining the politics of body counts “us” (Americans) versus “them” (Iraqis) as a
feminist framing of seeing makes the connection between the intimate and the global
apparent (2008). Her work illuminates how certain bodies are made invisible by typical
geopolitical scholarship while also shifting the scale of these geographies to the
individual level. This scaling down of a major conflict to the individual level moves the
conversation forward to enable Dixon’s focus on micro-acts of politics (2016). Using
four complex objects of analysis, namely flesh, bone, abhorrence, and touch- which
represent her case studies of bodies crossing borders, the “afterlife” of corporeal bodies,
things which are globally deemed “wrong,” and earth with an emphasis on the monstrous,
she not only challenges traditional and critical geopolitics, but she seeks to highlight
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entirely new individual scales and geographies from a feminist perspective.
2.4 CONCLUSION: SHIFTING YOUTH IDENTITIES OF URBAN CITIZENSHIP
Middle Eastern urban youth are understudied and frequently misunderstood.
Individual theories have largely failed to grasp the complexity of their changing and
interconnected lives. Further, too few scholars reach out to meet youth in their spaces of
daily life. A greater understanding of this generation cannot be obtained unless we reach
out to hear their perspectives directly. Only with those perspectives can we theorize about
their political futures in more holistic ways.
While research that views youth as a central object of analysis offers some needed
insight into the lives of Jordanian youth, I argue that using an urban citizenship framing
and applying a feminist critical geopolitical lens offers a more nuanced understanding of
the lives and hopes of Ammani youth through their own voices. Interrogating their
understandings of how they fit into local, state, regional and global social, economic, and
political systems also extends my work beyond the typical regional studies lens. It allows
me to analyze Cole’s optimistic theory that youth in the region are no more susceptible to
the pressures of the “youth bulge,” which features a population which is both relatively
educated as well as underemployed, than their peers out of the region. The complex
phenomenon of youth in the MENA triggering political changes across the region in the
Arab Spring, as well as the proliferation of youth from around the world joining terror
groups based in the region, demonstrates that traditional approaches to understanding
political motivations and actions of youth in the region need to be equally complex.
Therefore, my study is intended to build upon the work of critical geopolitics by situating
my research in the emerging field of youth critical geopolitics in a region that is currently
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the quintessential focus of youth political actors.
Therefore, I operate under the assumption that Ammani youth are engaged and
informed about local and regional social movements. I also consider them to be aware of
their positioning within the city and have an interest in understanding how both the built
environment and contemporary social movements frame their daily lives and potential
futures. When living in Tunisia, just after the Arab Spring, it seemed as though politics
and the future were the only conversations people were having (other than football). This
was a reaction to having overthrown a dictator and to being allowed to speak freely for
the first time about these issues. In Amman I was to have similar in-depth conversations
with Jordanian youth through my volunteer work and the personal relationships I built in
Amman.
Thinking about this complex group, whose situated citizenship further compounds
their already precarious state (due to being located in the center of regional instability),
requires an extension of critical citizenship theories and a focus on youth as critical
geopolitical actors. Throughout my ethnographic study in Amman I situated my study in
the emerging field of what I label critical youth geopolitics, working to unsettle the
classical geopolitical focus on how states reinforce their power, by instead examining
how different youth in the city experience multiple discourses and daily encounters with
urban citizenship. Situated citizenship thus presents a provocative framework with which
to expand critical approaches to geographic research on youth.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
3. 1 INTRODUCTION
While my research is based on a qualitative study of Jordanian youth living in the
capital city of Amman, it also includes a series of interviews with older generations of
Ammanis and other key informants which situate this generation’s responses. During the
two and a half years I spent in the field, I conducted continual participant observation,
participated in neighboring activities, and built multiple friendships which furthered my
understanding of both the city and the youth. I also learned a lot from my daily
interactions which allowed me to notice and understand Jordan more deeply. I added
complexity to these observations with longer semi-structured interviews based on
snowball sampling and guidance from local academic mentors.
When research trends, current events, and new questions needing further
investigation arose I selected a sample of respondents from diverse backgrounds to
immediately check on their perspectives. Staying engaged with my interviewees
throughout my time in Amman was a tremendous advantage as numerous youths began
to send me unsolicited information in the weeks and months after we completed our
initial interview. My contacts with young people began through my volunteering.
As a volunteer with Hamzet Wasel (meaning link) I participated in youth events
including city clean ups, making music using garbage, skateboard lessons, and urban
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scavenger hunts. Rami Daher, 12 who joined the committee and met with me on a regular
basis during the two and half years of the study, and Raghda Buttros the founder of
Hamzet Wasel 13 were both instrucmental in my insertion into the field. In addition to
volunteering with Raghda, I supplemented my volunteerism by serving as a speaker for
the US Embassy Speakers Corps giving presentations about soft skills at Jordanian
University, German Jordanian University, and youth-centered NGOs. 14 The presentations
most requested during this time were on volunteerism, interviewing skills, and
scholarship opportunities.
This outreach facilitated access to the Princess Basma Youth Centers where I
conducted multiple focus panels. These focus panels were located in lower income areas
of East Amman allowing access to a population with whom it would otherwise be
difficult to meet. Additionally, I volunteered as an English teacher which further allowed
me to build my network of interviewees. My English teaching was facilitated through
relationships I developed at local coffee shops. After becoming something of a regular at
two neighborhood coffee shops I was given permission to post a notice advertising free
English lessons. Several interviews developed from my English tutoring. These activities
allowed me to both make contacts with young people and to help my community. My
neighboring and friendship activities, including the local book club I joined, also
12

Dr. Rami Daher is a practicing architect and the head of the firm TURATH which
designed several prominent public spaces in Amman and emphasizes public space as a
form of social justice. He is also an associate professor of Architecture at German
Jordanian University in Amman.
13
Hamset Wasel is a youth focused NGO which works to connect youth from diverse
backgrounds by using Amman as the site of their interactions. I volunteered in one of
their primary activities- a scavenger hunt program for youth in Amman to show them
other areas of the city and to introduce them to new youth.
14
Mojadadedun Youth Center was the youth center I spoke at most frequently and they
were instrumental in introducing me to youth in East Amman specifically.
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provided significant access to young people. This book club provided access to educated
women mainly from the upper classes of Amman. During these meetings I was brought
into an intimate circle of women, many of whom became friends. Since I was the only
non-Jordanian in the group, I felt particularly privileged to be exposed to their
discussions about life in Amman. My contacts within this group lead to key informants
doing research on economic issues and on entrepreneurism.
To add additional context to my observations, semi-structured interviews, and
focus panels, I also reviewed a series of local newspapers daily. I began reading multiple
Jordanian news sources daily a year before I began the study and continued this practice
throughout my research including during the time I was writing my results. These
include: Jordan Times, which is often supportive of the Hashemite Regime, Roya News
which has a strong online presence skewing towards social media and contemporary
events, and Al Ghad, a privately-owned newspaper which originated 15 years ago in
Amman. Reading these three sources daily allowed me to view multiple perspectives of
single events as well as gather information about events not provided in every source.
This chapter begins by outlining the preliminary research I conducted prior to
travelling to Amman. Next in my research design section I talk about what sources of
data I intended to collect. After I explain the research design, I lay out my data collection
methods. I then explain how I analyzed my data. Finally, I end by exploring my
researcher subjectivity and positionality.
3.2 PRELIMINARY RESEARCH
The inspiration for my research project came when I was living in Tunisia from
June 2011-June 2012. My time in Tunis was just after the Arab Spring and the air was
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charged with unknown and potential outcomes of their recent revolution. It was the
Tunisian revolution which sparked other regional protests against authoritarians and
underemployment that spread throughout the region. Young Tunisians in particular spoke
about feeling empowered by their actions but also anxious about what would happen
next. The mix of excitement and fear permeated and divided Tunisians. It was when I
lived in Tunisia that I first traveled to Jordan. The contrast between how young people in
Jordan spoke about the Arab Spring and how Tunisians spoke of it intrigued me.
Jordanians I spoke with during this visit talked about admiring that Tunisians
were able to overthrow their dictator, Bin Ali, but also immediately declared that Jordan
did not want to undergo similar chaos. Instead they universally spoke about wanting slow
and steady reforms instead of dramatic changes. This cautious perspective ignited my
interest and inspired me to want to further understand how this disposition developed.
Further discussions hinted that Jordan’s precarious geography in the middle of regional
instability (due to on-going conflicts in Syria and Iraq as well as tensions in Palestine and
Israel) and as the recipient of multiple waves of refugees from these issues were major
contributing roots of this response to the Arab Spring. After beginning my graduate
studies, the people of Jordan and their response to instability continued to stay with me.
Once I began my doctoral program, I immediately proposed that my dissertation be
focused on Ammani youth.
My preliminary research began in May 2015 when I arrived in Amman. I began
more formally conducting research that August. This is when I completed an independent
directed history course on the people of Amman and concentrated my urban geography
seminar project in the fall of 2015 on researching Amman’s modern rebirth. The majority
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of my semi-structured interviews and focus panels were conducted between August 2016
and August 2017. From August 2017-December 2017 I conducted supplemental
interviews with older generations of Ammanis to provide historical context to the
perspectives this generation of young Ammanis presented to me.
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN
Amman presents a unique case to investigate, based not only on its centrality, but
also based on the circumstances of its modern rebirth. As I outlined in my introduction,
when Amman was reborn in the early 1920s it was repopulated primarily with migrants,
meaning that urban belonging in Amman tests theoretical questions of place-making, In
this section, I present my two central research questions as I originally proposed them,
before outlining how direction from my committee steered me to add additional literature
with which to contextualize my study. The original research questions for this project
were as follows:
1. In the context of an expanding and increasingly heterogeneous population, how
do youth in Amman, Jordan perceive the role of the city (how space is defined
and allocated) on their identities and goals for the future?
2. In what ways do (post-Arab Spring and ISIS/DAESH) Ammani youth perceive
recent contemporary social movements in the region impacting their positionality
in local, regional and global social hierarchies?
After my proposal defense, I began revising the research design to include a focus
on critical citizenship literature. This led to the inclusion of Harvey’s “Rights to the City”
and to the concept of “othering” within smaller social scales. Of note, the complex
interplay between Jordanians of different paternal lineages was more easily understood
from a critical citizenship lens than from viewing the city through a bi-furcated
geographic lens which framed youth as being from either East or West Amman, as I had
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originally proposed it. Once I was in the field however, it became clear that although
there are universal generalizations about these distinct parts of the city, the use of critical
citizenship literature offered a more robust way to examine my data. Thus, my two basic
research questions continue to drive my research, but with additional literature and focus
on citizenship.
3.4 DATA COLLECTION
My fieldwork for this project was conducted over the course of roughly two and a
half years from May 2016 until December 2018. My longer-term participant observations
and longer relationships with Ammani youth were bolstered by more formal semistructured interviews and focus panels. The primary drive of my research was to gain the
first-hand perspectives of Amman’s young people- how they not only experience their
daily lives, but also how they talk about pressing issues including social and economic
opportunities as well as the impacts of regional instability with one another (Pryke,
2003). The goal of hearing how youth talk about these issues with one another is twofold. First, to limit my outsider status by being more of an observer of their interactions
instead of an authority figure in one on one interviews and secondarily to see how young
people present their perspectives to peers.
In total, I conducted 60 semi-structured initial interviews which were split almost
evenly among male and female respondents. I also conducted five focus panels with
youth from August 2016-September 2017. Two of these focus panels were exclusively
male, two were exclusively female, and one was mixed gender. After the phase of formal
interviewing, I returned multiple times to my respondents during the analysis and writing
phases of my project. In order to contextualize my findings, I completed 12 interviews
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and 1 focus panel with older Ammanis from September 2017-January 2018. From
September 2017-January 2018 while I was conducting my interviews with older
generations I also moved into the analytical phase of my research. Starting in January
2018 I began the process of writing my results. Although some of the interviews were
conducted in English, when the informant was fluent and expressed a preference or
explicit confidence in our discussion being in English, the majority of interviews were
conducted in Arabic. All focus panels were conducted in Arabic.
In addition to conducitng interviews, I also studied public discourses circulating
in various texts, a locally made film, a local television show, and some social media
reactions to understand both official and unofficial rhetoric. My discourse analysis serves
to highlight generational differences I have identified as well as to explicate how others
frame Ammani youth. While I analyzed multiple discourses from newspapers, I also
reviewed government speeches, and discourses circulating in the media that inform the
ways in to determine how youth are impacted by navigating in their daily lives numerous
“figured worlds” (Gee, 2014, 29). 15
Per university regulations, any research involving human subjects requires an
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval. To become IRB certified I completed training
on interviewing human subjects, submitted a copy my research proposal, and sample as
part of my certification. This training provided me with the tools to make my
interviewees feel secure while also securing my research notes. Due to the sensitivity of
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Gee’s “figured worlds” is a tool of inquiry used in discourse analysis to examine the
social rules and conventions of a specific environment which would not be appropriate in
other situations. In my analysis I explore two ‘figured worlds” of behavior deemed
normal and acceptable surrounding soccer fans and at the University of Jordan. Both
instances reveal behavior which would be unacceptable in other spaces of Amman.
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some of my research I gave respondents pseudonyms and my notes are labeled with the
pseudonyms (except for adult key informants, who gave explicit permission to use their
real names).
Throughout my interviews and focus panels I took extensive notes. The majority
of interactions were also recorded. A few informants declined to be recorded but did
allow hand written notes. For interviews and focus panels which were conducted
exclusively in Arabic, I used a research assistant in addition to taking notes and/or
recording the sessions. During the course of my project I used three different research
assistants as dictated by both the circumstances of the interviewees. If female participants
preferred female translators, then I followed their preferences.
Both the semi-structured interview process and my use of local research assistants
strengthened my data collection. Although Dr. Daher and I created a list of questions with
which I began my interviews, I was able to react and pursue additional themes which
emerged during the semi-structured interviews as I had the freedom to follow the
conversation and to instantly check and expand on places and words in local Ammani
dialect that I couldn’t follow on my own. Individual interviews ranged from one hour to
four hours and a half each. Two hours was the average interview length. Focus panels
averaged three hours, with approximately ten participants per panel. I made use of focus
panels when I wanted to ascertain how young people talked about their responses to my
research questions amongst themselves, instead of simply one on one with me as the
outside researcher. I conducted interviews primarily in locations which participants
selected, including: Jordanian University, coffee shops, private homes, and youth centers.
A few interviews were conducted in my home, since I had developed longer lasting

72

relationships with these youth through my work as their volunteer English teacher.
One disappointing development which limited my sample arose from my failed
collaboration with a youth NGO based in East Amman. Although I had obtained written
confirmation of my volunteer status before arriving, and even had a very promising
meeting with the NGO director upon arrival, in the end this relationship did not actually
materialize. The population in East Amman was the most difficult to access and if this
relationship had worked out as planned, I believe it would have enhanced my data. In
Chapter 4 on the cultural geography of Amman, I go into more depth as to why this
population was the hardest to reach: this community is a relatively closed community.
However, the NGO director was evasive and despite numerous attempts to begin my
volunteering schedule at the center, I was never able to actually serve there. This was
partially due to my outsider status, but also the result of the center having just secured a
substantial grant which they prioritized.
My first interviews began as a result of my own social connections. This was the
basis of my initial snowball sampling and produced slow and steady interviews one at a
time (Patton, 2002). The pace of my interviews picked up significantly after I gave a few
talks at the University of Jordan and the German Jordanian University. This produced a
larger group of interviews who were self-selected instead of referred by my contacts.
Despite originally wanting to focus on interviewing an equal number of youth from East
and West Amman, I concluded my interviews once I hit a general saturation point in
which I was no longer receiving unique answers, but simply variations of answers
previously collected. My work is thus not based on a quantitative representation of young
people from specific geographic areas. Amman is a large metropolis with a diversity of
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youth experiences, and I was able to speak with groups and individuals both I and my key
informants identified. Thus, although my total sample size is less than the 100 youth I
had initially hoped to interview, the data from this sample did reach saturation and does
provide a representative sample of the population of Amman. While the entire population
of young people cannot be reduced to the answers given by my informants, the diversity
of the responses I received present a broad sample with multiple identities, perspectives,
and socio-economic experiences being represented.
My study focused explicitly on youth born and having spent their childhoods in
Amman. However, it became clear during my ethnographic work that multiple additional
groups of young people could and should be interviewed for future projects. Those
include Jordanian youth in rural areas and immigrants who arrived in the city as adults.
3.5 ANALYSIS
Per ethnographic best practices, I transcribed my recordings and typed my
interview notes concurrently with my fieldwork (Maxwell, 2012). Additionally, I typed
my observations and field notes immediately after my interviews. I printed all of this data
and assigned numbers and corresponding pseudonyms to each informant. I then printed
all of the transcripts and organized them into a binder. Once the transcripts were in the
binder, I color coded key phrases and ideas. While my questions were fluid, I began each
interview with the same basic questions presented in appendix A to try and get to the
heart of my central research question on how Ammani youth are envisioning their futures
based on their sense of belonging in the city and their perceived ability to reach their
goals in Amman. However, I allowed the interviews to deviate to accommodate the flow
of the conversation and to react to new concepts.
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To code these diverse types of data I developed and grouped relevant data points
into key themes. I identified key themes based on recurrent issues which arose. Once
these were coded themes were aggregated, I transferred them to a large board to better be
able to visualize smaller subthemes, which also enabled me to use smaller and more
specific codes. Once the coded themes were posted on the board, I was able to identify
the four major findings which became the basis for each of my findings chapters: Situated
citizenship, Fight or Flight, Creating Young Neoliberal Citizens and Redefining
Ammaniness.
3.6 RESEARCHER REFLEXIVITY
Since my primary research focus as a qualitative researcher is to “understand and
describe social phenomena from perspectives of participants” it is essential to
acknowledge and recognize my own positionality (Glesne, 2011, 17). It is important to
recognize that my outsider status informed and co-produced my results. Particularly, as
an American, a mother, wife, and as a member of an elder generation, as defined by Arab
culture I am aware that power dynamics surrounding respect are a large cultural influence
on my interactions with young Ammanis. In addition, as a first-time researcher, a nonnative Arabic speaker, and a non-Jordanian, my research is imbued with outsider
perspectives which I actively worked to mitigate as I sought to get as close to "native
truths" as possible. I was mindful of and continued to reflect on my own subjectivity and
positionality throughout my research.
Upon arrival in Amman I enrolled in local dialect courses and immersed in the
community as much as possible to improve my ability to connect with my informants.
This period of entering the field also included weekly meetings with my local committee
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member, Dr. Daher. We reviewed the design, implementation, and analysis phases of my
research greatly facilitating my insertion into the field and lessened the impact of being a
first-time researcher. Still, I continued to be aware of my outsider status as I
experimented with putting the theoretical elements of my methods training into practice.
Despite working to position myself as close to local youth as possible, by building longer
term relationships, the knowledge that I would leave at the end of my study contributed to
my remaining an outsider.
My affiliations as a volunteer and a longer-term researcher in Amman provided
great advantages. As previously mentioned, being in the field for over two years enabled
me to develop deeper relationships with my interviewees, allowing me to gain increased
levels of trust and prolonged access to the same youth over and over. In addition to being
able to triangulate my results, check on new events, and to clarify comments by member
checking while I was still on location, these deeper relationships increased my
respondents’ levels of comfort with both my project and with me as a researcher.
Although longer term relationships didn’t nullify my outsider status entirely, they did
decrease it.
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CHAPTER 4
MAPPING THE CITY: EMBLEMATIC CULTURAL SPACES
This chapter provides the reader with a cultural mapping of Amman based on my
informants' descriptions of various parts of the city. This map should constitute a spatial
reference point for understanding the urban circumstances of young people living in this
much maligned but understudied space. While the boundaries of these spaces are not
fixed physically, and they often overlap and blur (notably, one of the spaces hasn't even
been built yet), this baseline is necessary for the reader to understand the ways young
people talk about living in, moving through, and using these spaces in later chapters. The
spatial categories describe relative cultural differences and similarities instead of precise
geographic locations. However, the descriptions of these spaces are part of Jordanians'
shared mental mapping of the city and its place within the wider country.
Thus, this chapter maps the city’s three current primary regions as various
dimensions of how youth discuss Ammani identity: East Amman, West Amman, Wast al
Balad (downtown) - in addition to a recently announced planned space. My selection of
these emblematic areas of the city is a reflection of the areas most referenced by young
people. They did not spend much time speaking about the cultural significance of the
more ordinary areas of the city unless we were speaking about their specific
neighborhoods. By understanding their interactions with and framings of spaces within
the city it is possible to interrogate how they are attempting to craft their own urban and
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cultural belonging in a city being deeply impacted by surrounding and destabilizing
geopolitical events.
Although my informants universally speak about Amman using these cultural and
spatial divides, and the intense wealth disparity between these sections of the city is
highly visible, maps of Amman that demarcate these regions are not widely circulated.
Parker and Ababsa created the only map reflecting the cultural division between East and
West Amman that I have been able to find. 16 I use their original map here but have made
two minor color additions to emphasize elements of the map that emerged as prominent
during my interviews. First, I added red circles around the traffic circles since youth
referred to their spaces frequently by describing locations based on these circles.
Likewise, I have added white and blue coloring to Wast al Balad to draw attention to this
region since it is one of the three regions I am outlining in this chapter.
The dotted line on the map below shows the rough cultural boundaries between
East and West Amman. As depicted on the map, Wast al Balad anchors the imagined
border between the eastern and western portions of the city. This border area is a key
space where people from across Amman’s socioeconomic spectrum freely mix both in
the Roman amphitheater and in the souq (market) area. Also portrayed on the map are
West Amman’s highend developments, exclusive shopping malls (including Abdali), and
the US Embassy, all of which inform the cultural placement of West Amman as elite and
modern. Notably, East Amman is instead portrayed with two transportation terminals and
one of its two large Palestinian refugee camps. These features of East Amman also
16

The map is based on Parker’s long-term project on Neoliberalism Assemblages and
Ababasa’s long-term work on how public policy impacts urban development. They used
on Greater Amman Municipality (GAM) documents as well as on ethnographic
interviews with Ammanis to draw the line between East and West Amman.
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contribute to it being imagined as more conservative and less wealthy.
Also, on the map are the numbered dawaar (traffic circles) starting downtown and
radiating out towards Airport Road. These circles are cultural reference points in addition

Figure 4.1 Cultural Map of Amman adapted from Ababasa and Parker, (2009).
to serving as physical references. Youth talk about living near a particular circle and also
describe places where they feel included or excluded based upon these descriptive
concepts. Directions in Amman are rarely given by street names or cardinal directions.
Instead they typically start out by identifying the nearest traffic circle and then proceed
by a list of left or right turns based on landmarks. Zahran Street is the spine along which
the numbered traffic circles run. 17 The traffic circles, or rings, start at first circle near
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downtown and then increase until reaching eighth circle in West Amman’s suburbs.
Mohammed, 20 describes the reaction he gets when he says he lives near seventh circle,
“People expect my house to be big and think that we have money. It is known that my
sister can wear shorts because of our neighborhood.”
Several key neighborhoods also have geographic titles which are used for
communicating about the space. To locate spaces which aren’t very near ring road or one
of the primary numbered circles directions are instead based on the jabal (hill) which
dominates the particular neighborhood. One example would be how I was given
directions to find the best baguette in Amman: "go to Jabal al Weibdeh when you are at
Dawar Pari (Paris Circle), look for the French Language Institute on the corner, and buy
your baguette from the bakery inside the institute". In this way both the hill and the minor
circle are used to guide people through the city. In addition to creating distinctive
neighborhoods the valleys between Amman’s hills also define Amman’s uneven
topography.
Untangling the cultural mapping of the city is complicated by the overlapping and
irregular layout of the city. Therefore, before discussing the cultural framework of the
city, I will provide further imagery of Amman’s physical layout. Below is a map which
locates Amman’s neighborhoods based on their proximity to the numbered traffic circles
and hills of Amman. The majority of youth I interviewed had difficulty placing their
neighborhoods on maps similar to the one below. However, once they told me the name
of a hill or circle, we were able to work together to approximate where they live since
these are the culturally significant landmarks. The cultural or land features are much
17

Known by expats as Ring Road, which refers to the traffic “rings” instead of a road
which creates a ring around the city.
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more significant than street names to Ammani youth.
Although the government has been trying to make the city more legible by
naming streets and creating uniform numbers for houses, these changes have not been
adopted as primary cultural ways of navigating or discussing the city. When I first moved
to Amman in June 2016 my street was unnamed and my apartment building didn’t have a
number. Yet locals could easily find my apartment based on the verbal instructions I
gave. In 2017 my street got a name, but by the time I moved in December 2018 it
remained more confusing to use the name which Jordanians didn’t recognize than to use
the traditional verbal directions. My building still didn’t have a number when I moved,
but that was less of an obstacle than if I tried to give directions using the new street name.
The neighborhood map below lists both systems used locally to identity areas of
Amman: by the traffic circle and by the jibaal (hills). Jabal al Weibdeh which I
referenced above is shown between Jabal al Hussein and Jabal Amman. Each of these
distinctive middle-class neighborhoods were originally built on a hill and now spread
along valleys connecting the different neighborhoods of the city. Moving away from
Wast al Balad west towards Airport Road are the more elite neighborhoods of Abdoun,
Sweifeheh, and Der Ghbar which are all south of ring road. The traffic circles become
more dominant cultural markers moving west away from the hills which are used to
discuss the areas closer to East Amman.
Before exploring Amman’s most prominent social spaces, I first explain how the
bifurcation between East and West Amman came into being. Then I outline Wast al
Balad (downtown), East Amman, and West Amman. After exploring these three primary
contemporary spaces, I discuss the Government of Jordan’s recently announced plans to
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build a ‘new city’ to alleviate Amman’s problems. Finally, I end by illuminating the
potential impacts the ‘new city’ which is being proposed could have on those young
Ammanis gaining pride and starting to actively embrace being from the city.

Figure 4.2 Neighborhood Map of Amman
www.orangesmile.com/common/img_city_maps/amman-map-0.jpg accessed 06/1/2017
4.1 BIFURCATED AMMAN: HOW THE DIVIDE DEVELOPED
Drilling down from Jordan’s history, which I discussed in Chapter 1, to examine
the history of Amman’s specific regions allows us to understand youths’ local
perspectives of place. Unlike other Arab cities including Tunis, Algiers, and Aleppo,
Amman’s bifurcation was not caused by the colonial presence of the either British or the
French. During the mandate periods both of these powers created a modern European
quarter while the preserving the old quarter for locals throughout the region (Home,
2013). In Amman, in contrast, the spatial-cultural divisions occurred as multiple layers of
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residents arrived to repopulate the city. Although the British controlled the
Transjordanian Emirate as a mandate from 1921, when the modern state was founded,
until 1946, the “Transjordanians had no significant urban tradition.” Thus, the land that
would become Amman was only sparsely developed and was under the authority of
nomadic tribes (Maffi, 2009). Amman was sufficiently dormant in the early 1900s to
warrant Maffi’s claim of a low level of urbanity in the area.18
The extraterritorial framing of Amman which created its’ residents situated
citizenship19 was cemented when the capital city was reborn during the British Mandate
period. Instead of Amman being an already established part of the Jordanian landscape
and within the tribal hierarchy, it became a place for “others” who arrived in the nascent
land of Jordan. Essentially, when the British and Emir Abdullah moved the capital from
the natural and established social capital of Salt to Amman, they were able to plan the
city from the ground up (Hannoyer, 1996). Other than the Roman amphitheater and a
smattering of commercial buildings nearby, the city was a transit point and not heavily
populated by native peoples. Although Amman is clearly the dominant city in Jordan, the
city required a rebirth and repopulation with migrants to become Jordan’s capital city.
Since the city did not have a highly populated historic core, colonial officers didn’t have
to establish a more modern and European inspired section of the city. Instead, Amman
was constructed based on conditions during the Mandate period. Thus, East Amman is

18

While Maffi’s conclusion might be contested in Salt or Irbid, which had relatively
more settled populations during this time-period, Amman was little more than an outpost
prior to the Mandate Period.
19
In Chapter 4 I define how being Ammani situates a person as both Jordanian and not
fully Jordanian based on social obligations to retain geographic connections to tribal
centers or other nations outside of the city which situate Ammanis citizenship lower on
the scale of Jordanian-ness.
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not the typical native and historic section of the city found in other formerly colonial
capitals. Likewise, West Amman was not built for the comfort of colonial officers.
The novelty of this bifurcation is that it is based largely on Amman being built
rapidly by a series of migrations – many triggered by regional wars – leading to it
becoming “a city of many hats” with a rapid succession of multiple beginnings instead of
a one-time planned division to separate locals from colonial citizens (Daher, 2011).
According to Shami, Amman’s unique history of being built by layer after layer of
trauma contributes to divergent urban imaginaries inspiring her to ask if Amman is, in
fact, a city at all (2007). In addition to the unplanned attributes of the city, she also points
to the lack of institutionalized nationhood in the city as underlying causes of the
amorphous lack of traditional city-ness in Amman (Shami, 2007).
Specifically, the waves of immigrants who arrived in the city and settled on
particular hills drove this bifurcation as noted by Ababsa:
“social disparities within the city continue to grow stronger between West Amman and
East Amman. These disparities tie in with morphological differences between informal
housing communities developed near the Palestinian camps of Wahdat and Jabal Hussein,
with their self-built buildings; and West Amman neighbourhoods with family-owned four
storey buildings, interspersed with villas and office blocks” (2010, 207).
The informal buildings which initially spread out from the Palestinian camps on
cheap land meant that this area of town was labeled as the lower economic area nearly
from the beginning of Amman’s reemergence. So, when new arrivals with money settle
in Amman, they flock to West Amman due to its much higher property values and
potential for higher-end developments. Schwedler posits that a person who is absent from
the city for years will still instantly recognize East Amman, but “Western Amman, by
comparison, is barely recognizable from year to year” (2012, 263). This conclusion is due
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to the constant building in West Amman as it drives towards more elite and modern
spaces.
The generalizations about the East Amman half of the dichotomy largely
characterize it as more traditional, religious, closed, and poor. But as with all
generalizations, this belies the reality that non-religious, and even quite wealthy people
live in East Amman (as described in Chapter 1). Still, East Amman has relatively more
traditional neighborhoods, almost exclusively Arabic signage, denser population, 20
increased poverty, neighbors who tend to know one another, and more conservative
dress. Meanwhile, the West Amman half of the bifurcation is typically spoken about as
being more modern, open, and wealthier. It is more common in West Amman to see
English signage, a less dense population, larger villas, gated communities, neighbors who
tend not to know each other well, and more liberal dress. Multiple informants described
these differences with language that resembles the description given by Sadiq, 31, a
Circassian Jordanian who referred to these parts of the city as “feeling like two different
cities or even two different countries” instead of one cohesive space or culture. Thus,
while living in East or West Amman does not define your Jordanian-ness, the experiences
of young people within these spaces can be felt in vastly different ways.
Regardless of whether East Amman or West Amman is being discussed, Daher
argues the entirety of Amman has been framed as an “extraterritorial space” to minimize
Ammanis of diverse origins for regime self-preservation (2008). He further makes the
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Since the regions of East Amman and West Amman are based on cultural norms, they
do not align with Greater Amman Municipality (GAM) districts. The Department of
Statistics does not have official population densities for these cultural parameters.
Calculating these numbers is an area of future potential research, but beyond the scope of
this project.
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call for scholars to examine the intricacies of this often overlooked but rich urban setting.
I respond to this call by examining three regions of the city which I selected based on
their being an illustrative region which instantly calls to mind particular socio-cultural
generalizations in Jordan. Of course the reality is much more nuanced and does not
follow strict borders, and to be clear, each of these regions has a myriad of exceptions
which do not follow the general concepts that I am about to describe. However, it is still
worth exploring these regions to get a basic framework for how Ammanis and other
Jordanians conceive of neighborhoods and spaces within the city.
4.2 WAST AL BALAD: THE SPACE OF CULTURAL INCLUSION
Although Amman is branded by many Jordanians as "less authentically
Jordanian" than tribal areas of Jordan, one district within the city is generally accepted as
"truly Jordanian." Indeed, marketing material for the city states: “To get to the heart of
Amman it is imperative to explore al-Balad, the historic downtown” (GAM, 2017). This
paradox of Wast al Balad 21 (downtown) being a site of true Jordanian Heritage, while the
larger city of Amman and her residents are framed as less Jordanian, provides an
appropriate starting point for our tour of the city. This also offers a visual landscape for
understanding how little impact the nation-state has on Ammani youths’ sense of self.
The shop selling both a Jordanian Red and White checkered head scarf and a
Palestinian Black and White checkered head scarf highlight how Jordanians from all
origins freely mix downtown area. Below that photo are two photos showing work being
done outside of a shop and a humble self-built stall offering lower cost goods. These

21

Or Al-Balad\Balad as the downtown is colloquially known in English marketing
material and among expats.
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Figure 4.3 A shop display in Wast al Balad selling both Jordanian and Palestinian head
scarfs. Author’s photo.

Figure 4.4 Tradesmen working outside in Balad. Author’s photo
Figure 4.5 Market stalls in Balad. Author’s photo
stalls welcome customers from all socioeconomic backgrounds as opposed to elite
shopping centers with exclusionary prices more common in West Amman.
While Wast al Balad abuts both East and West Amman, in the popular cultural
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map of Amman it is slightly more East Ammani. Balad spreads out from the wadi
(valley) itself and climbs the slopes of the surrounding jibaal (hills). Although the souq
(market) portion of Wast al Balad is less labyrinth-like than those in the Maghreb, the
heart of Wast al Balad is unmistakably a Middle Eastern souq (Abu-Lughod, 1987,
2014). The crammed stalls with vibrantly colored goods hanging from the windows and
spilling into the streets are the backdrop for vendors calling out prices to passersby.
Rising from the wadiaan (valleys) to the jibaal around Wast al Balad are multiple
staircases which connect the residents of the city, like the stairway in the example below.

Figure 4.6 Stairway connecting an upper and lower jabal. Author’s photo
Figure 4.7 Decorated road way in Balad. Author’s photo
Tucked into alleyways are traditional a variety of Arabic stalls and restaurants
featuring local cuisines. These range from the small kanafeh (regional cheese-based
dessert) stand, Habiba, which is reputed to be the best in the city (and which the constant
line attests to) to the ubiquitous smoke filled sheesha shops crowded by rooms of either
women or men. Wast al Balad is anchored by the Roman Amphitheater which is both a
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key tourist site for the city and a public space used by locals for concerts and other large
functions. When I first visited Amman in 2011, I was struck by the development of
modern city seemingly germinating from the very base of this ancient site. This
undeniably long-standing site thus combines ancient history with contemporary Arab
culture and offers not just a physical anchor for Amman, but also a mental one which
minimizes the impact of the Ottoman Empire on the landscape by connecting the modern
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to ancient roots.

Figure 4.8 Roman Amphitheater bordering Balad. Author’s photo.
While Wast al Balad is unique due to its Roman ruins and its sprawling markets,
it is also a rare place in Amman where all the youth I interviewed feel welcome. From the
colorful alleyways connecting hills to the decorated streets pictured above, downtown is a
place which works to attract visitors. While West Ammani youths typically reported
feeling they don’t have a reason to go to East Amman and that they feel excluded there,
they also report feeling comfortable spending time in Wast al Balad. A few West
Ammani female youths reported that they are forbidden to go to East Amman, but with
an escort, they are permitted to visit Wast al Balad. Likewise, while East Ammanis report
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that they can go to West Amman, they often lamented that they couldn’t afford to have a
good time there or that they feel be out of place there, so while not physically excluded,
socially they would feel like outsiders.
So, it is remarkable that Wast al Balad serves as a space of inclusion despite its
being culturally situated in East Amman, a space described as a “closed space.” In Wast
al Balad, socioeconomic status does not prevent the poorest and wealthiest from being
included and comfortable. Although I have heard expats and tourists talk about this space
through Orientalist eyes which label it with an edge of danger due to the narrow passages
and high energy crowds, Wast al Balad is not only open to tourists, it caters to them as
evidenced by the below reviews on the Western travel site, Tripadvisor. Reviews declare
the space as “the best place to recognize the culture of Amman” and where you “will see
the Jordanian culture.” Balad is also described as the place for tourists and locals to get a
bargain. While the message is a clear one of inclusion, by framing this space as
inherently traditional, representing “the Jordanian culture”, the authors of these reviews
(unwittingly perhaps) undermine the authenticity of modern spaces in Amman where
fixed prices and wider alleys are the cultural norm.
Understanding how Wast al Balad traverses the divide of being authentically
Jordanian within Amman, despite state attempts to exclude Amman from the national
identity, requires examination of the forces which situate and promote Wast al Balad as
Jordanian. Understanding these cultural forces provides a prism for understanding
Ammani youths’ dilemma of attempting to be authentically Jordanian living in the city.
Tourist literature proudly markets Wast al Balad’s ancient past by outlining its
occupants dating back 9000 years. These occupants were part of multiple civilizations
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Figure 4.9 Tripadvisor website https://www.tripadvisor.com/Attraction_Reviewg293986-d8094375-Reviews-Al_Balad_Downtown_AmmanAmman_Governorate.html
accessed 6/1/2017
based in the Bilad al Sham. Yet, Shawash argues that this literature and tourist
movements are largely US funded projects based on capitalist conceptualizations which
attempt to create marketable heritage disconnected from native heritage (2011). She also
frames Wast al Balad as a tool used by the Government of Jordan to combine pre-Islamic
Ammonite history with the Hashemite reincarnation of Amman, since it contains both
Roman ruins and Hashemite monuments (mosques, palaces, etc). Arguing that the
Hashemite regime is invested in and uses state power for both self-preservation and to
counter the threat of Israel by controlling the meaning of belonging in downtown, she

91

raises questions about the nature of belonging and authenticity in this space. While she
correctly assesses that much of the marketing of this area is driven by neoliberalism and
funded by USAID, I argue that does not negate the importance of Wast al Balad as an
authentically Jordanian space in the heart of Amman to Ammanis.
Indeed, many Ammanis asserted that Wast al Balad, including the slopes of the
residential hills fronting Wast al Balad, is authentically their downtown by aggressively
rejecting the official discourse and marketing of the Al-Abdali mega project as the “new
downtown” starting in 2000 (Al Huniti, 2016). The importance of Wast al Balad being
the true downtown was voiced so strongly that Abdali’s developers began dropping the
tagline of “new downtown” in 2015 and instead are now using the “New Abdali” tagline.
While the state continues to center Jordanian-ness in rural areas for political
expediency, initial concessions promoting Wast al Balad as an authentic Jordanian space
reverberate in the landscape of Amman and are felt through the city. The state’s attempt
to facilitate the neoliberal branding of a “new downtown” in the Abdali project via
significant state subsidies and the privatization of urban planning failed to resonate with
Ammanis who rejected the concept of a new elite project as their downtown.
Ammanis rejecting the relocation of the downtown to a newer modern space,
which they labeled as “foreign 22” reveals the impotency of the nation-state, developers,
and global capital to completely control the will of the people or to force a new affiliation
to the new identity of ascribed spaces (Daher, 2014). Instead Ammanis remain attached
to Wast al Balad as the place which contains their lived memories of inclusion in
Amman’s downtown. Downtown’s iconic arches, which are pictured above, cover the
22

The Solidere cooperation which is ubiquitous in Beirut is also the Abdali project
developer.
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Figure 4.10 arches above shops in Balad. Author’s photo.
souq and a street which is active both during the day and at night. Most Ammanis have
fond memories of spending time beneath those arches and those memories couldn’t be
erased by the development of a new downtown.
The power struggle ended with Wast al Balad - “the old downtown”- remaining
the only downtown. Instead of the economically conditioned Al-Abdali becoming the
“new downtown” and successfully rewriting the cultural map of the city, it is becoming a
distinct modern district with gated high-rises. Although Al-Abdali dramatically changed
Amman’s skyline, by adding new elite spaces, local resistance was strong enough to
withstand the state’s attempt to force this new geopolitical framing of Abdali as
Amman’s new downtown. As seen in the photos below, Balad’s humble street stalls and
informally constructed structures are not undergoing a formal process of gentrification or
reconstruction.
With the new investment shifting away from the historic market district, Wast al
Balad has been left to age and isn’t currently experiencing gentrification typical of other
downtowns. Instead, the city’s wealthy citizens have clustered in the less densely packed
West Amman or moved to the new urban sprawl most notably along Airport Road. This
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form of resistance to a project intended to modernize and redefine Amman’s skyline
mirrors the aversion to and nuances of nationalistic attachments youth expressed in my
interviews.

Figure 4.11 Bookseller in Balad. Author’s photo.
Figure 4.12 Pavilion in Balad. Author’s photo.
Examining practices of making meaning in Wast al Balad exposes where the state
led process of making spatial meaning initially co-opted an ancient space to imbue it with
a newer and specifically Hashemite meaning. Yet it also reveals how this same space,
once it was reoccupied, becomes a space of resistance in which cultural meanings are
made and remade to allow for a fluid space of Jordanian authenticity. The artistic graffiti
lining the alley connecting two hills in the photo below highlights the lived nature of
Balad. Additionally, the rooftops visible above the stairway in the first picture and above
the shop in the second picture reveal the more informal building style used downtown.
With this understanding of the varying attempts to make and remake meaning in Wast al
Balad as the background to our understanding of how the project of nationalism unfolded
within the city, I will now turn to another emblematic space of Amman. However, this
94

space doesn’t enjoy Balad’s reputation of being more Jordanian than Ammani.

Figure 4.13 Arial view of stairway in Balad. Author’s photo.

Figure 4.14 Housing area above shops in Balad. Author’s photo.
4.3 EAST AMMAN: A SPACE ETERNALLY LOOKING BACK
At the end of our interview, 24-year-old Ahmad noted, “I hate myself for
stereotyping, but I don’t know anyone from East Amman, they are too rough and
unrefined. If anyone in Amman joins DAESH, it is them.” Ahmad is PalestinianJordanian and is middle class. His comment judges Ammanis based on his perception that
lower class people live in East Amman and he believes they are not well mannered.
While all social generalizations are problematic and Ahmad himself expressed regret at
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reiterating this stereotype, it is part of a common dichotomy I heard from many other
young people. The imagined cultural divide stereotypes people from East Amman as
being from the "wrong side of the tracks," lacking refinement.
As noted previously in Chapter 1, several areas of East Amman were built as
rerfugee camps following war in neighboring Palestine and Israel which led to the arrival
of a multitiude of Palestinians in Amman. While the buildings have been constructed to
be more durable, the occupants have created a space which continually reminds the
residents of their duty to seek their haq al-awada (right to return) to Palestine.
Overcrowding due to the extremely dense population creates vibrant lively streets as
residents (primarily male) spill out of small apartments onto the streets to socialize in the
available spaces. 24 Unlike Wast al Balad this portion of the mental map of East Amman
was deemed by most of my informants to be a highly masculine and closed space. The
cultural mapping of both camps places them firmly as part of East Amman.
Interviewees repeatedly described these spaces, which no longer visually
resemble camps and instead blend into the fabric of the city (although they resemble low
income slums more than elite gated villas), as places where women must cover to fit in
and not be ostracized by their community. They were also described as neighborhoods
where people would label you an outsider and where you would be made to feel
unwelcome. The street stalls and spaces like those pictured above are more informal than
those in Balad. Vendors here are from the neighborhood and tend to know one another.

24

Youth repeatedly described East Amman as a hostile space to women who are expected
to stay off of the streets which are not meant for them to socialize. When I went to the
camp, I quickly discovered gender restricted streets. Although the souq did have a
‘women only’ row for intimate clothing, men were not restricted from other places in the
camp.
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Figure 4.15 Street stalls in East Amman. Author’s photo.
This space is where it was most difficult to schedule interviews. Most youth
proposed alternate sites for interviews, either in coffee shops, public spaces, or near the
University instead of inviting me into their homes. Since having a Western researcher in
their homes would be difficult, I met them at alternative locations. The skittishness of
these youth belayed a sense of self-policing which made them hesitant to engage
outsiders in their neighborhood. Likewise, people from East Amman proved the most
likely to back out of the interview process altogether, as multiple youth rescheduled our
meetings repeatedly before ultimately declining to participate.
The perception West Ammani youth shared with me is that they would be largely
unwelcome and treated like outsiders in the “camps.” Another common refrain was that
they simply have little reason to go to East Amman, unless they are looking for good
price on an item that is priced higher in West Amman, as there are no social spaces for
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Figure 4.16 Housing area of East Amman. Author’s photo.
outsiders to occupy in East Amman. In the picture above the informally built spaces
include spaces which are used for hanging laundry and working on repairs; however, no
one is out on the street socializing or selling goods. This would be a difficult place for
youth from other areas of the city to come spend time in without a specific invitation.
Female participants listed East Amman as the space of their greatest exclusion in the city,
including East Ammani women who stated that when the evening call to prayer rings
they are expected to go indoors. According to 22-year-old Ay’ay, “My neighborhood is
closed. I have to be indoors before the evening prayer! People in West Amman don’t
understand what that is like.”
Although West Amman has an overall higher distribution of wealth and is less
densely populated, it is incorrect to envision everyone from East Amman as from the
lowest economic status. While this is the common assumption youth from West Amman
conveyed, their elders were more careful to add nuance by explaining that some very
wealthy families stay in the camps for ideological and community reasons. Recent
scholarship notes that this a regional phenomenon as Palestinians in Syria, Lebanon, and
Jordan gain legitimacy from maintaining their spaces within their host nations in austere
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conditions which accentuate their status as displaced people who are suffering while
waiting to return home (Feldman, 2015; Gabiam, 2012).
So it is that improving the camps too much would be a betrayal of their roles as
the martyred, displaced people who deserve to be valorized for their commitment to the
Palestinian cause. While the camps are objectively overcrowded and less modernized
than West Amman, leading the Government of Jordan to be accused by some of
neglecting them, this surface reading neglects the will of the residents to maintain this
space as a temporary camp to preserve their cultural obligation to Palestine. While the
colorful stairways from my above pictures in Wast al Balad are intended to invite people
to come spend time, the extremely unadorned stairways below are merely utilitarian,
reflecting a mentality of not improving the space which is meant to be temporary. In the
second stairway, children are seen playing, but even this space is left unimproved or
undecorated.
Indeed, although it is common to see flashy signs of the nouveau riche in Abdoun
or in Dabuq (both areas which are known to be wealthy enclaves of West Amman),
wealth is also present in East Amman. I observed this while conducting an interview at an
orphanage in East Amman. During the interview, three different elite branded European
cars drove past the orphanage. Another generalization I heard from youth about those in
East Amman is that they lack sophistication and manners. Both men and women stated
that once East Ammanis come to “their” social spots they “trash” them and catcall
women. These actions make places like Wakalat, Rainbow Street, and the dragstrip
between Abdoun Circle and Taj Mall, contested spaces which West Ammanis say that
they abandoned once East Ammanis arrived.
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Figure 4.17 Alley in Wehdat Author’s Photo.
Figure 4.18 Stairwell in East Amman Author’s Photo.
This social layering divides the city between a society which claims they are open
and more liberal and a society which is described as more conservative and closed. East
Amman is a region which numerous people stated is neglected by the Government of
Jordan which focuses its energies on keeping wealthy and influential people happy in
West Amman. Yet, in these spaces, the sense of community is quite strong.
Meanwhile, West Ammanis spoke of not knowing their neighbors and wistfully
describing childhoods which were spent playing in the street with other children. Now,
children in West Amman are kept indoors to avoid unknown people and to be protected
from the increase of traffic, which doesn’t respect children playing. Despite East Amman
being generalized by youth in some derogatory ways for the way they perceive women to
be treated, or for an overall close mindedness which was considered backwards by many
informants, it was also admired for retaining a village feel where neighboring is the norm.
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The densely packed housing shown below gives insight into how people in these
neighborhoods retain the village feel to their community due to their close proximity.

Figure 4.19 Landscape view of East Amman. Author’s photo.
The identity which is prized and dominant in the Palestinian Camps of East
Amman is not the one of national and tribal origins, but of Palestinian origins. When the
importance of the camps was elevated by the PLO starting in the late 1960s al-Wehdat in
Jordan and Shatila in Lebanon and other refugee camps became the symbolic core of
“Palestinian nationalism” this politicization of remaining apart from the city of Amman
stalled the process of integration which the Government of Jordan had been pursuing
(Achilli, 2012). Achilli argues that the lack of participation in Jordan’s Arab Spring
protests by most residents of al-Wehdat is driven by the desire to reach a state of adhi
(normality) instead of being active political actors who are at risk of being double
refugees.
Yet, as an urban geographer I argue that the underlying reasons to avoid attaching
to the space of Amman means that clinging to an identity outside of the city is inherently
a political act. These actions have the perhaps unintended consequences of leaving a
capital city suffering from having a large part of its population seeking to emigrate and
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essentially disengaging from exercising their “right to the city” (Harvey, 2003). Although
Harvey’s seminal piece highlights those who live marginalized lives with little access to
or ability to change the city, in the case of those living in the camps of Amman, they
chose to only modestly improve their section of the city to at least partially to preserve
their status as Palestinians. The doors below show splashes of faded color, but also reflect
minimal improvements to personal homes. I explore this concept more in Chapter 6.
From the perspective of many people in the camps, Amman is framed as a
transitory space with home being in Palestine. In the camps, being Palestinian affords a
sense of belonging that often eludes West Bank youth in the rest of Jordan. Not all

Figure 4.20 Doors of Wehdat. Author’s photo.
Ammanis aslyn min Palestine live in the camps, but the population of the camps is
dominated by Palestinians. However, many Ammanis are in a similar situation by having
multiple allegiances, many of which are to spaces outside of the city and their desire to
return home have impacts upon the city. The resonance of the past is very present in East
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Amman. Although the pictures below show a bit of decoration near the mosque and
above the shopping area in Wehdat, personal homes were very minimally decorated as
seen in the stacked homes pictured in the middle of the three photos below. While this
topic was not a subject in my semi-structured interviews it was a perception shared with
me by Jordanian friends. Additional research would need to be done to ascertain if
politics is the only reason for this lack of improvement, or to what level poverty may also
be playing a role. Wehdat While East Amman is talked about and framed as a place
which is looking backwards West Amman is considered to be a place which is looking
towards modernity and the future.

Figure 4.21 Mosque in East Amman. Author’s photo.
Figure 4.22 Horizontal homes in East Amman. Author’s photo.
Figure 4.23 Street in Wehdat. Author’s photo.
4.4 WEST AMMAN: A SPACE LOOKING FORWARD
When Jordanians talk about “two Ammans” they are referring to the stark
differences between East Amman and West Amman. West Amman has been sarcastically
called “Jordan’s Paris” as it is so different from the rest of Jordan that it might as well be
103

a foreign land. If Balad is a space of inclusion and authenticity and East Amman is a
space stuck in time due to obligations of the past, then West Amman is a space racing to
reach the future. The images of West Amman below show a stark difference between it
and other parts of the city. From the modern high rises, to the glitzy décor, and neon these
spaces focus on luxury and modernity as seen in the images below.
Although the west is demographically older than the east, the west has more
services and a lower birth rate which is typical of regions with higher income levels

Figure 4.24 Courtyard in Abdali shopping center. Author’s photo.
Figure 4.25 Water fountain décor at the Boulevard. Author’s photo.
Figure 4.26 Palm trees lit with neon in Abdoun. Author’s photo.
(Ababsa 2010; Daher, 2013, 384). The relative availability of disposable income results
in the development of an entertainment scene not seen elsewhere in Jordan. This includes
many active nightclubs for drinking, dancing, and socializing. This nightlife is aimed at
young Ammanis who are well acquainted with and may have been educated in the West.
Modernity and liberalism are key markers of nightlife in West Amman.
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This became abundantly clear when I went to a comedy competition with a young
Jordanian friend in Abdoun. The cover charge included one alcoholic drink and
admittance to the “Good Pub” after the show. In order to get to the comedy show on the
second floor we passed through the dance floor and a jam-packed bar which was playing
American rap music complete with explicit lyrics. Based on music, dress, dance style,
and décor there was nothing to distinguish this scene from any nightclub in a big
American city. Upstairs the vibe was similar; however, local comedians bounced back
and forth between Arabic and English in their routines.
At the end of the night the winning comedian was awarded $5000 dollars in US
cash. Given that the World Bank lists Jordan’s per capita GDP at $2900 for 2017, this
winning is significantly higher than the average annual salary for most Jordanians (World
Development Indicators, 2018). It is nearly impossible to imagine this scene being
repeated anywhere else in the Kingdom other than in West Amman, due not only to the
large sum of money at stake, but also to the very Western setting of mixed male and
female company, alcoholic drinks, dancing, and overall extremely liberal activities.
During our interview in her home in East Amman Ruba, 22 phrased it this way, “In West
Amman they grow up detached from each other and our culture. I grew up playing on the
streets with my friends and they grow up going to gyms, summer camps, and then go to
night clubs when they are old enough. That is not our (Jordanian) culture.”
Indeed, West Amman is the epicenter of Jordan’s neoliberalism transformation. In
the place of tightly packed dense apartments of older parts of Amman, in West Amman it
is common to see spacious homes spread across leafy residential districts like the one
above. This area also features exclusive malls, high-end art galleries, trendy cafés and the
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Figure 4.27 Alleyway lined with greenery in Abdoun. Author’s photo.
Figure 4.28 Zain Circle Commerical center. Author’s photo.
aforementioned pubs serving alcohol. Noticeably, the shopping center above features
shops for elite consumption including ‘Laser hair removal,’ ‘Burger Makers,’ and ‘Pizza
Lovers.’ These sorts of goods and services are quite common of shopping centers in West
Amman but would be very out of place in East Amman.
Instead of traditionally and conservatively dressed clothing which dominates in
East Amman, it is commonplace to find people in western style liberal clothing in
neighborhoods from seventh circle and outward. Indeed, in Abdoun or Dubuq, women
are frequently in short sleeves and short skirts are common as well. Although many
Ammanis continue to dress conservatively in West Amman, young women still have
more freedoms. The picture below features a group of conservatively dressed women in
Abdoun; what marks this as a specifically West Ammani picture is that it is a group of
young women out at night who are socializing and not with their families. Further, men
and women can walk hand in hand on the street in West Amman- again a sight which
106

would not be possible in other parts of the city or indeed the country.
This second Amman reflects the concentration of relatively wealthy socioeconomic groups who settled to the West of the old city on Jabal Amman (Razzaz, 1996;
Hannoyer and Shami, 1996). Jabal Amman’s location to the immediate west of the
downtown established the trend of wealthy families moving further west as the city
outgrew its original spaces. Each time the city grew, the wealthy quarter has

Figure 4.29 Ladies night in Abdoun. Author’s photo.
Figure 4.30 Street in West Amman. Author’s photo.
Figure 4.31 A home in West Amman. Author’s photo.
extended further west resulting in higher land costs in West Amman than in the older
portion of the city. The first time I saw Jabal Amman I was struck by the mix of older
homes with high-end shops and restaurants. Compared to the newer sections of Amman,
Jabal Amman feels quainter, but still much more developed than East Amman. As the
older part of West Amman this neighborhood feels much more ordinary than the newer
sections of the city which are being built.
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Over a decade ago the commentary of four prominent urban planners notes,
“residential lands occupy the entire western and northern parts of the city, reflecting
larger residential plot sizes, more substantial buildings and higher overall levels of wealth
and social status” (Potter, 2007, 15). This wealth disparity is on display above both in the
picture of the tree lined residential street with the large single family home and the sports
car parked outside, and in the picture with the elaborate home on the corner. However,
since then the polarization has only increased due to newer migrations into the city,
particularly as excess funds from oil wealth began to be invested in Amman. A key site
of where this oil wealth was invested is the Abdali shopping center shown below. The
image on the left features the English tagline, “It is always sunny at Abdali,” while the
middle picture shows the clean, modern, high end shopping district named Abdali
Boulevard. Finally, the Abdali image on the right includes the English, “I love Jo”
advertisement on a wall above a shop with another English name.
The group of migrants shaping the city starting in the 1980s-1990s had markedly
different socioeconomic standings than prior waves, as these new arrivals began coming
from Iraq, mainly due to the Gulf War in 1991. During this period the “urban expansion
is about 45 km2, which represents a growth of 43%” primarily in West Amman
(Makhamreha, 2011, 261). Many of these migrants established themselves in Amman,
particlarily in the new developing area of West Amman since they frequently arrived
with the resources to purchase larger plots of land or single-family dwellings (ibid, 2011).
Daher’s framework based on discursive practices about these new neoliberal spaces is a
useful way to explore West Amman. Particularly relevant is his categorization of the new
developments as being marketed and discussed as both places of refuge and of
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Figure 4.32 Abdali Mall. Author’s photo.
consumption (Daher, 2013). The gated spaces of Abdali, Jordan Gate, and other enclaves
are discussed as places to escape the city and to dwell above the city and the masses
below, as encapsulated by the billboard below which uses an image of sky rises being
linked to opportunities.
This characterization is illustrative of the layering of the city which I heard from
young people who talked about how various socioeconomic groups use the city
differently. Distilled to the most basic terms, they reported that the poor use the street
level, the middle class use cafés, and the upper class use private spaces. Dana, 19
reiterated this economic layering of the city by stating, “my group is middle class, we
aren’t excluded anywhere in the city. But there is nothing for us to do in East Amman,
my Dad just told me to stay away from there and to go to the malls in West Amman, but I
could go there with a chaperon if there was something to do.” Despite emancipatory
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Figure 4.33 Advertisement next to Abdali. Author’s photo.
rhetoric, Daher argues that these new elite spaces will only continue to polarize the city
as economic disparity is further built into the landscape. Young peoples’ cartographies
are where their political consciousness are formed and their acts of politically negotiating
their citizenship play out.
More evidence of the cultural tensions inherent in limiting excusive spaces to
particular people can be seen in West Amman’s social rules which are applied in
commercial spaces. Throughout the region, it is common to have specific times for young
single men to visit shopping malls. Even in West Amman this is quite common as
security screeners regulate the entrances to shopping malls. These rules are meant to keep
different segments of the population separate.
A case study of how elite spaces resist being opened to mixed crowds can be seen
with the struggle against the GAM regeneration project in the Wakalat commercial area
of Sweifeheh (Daher, 2008). This project was an effort to create inclusive public spaces
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by closing the road to vehicle traffic and creating a pedestrian zone to serve as a free
public space for mingling. Benches, garbage cans, and new signage were all incorporated
to create a new space which invited people to spend time outdoors together. The specific
aim was to create an open “Anti-Mall Space” inclusively serving people from various
destinations and economic backgrounds by being a welcoming and vivid urban space
which could reclaim public life from the shopping malls and stimulated pedestrian life in
Amman (Daher, 2010).
However, shop owners soon expressed that the pedestrian area brought the
“wrong type of people,” instead of new clientele with proper etiquette arriving- they
complained that young people who weren’t spending money and had poor manners began
to occupy the space. 25 Despite the project being based on the premise of creating social
justice by creating free public spaces, the GAM allowed vehicle traffic to return to the
area in 2013 in response to the complaints of the business owners (Aljafari, 2014). Thus,
the attempt to open a public space in West Amman was rejected and the space was
reclaimed by elites. This physical transformation of a space in the city was then largely
undone because of social pressures.
In addition to the physical changes most noted in West Amman and in the shape
of the skyline as a result of the “bigger is better” style of building characteristic of these
new developments, cultural changes are also occurring. When youth talk about how they
used to play on the street with friends growing up, they say it with a bittersweet note. In
West Amman, the neighborhood feeling is absent. It is very uncommon to see children
out in the street playing and often neighbors do not know one another. Although I lived in
25

Numerous youth indicated that they wrong type of people are those without “manners”
who come from poverty.
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Abdoun, a neighborhood in West Amman for two and a half years, I only had the
opportunity to meet a few neighbors. Indeed, my building had six apartments and one
shared elevator, but I only met one family in my building during my time in Amman.
Practices of neighboring are vastly different now than when Amman had a village
feel. While older neighborhoods are portrayed as being stuck in the past, West Amman is
portrayed as not being rooted in the past enough. The imagery isn’t of a neighborhood
which lost the village feel, it is instead of a modern developed part of the city which was
born as a city and skipped the village phase. Although there must surely be streets in
West Amman where neighbors look out for one another, this is not the popular concept of
this region. Instead this is framed as the place where the wealthy lock themselves away
from their surroundings. The impression youth have of the upper class who stay in elite
spaces is that they are detached from Amman and can leave by gating off spaces which
are somehow less Jordanian. When claiming an identity that is specific to elite areas of
West Amman, the implication is that the luxury afforded by these addresses is being used
to portray someone as more global or affluent than typical Ammanis.
Further evidence of the changing culture visible in West Amman can be seen in
the signage. Instead of Arabic-only signs which are most common in East Amman, or
bilingual signs which are common in Balad, in West Amman status is sought by
displaying signs only in English and linking commercial spots to Western neoliberal
concepts (Hussein, 2015). Vying for customers are: toys shops with unlicensed images of
American cartoons like Mickey Mouse, high-end foreign fashion labels, and dozens of
American fast food chains including: McDonald’s, Dairy Queen, Popeye’s, and Pizza
Hut. Consumption is equated with status as evidenced by coffee shops selling drinks at 5
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JD ($7 in 2018) while coffee shops in other parts of the city charge less than 1 JD. For
23-year-old Shireen from East Amman, the prices are what exclude her from West
Amman. “I work in Abdoun, but I couldn’t afford to spend any time there. I go to work
and then go home; these prices are crazy!”
Despite West Amman being a space that is striving for modernity and rapidly
transforming along neoliberal lines, the government recently announced plans to create a
new city which is “smart, modern,” and planned in a way to avoid the problems so
lamented in Amman. While the timeline or indeed feasibility of this new city is yet to be
determined the possibility of a new city raises questions about how this potential new
space would impact Ammanis. In the next section I conduct a critical discourse analysis
on news articles announcing the new city.
4.5 TOO AMMANI TO BE JORDANIAN: THE NEW CITY
Although the planned new city is not currently included within the physical
geography of Amman, it is an imagined emblematic space in that it is portrayed as a
space to fix Amman’s systemic problems. To understand how the new city impacts the
symbolism of Amman I traced the government’s shifting discourse about the new city
through their successive announcements on whether the new city will replace Amman to
become the new capital26 or how the city will fit into the imagined map of Jordan.
Jordan’s plan to create a new capitalcity aligns trend within the Global South of creating
‘new cities.’ 27 Van Noorloos describes this trend as a:

26

Reports as to whether the new city will replace Amman as the capital of Jordan are
contradictory and appear very preliminary. Governmental discourses shift on this issue.
27
The term ‘new cities’ is part of ongoing recent academic debates, which understand
that the term ‘new cities’ is problematic as it erases what was in the space prior to the
planned city and it also a marketing term used by their own promotors. Hence, a brief
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particular urban form that is often assumed to emanate from such
neoliberal urban strategies and inter-referencing: the new city. These can
take the form of entirely new cities built up from scratch as
comprehensively planned self-contained enclaves in the outskirts of
existing cities…they are often iconic, themed cities, spectacular showcases
in the global economy (2017, 1224).
The promotion of ‘new cities’ as the way to fix entrenched problems within
existing cities is being done both from a North-South perspective and through a SouthSouth sales pitch. Morocco has emerged as a lead advocate for establishing ‘smart’
planned cities which will attract populations from cities riddled with systematic problems
driven by overpopulation and limited infrastructure. Of note Morocco is pursuing an
aggressive form of urban entrepreneurship by positioning themselves as ‘new city’
experts based on two new projects: Zenata Eco-City and Benguerir Green City. However,
Côté-Roy argues this leadership role is based on an imagined technical knowledge which
is beyond Morocco’s actual built reality, since both cities are in the early stages of being
built and it is unclear at this stage if their scopes will reach the vision of the urban
planners (2018). Her skepticism of Morocco’s positioning itself as an expert on building
new cities can be contextualized within the greater academic critiques of this trend.
The reality of building these ‘new cities’ has attracted other academic critics who
have dubbed ‘new cities’ as ‘urban fantasies’ (Watson, 2013) and ‘speculative urbanism’
(Goldman, 2011). Further scholars critique not just the process of building new cities but
the rationales which underlie these building paradigms. These ideologies have already
exploration of the term ‘new cities’ seems appropriate given recent debates on what
constitutes a city or how to theorize about the urban (Brenner, 2013; Scott, 2015). New
cities can be seen as part of increasingly complex geographies of urbanization which
challenge the urban/rural divide while also stretching our understandings of urban megaregions as they exist outside of the currently defined urban region but seek to bring the
formerly rural region into the urban lifestyle (Sassen, 2018).
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been subject to much criticism including the themes of: modernization with implicit
notions of ‘slum-free’ utopias (Cirolia, 2014; Grant, 2015), master planning based on
social hierarchies (Fawaz, 2014), displacement (Galonnier, 2015) and discourses of ecocities (Caprotti, 2014) and smart cities (Kitchin, 2015). Ammanis’ reactions to the
proposed new city have been also been highly skeptical, based on their own local
experiences of the overpromised but under realized neoliberal transformation of Amman
including the Abdail project. Abdali was initially billed as the “new downtown” but was
not seen authentically Jordanian by locals and developers dropped the use of being a
“new downtown” after much backlash. Further the promised public portions of the
project failed to be built and it has become an elite playground exclusive to wealthy
Ammanis and tourists, quite opposite of the mixed class clientele in the historic
downtown of Wast al Balad.
This skepticism is well founded based on the large number of the nearly 100 new
cities which “are still dreams in the heads of their planners, and for a number of them it is
very uncertain if they will ever be built or if they will remain PowerPoint cities” (van
Noorloos, 2017). Below I analyze several media announcements of this newer ‘new
Jordanian city’ to reveal how the Jordanian government's discourses about the project
shift. The first announcement of “new Amman city,” by the then Prime Minister billed
the new city as the country’s new capital:
Gov’t completes preliminary design for new Amman city
The government has completed a preliminary comprehensive design for
the establishment of a new Amman city, which is set to be the country's
new capital. We found the solution to address several pressing issues in
Amman; we will create a new Amman city. This project will be offered
for implementation on the basis of Build, Operate and Transfer next year.
The new city will not be attached to Amman.
115

The project will be constructed over five phases, new government
buildings will also be available in the city.
Ghazal, 2017 Jordan Times 10/23/2017
In then-Prime Minister Mulki’s first comments on the ‘new city’ he states that the
‘new Amman city’ will be the country’s new capital and lauds it as a separate city which
will solve several seemingly intractable problems in Amman. Despite this late October
statement by the former Prime Minister announcing the new Jordanian capital,
government discourses around the ‘new city’ change rapidly when the Mayor disputes
that the new city will become Jordan’s capital city.
A second article in November is highlighted below:
Jordan plans new city near Amman to ease overcrowding
“Jordan has announced plans to build a new city east of the capital Amman to ease
overcrowding and traffic congestion. Touted as "environmentally friendly, sustainable
and smart,” the new city would be built on a major highway that links Jordan to Iraq and
Saudi Arabia.”
New Arab on 11/06/2017
This article states the “new city” will be a utopia of development buzzwords but it
is not called the new capital. The new city aims to provide "drastic solutions to rising
population density and traffic congestion" in Amman and the north-eastern city of Zarqa
and would invest in "clean and renewable sources of energy and water treatment" as well
as provide affordable housing. This announcement carries several of the key development
buzzwords critics of ‘new cities’ have already warned about including: eco-city,
sustainable, and smart. Although the project is billed as a ‘drastic solution’ to Amman’s
myriad of problems, it alleges a utopia with clean renewable energy and water which will
be available in affordable housing. Based on the academic critiques of underlying
rationale behind these buzzwords and the bold claims to be a modern drastic solution
116

which somehow provides affordable housing this news report is not being taken seriously
by many Ammanis. Notably neither the term ‘new Amman’ nor any mention of this city
becoming Jordan’s new capital are used in this article which comes just two weeks after
the Prime Minister’s first statement about the city.
Comparisons to both the inauthenticity and lesser final built environment of the
‘new downtown’ Abdali project and to the government's failure to complete the bus rapid
transit (BRT) project are rampant. The BRT project has been advertised for 10 years but
has been beset by accusations of façade (corruption), little actual construction, and no
operating buses. These very visible failures leave many Ammanis doubting that the new
city will actually be built.
Another article in Roya News includes a large selection of Jordanian reactions to
the proposed “New Amman” all of which express skepticism of the plan. I have
excerpted seven of the tweets and public Facebook comments below the article.
Jordanians’ best reactions to the “New Amman” project
“Only their questions intensified on Saturday, after Spokesperson of the Jordanian
government, Mohammad Momani, revealed that only five people, excluding him, have
been trusted with the location of the planned city, which will not be attached to the
original Amman.
While we continue to wait for more details to emerge, here are the best (skeptical)
reactions to the upcoming project.”
Excerpted social media reactions from the above article:
1. “Five people in Jordan know the location of the New Amman city, while the
rest of the nation knows that it’s all but one big performance.”- ﺳﻌﺪ اﻟﺸﮭﻮان
@SaadShahwan88
2. “Is Jordan really THAT big for the government to hide its location from
us?”- اﻧﺠﻮد
@EnjoodElayan
3. “Don’t let the New Amman project make you forget about the imminent
increase of bread and other commodities’ prices.”أﺑﻮ ﺳﯿﺮﯾﻦ
@jordanian_voice
4. “It’s been 10 years since they said they were going to launch the Express
Bus project… those alive today won’t live to see the day the New Amman is
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built.”

وھﺒﻲ ﺧﻠﯿﻞ اﺑﻮ ﺧﻀﺮه
@84wahbiabokhadr
5. “Yes, a new Amman outside Amman without the Ammanis....” -Suhad
Suhad FB
6. “Why should the planned city be named Amman?! Amman is ours as it is.”
Sana Bushnaq FB
7. “I’m 30-years-old now: will I live to see the New Amman city?”- Zaid
Alfred
Dayyat @dayyat23 FB
Roya News 10/29/2017
This article highlights the popular sentiments among Ammanis that this
announcement is unlikely to produce change in their daily lives, and that it is a distraction
from more pressing issues, and the city would be a threat to Ammanis. Indeed, those who
think there will be a new Amman state that it would be an Amman without Ammanis.
They also argue that it should have a new name, as Amman belongs to them. These
reactions included not only doubts about the speed and reality of the new city, but they
also question the lack of transparency about the project and who the city will belong to if
it is built. A fourth article published just over a month later includes the Jordanian
government's attempts to address some of the public backlash to the new city:
High tech desert utopia rises from the sands: Jordan announces new mega-city built
among the dunes to overcome overcrowding in its capital
“A shiny new city is to arise from Jordan's desert over the next three decades, potentially
rivaling the kingdom's capital of Amman, a rapidly growing and increasingly unwieldy
metropolis of 4 million people.
This week, Amman Mayor Yousef Shawarbeh defended the rocky rollout in a meeting
with business people, diplomats and representatives of the energy and environmental
sectors, many of whom seemed skeptical.
'The topic hasn't been fully studied yet,' the mayor said when pressed for details. 'When
we conclude the studies, we will announce plans and have clear roles for government,
citizens, investors, and so on.'
Shawarbeh insisted that Amman would not be neglected as Jordan, buckling under record
public debt, shifts scarce resources to the new project. 'The new city is not a new
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Amman,' he said. But it is needed, he argued, to relieve pressure on the capital."
Inge, Mail Online article published 12/08/2017
In this article we see Amman’s Mayor is attempting to deal with the public
skepticism about the ‘new city.’ Although it was initially reputed to be a new capital and
labelled a New Amman, in this piece Shawarbeh is stating that the new city won’t be a
New Amman and is being built only to relieve the pressures and instability of the current
capital, not as a replacement. While the article notes Jordan’s planned ‘new city’ fits
within the larger trend I already identified, it also cites an urban geographer, Moser who
warns that Jordan should proceed cautiously with these plans as many other ‘new cities’
are encountering significant challenges. Additionally, the author notes that “This
perceived secrecy and 'top-down' approach has drawn widespread criticism.”
Few Jordanians have shown much enthusiasm, even among Amman residents
who complain constantly of the city's traffic. Some suspect the new city is largely meant
to benefit Jordan's powerful and their business cronies” (Inge, 2107). Given that the
article is written by a British publisher instead of a local or regional newspaper the
complete article takes the time to layout some of Amman’s history and also outlines
contemporary urban problems which contextualize the rationale behind building a new
city. Finally, a fifth article notes that the ‘new city’ will be offered to specific Jordanians
before being opened up to all Jordanians.
Plots nearby ‘new city’ to be distributed to civil servants, military retirees
“The government is looking into a project to distribute plots of lands to civil servants and
military retirees in areas adjacent to the new city that the government is planning to build
in Amman, a government official said on Monday. The plots of lands, located close to the
new city that scheduled to be built in Amman’s Al Madouna area, will “either be
distributed for free or in exchange for nominal fees in line with specific conditions”, the
official told The Jordan Times over the phone on Monday.
“Our objective is to enhance the living conditions of citizens and provide them with a
119

chance to own appropriate houses… The idea is also to reduce the pressure on Amman,”
the official said, noting that “the details of the plan to distribute lands will be announced
this year”.
The new city is planned to be a “smart and sustainable city that will be equipped with all
the needed infrastructure and services, adopting a long-term urban planning system with
a vision that leaves the door open for further future development”, according to the
government, which stressed that it will be financed and implemented in cooperation with
the public and private sectors.”
Jordan Times, 4/9/18.
Again, the key buzzwords of the ‘new city’ - “smart” and “sustainable” - are
featured in this announcement by the government. However, a new twist on the trend
emerges within the Jordanian context. Notably, members of the security forces are being
given the opportunity to either receive free land or to buy land at low prices where the
new city will be built. Since the public sector is occupied almost exclusively by East
Bankers from the tribes, this policy will allow the prime supporters of the regime to
benefit financially from the sale of the land on which the new city will be built. This is
tying the financial standing of East Bankers to this ‘new city’ in ways which they are not
necessarily tied to Amman.
Amman was intentionally minimized during the process of creating the new
nation of Jordan to elevate and secure the support of the local tribes. 30 The formation of
the idealized Bedouin elite results in Jordanians whose interests are served by not
affiliating with the city of Amman. Additionally, many forced migrants are also
continuing to affiliate with their sending nations. With the Government of Jordan
working to maintain attachments to tribal areas through voting, and with situated
citizenship being part of the national imagined mapping of belonging to Jordan, Ammanis
are only recently beginning to claim their heritage of being Ammani, nearly 100 years
30

Detailed more fully in Chapter 6.
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after the rebirth of the city. 31 It is yet to be seen how the growing population of young
people now identifying as Ammanis would be impacted by the demotion of Amman to
the status of a secondary city. While the history of Amman includes state actions to make
it an extraterritorial space of exclusion, the intensification of geopolitical pressures on
Jordan’s borders after the Arab Spring and the aging of refugee’s expectations to return
‘home’ are coalescing and potentially creating space for Amman and Ammanis to claim
greater belonging to Jordan. Although rural areas are still seen as the most loyal to the
regime, it is no longer in the best interest of the regime to foster an entire city of
disaffected citizens as loyal Ammanis are much less threatening than any Jordanians
supporting DAESH.
Echoing Jordan’s movement away from subjects and towards young
entrepreneurial neoliberal citizens via a hodgepodge of actors including INGO’s, Royal
NGO’s, Transnational Corporations, and a survival strategy of the Government of Jordan
instead of a top down state led effort like in the Arab Gulf (Jones, 2017) the effort to
create a ‘new city’ is also a being done in a decentralized manner. A similar potpourri of
actors underlies the government's strategy to build a ‘new city’ instead of it being an
organized state led effort specifically to delegitimize new Ammanis. Thus, my discourse
analysis of recent newspaper articles about the proposed ‘new city’ is part of the potential
future cultural mapping of Amman. However, in the context of young people claiming
Ammaniness I am now raising the question of what happens to those with newly formed
Ammani identities if Amman is replaced by a more advanced primary Jordanian city.
In particular, since plots of land are being sold to those working for the security
31

In Chapter 7, I argue that an emerging Ammani identity is a key generational
difference which emerged in my interviews.
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services, the hypothetical new city is being envisioned as another place where links to
tribal roots outside of the new city will once again be beneficial. By creating the ‘new
city’ as a place of belonging for native Jordanians before it is even built, Amman’s
positioning as a place of situated citizenship is still being reinforced. This is occurring as
young Ammanis contest the diminished place of Amman in the imagined social hierarchy
of the country. If citizens of the ‘new city’ are able to identify with the ‘new city’ instead
of needing to remain tied primarily to their tribal districts it is unclear how non-tribal
Jordanians will also be able to belong to the new city.
4.6 DISCUSSION: AHLAN WA SAHLAN (WELCOME)
In this chapter I outlined key cultural spaces with the city as reference points for
understanding how youth are impacted in the various spaces they live, work, and move
through in their daily lives. Although these spaces are not geographically fixed, these
areas do occupy particular cultural spaces within the imaginations of Ammanis. This
cultural mapping of the city is necessary to contextualize the next four findings chapters
and the interviews which those findings are based upon.
With our understanding from Chapter 1 of the historical reasons for the
bifurcation between East and West Amman and why the cultural divide is increasing as
Amman’s neoliberal transformation continues, it is easier to understand the
generalizations and misconceptions young people have about one another. The waves of
immigration which allowed the city to be rebuilt make it distinctive and serve as the
backdrop to the aspirations and challenges youth discussed with me. In addition to
highlighting this division, I also explored Wast al Balad’s unique place within the
cultural imagination and social interactions within the city. After exploring these three
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primary spaces I laid out the Jordanian government's shifting rhetoric around the recently
announced plans to build a newer ‘new city’ to alleviate existing structural problems in
Amman. This potential plan is problematic for many reasons, not the least of which is the
impact it would have on Amman’s emblematic cultural spaces.
Young peoples’ experiences of these diverse parts of the city provide necessary
context for my research questions about about their perceptions of the role of the city on
their identities and goals for the future. Knowing they must negotiate their urban
citizenship differently across these particular spaces in their daily lives raises questions
about how their ability to use the city impacts their desire to leave or remain.
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CHAPTER 5

SITUATED CITIZENSHIP: HOW GEOGRAPHY, HISTORY, AND SCALE QUALIFY
AMMANI YOUTH IN JORDANIAN NATIONAL DISCOURSE
“I was born in Amman and my parents were also. But in my grandparents’ stories,
Palestine is home. I have to wait for them to pass before I can claim my Jordanian-ness
so I don’t upset them. For them I use the Palestinian accent, but I can “pass” as
Jordanian by just changing my accent.”
Nayef, 24-year-old
Nayef’s quote above raises questions about how we study urban citizenship, as
contemporary approaches fail to understand his seemingly contradictory sentiment. To
better understand his statement this chapter explores the factors influencing the
development of urban citizenship and belonging among young people. Inspired by urban
citizenship scholarship that demonstrates how substantive access to rights hinge on
various identities (and modes of political participation) which do not map directly onto
the nation-state, I argue that we need to look at the scale of the urban/local/every day to
understand how citizenship becomes a lived reality. Even as urban citizenship allows us
to examine cultural hierarchies, the legal parameters of citizenship still fundamentally
impact youth since Jordanian citizenship is legally defined by Jus sanguinis (by blood
instead of birth) and is based solely on paternal lineage. Nonetheless, the critical turn in
citizenship scholarship away from legal parameters of the nation state and the rights,
obligations, and privileges attached to legal membership allows me to layer social forms
of citizenship on top of this basic legal foundation to address how Amman is both

124

minimized in the national discourse while also impacting youth living in the city in
important ways. These impacts are felt not just in the frequent conversations where youth
must situate their belonging to somewhere other than Amman when introducing
themselves, but also in the broader cultural and legal ways discussed in this chapter.
My work examines how the two components of citizenship- the legal and the
cultural - play out as situated citizenship for young Ammanis who must navigate both of
these spheres. By ‘situated’ I am referring to culturally mandated connections to other
geographies culled from familial pasts which are impacting youth not only in their
present, but which also have implications for their futures. The cultural obligation to
belong to somewhere else is both imposed upon and employed by youth as ways to
establish insider and outsider status. In this sphere youth strategically engage in ‘code
switching’ as they move through various social circumstances in the city. 32 This notion of
citizenship captures both (1) the formal nation-state status, since it constrains where
people vote, impacts University costs, and limits employment within the public sector;
and (2) identity, which remains a strong component since belonging and exclusion run
through the daily experiences of Ammani youth. In the citizenship sphere youth are
‘frontier actors’ exposed to cosmopolitan information motivating their behaviors and
informing their desires for mobility which then plays out unevenly based on economics
(Skrbis, 2014, 5).
While my work identifies social hierarchies navigated by youth in Amman,
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Code switching typically refers to when people selectively switch between two
versions of the same language based on their social circumstances, such as when Nayef
speaks in a Palestinian dialect for his family, but in an Ammani dialect socially.
However, it can be extrapolated beyond language to describe the intentional switching of
other behaviors as a social practice of building rapport.
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research on constations of citizenship (which produces new understandings of
citizenship) includes: Brazilians’ ‘insurgent citizenship’, which highlights how
marginalized citizens with limited access have been claiming rights through informal
housing and by mobilizing in the face of land conflict (Holston, 2008); moments when
regardless of status and affluence, people establish themselves as citizens through ‘acts of
citizenship’ (Isin, 2008); the ‘logic of alterity’ employed by Kurdish women in Turkey as
they experience being both the citizen and the stranger due to their positionality within
society (Secor, 2004); the struggle for urban residents to enjoy ‘rights to the city’ which
would allow them to not just live in the city but to shape the city in a way which benefits
their lives (Harvey, 2008); and finally the ‘do it yourself (DIY) urbanism’ of people who
build community gardens or construct other self-improvement projects as ways of
expanding their access to the city (Iverson, 2013). Notably, in each of these instances the
focus is on minorities’ resistance to inequitable social ordering enforced through
citizenship. However, Amman is an ambiguous space within Jordan, simultaneously a
site of exclusion and marginalization and also inclusion and belonging.
In Jordan the social group which would be traditionally considered second class
citizens is the Palestinian-Jordanian group. This is despite West Bankers being
numerically the majority group in the city. However, in spite of this they are not the only
group whose citizenship is situated within the national discourse by living in Amman.
Indeed, nation building processes (outlined in Chapter 1) in Jordan created the general
phenomenon of situated citizenship that places Ammanis’ citizenship along a continuum
of Jordanian-ness. Those in the city are still Jordanian, but they are located in a hierarchy
underneath those who can claim authenticity by linking to tribes or tribal areas in the
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imagined nation of Jordan. Due to the strong tribal system in Jordan, young people’s
senses of belonging are informed more by geography, history and society than legal
national status.33
As noted in the introduction, this chapter explores four interconnected themes of
the influences between historical geography and contemporary citizenship with regard to
how young Ammanis imagine their identities in relationship to others, or their places in
the worlds. The first theme focuses on youth having a sense of being Jordanian and yet
not purely Jordanian as a result of Jordan’s strong tribal systemvwhich places everyone
else lower on the scale of Jordanian-ness. 34 Secondly, I explore how paternal lineage is a
determinant of identity for Ammani young people. The third theme emerging from my
research highlights the importance of migration on building Amman’s character. Finally,
the fourth theme I explore in this chapter with regards to how young Ammanis discuss
their identities in relation to others is the importance of multi-scalar belonging among
Ammani youth.
I describe each of these themes in a separate section below. After interrogating
each of my four major themes, I extend the historical narrative from the first chapter to
connect these themes to contemporary events. I examine why Ammani youth are reacting
to nationalist trends unfolding in the global north in ways which appear counterintuitive
due to the geopolitical pressures on Jordan. These responses become more
33

The strength of Jordan’s government has been attributed to the creation of hybrid
government which overlaid state systems onto existing tribal structures (Alon, 2007).
34
Jordan’s tribal system cuts across all socio-economic layers of the country. It is
common to see contemporary modern tribal members living in expensive homes common
in any major urban city and driving expensive cars. Likewise, tribal members who are the
backbone of the public sector occupy a large percentage of the lower and middle class in
Jordan. Tribal affiliation is a system of using last names to further a social hierarchy and
does not determine modernity, education, or class.
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understandable after examining how contemporary understandings of history condition
contemporary citizenship. By understanding this historical conditioning, it is possible to
better understand how young Ammanis understand belonging.
5.1 JORDANIAN IDENTITY AND TRIBAL ROOTS: DECENTERING THE
CONCEPT OF NATIONALISM IN JORDAN
Cities are not passive spaces, they are an active space through which people create
and contest identities, form community, and impose/reject social orders and hierarchies.
Cities thus actively contribute to the formation of identities. An important dimension of
urban identity is the relationship to national space. Jordan is often dismissed as a modern
construct without natural borders that would not have become a nation without western
interference. However, since the first King of Jordan rose to the throne, the government
has sought to create a group identity of Jordanian people loyal to the Hashemites. Jordan
is a complicated space in which to attempt to create a unified imagined community, as so
many people have come to Jordan as refugees with their own pre-existing national
imaginaries. My research delves into this complexity by examining the role of
nationalism in belonging in Amman.
Indeed, my study of urban youth challenges western scholars who emphasize a
primary role of the nation-state in determining how young people think of themselves in
the context of their feeling of citizenship and belonging. Neither of the two leading
schools of nationalist thought: (1) the primordial approach which views the nation as an
unchangeable group of people based on shared linguistic, cultural, and historical legacies;
nor the (2) modernist approach which focuses on the nation-state as a primary unifying
source of identity with shared citizenship rights and responsibilities, effectively addresses
how nationalism unfolded in the MENA. The abrupt disbanding of the Ottoman Empire
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and the formation of heterogeneous nations into new nation-states designed by the
European imperial powers simply require different perspectives than the concept of
shared ancient roots which generate a bottom up formation of a national identity.
Likewise, the approach of modernists who envision a contract between the state
and the nation which encompasses a negotiated identity is ill-suited to the imposed states
and rulers who suffered challenges to their legitimacy. Colonial powers actively worked
to implant national identities, which were only partially founded on history. They also
created borders incongruent with linguistic or ethnic divisions. Anderson’s discursive
analysis of the imagined community is rooted in South East Asia, and has less
applicability with regard to nationalist movements of the MENA, which feature
simultaneously layered and often contradictory identities. Another striking feature of
nationalism elided by the focus on the culturally negotiated nature of national identity is
the emergence of powerful dictators whose imprints on national personalities are difficult
to comprehend fully with the scant attention that modernist theory pays to the role of the
state. Several scholars who focus on the region identify weaknesses of traditional
nationalism literature and propose alternative approaches.
I will briefly outline the leading theories of nationalism in Middle East Studies
before returning to the urban citizenship approaches. In Jankowski’s anthology, the
authors seek to frame Middle Eastern nationalism as more than simple reactions to the
fall of the Ottoman Empire, or the diffusion of the global new order instead of looking at
the internal drives to modernize and claim new identities and the psychological
motivations of locals (Jankowski, 1997). The authors in this anthology argue that a grand
theory of Middle Eastern Nationalism is elusive precisely because each nation reacted
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differently to the process. They conclude the strength of “invented nations” can be traced
to the historical roots of shared identities, and they argue that identities are still fluid and
contested.
Khalidi’s anthology encapsulates both the diverse reasons for and reactions to
nationalism in the disintegrating Ottoman Empire. This collection moves away from the
narrative of the Arab Awakening as a uniform event by studying Arab nationalism at
local levels. Analysis of the political use of Arab nationalism in the Hijaz, where the
Arab Revolt began, demonstrates that original reasons for revolt were more religious than
nationalist. These authors argue that local motivations were based primarily on resistance
to Ottoman secularization, a sentiment epitomized by a local newspaper slogan popular
on the eve on the Arab Revolt, “love of country is part of faith” (Khalidi, 1991, 197).
They also highlight a division between urban towns-people who were more content to be
part of the Ottoman Empire and nomadic people who were focused on religious
autonomy. In a bid to establish familial monarchies, the Hashemites entered into
agreements with the colonial powers in political calculations which reflected nationalism
as a tool and not the goal. Both of these anthologies call us to complicate Middle Eastern
nationalism by examining multiple scales, motivations, and identities which provide
better analysis than either classic approach for Middle Eastern nationalism. These more
nuanced approaches to Middle Eastern nationalism align well with the critical approaches
offered by the urban citizenship literature, to which I now return.
As discussed previously in the literature review, the critical geopolitical approach
interrogates how cultural processes and state power combine to create meanings about
place and belonging (Agnew 1994; Rose 2007). Contemporary state efforts to foster
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national identity in Jordan are complicated by the extra-national status imposed upon
most urban residents in Amman. Yet, critical citizenship scholars applying an urban
framing allow us to understand how residents of a city experience their national and local
identities. Holston’s work in Brazil illuminates how urban residents resist social
hierarchies by constructing their homes as spaces of belonging within the city and the
nation. In contrast, Ammanis claim belonging by situating their identities outside of the
city (Holtson, 2008). Thus, building physical structures and laying claim to urban
infrastructure does not necessarily help Ammani youth to advance in the social layers of
Jordanian society (or even of Amman itself). Holston’s notion of insurgent citizenship, in
its focus on the oppressed urban citizen who must fight for equal legal rights, likewise
does not apply directly to the case of Jordan.
Lacking a recent native population with greater intrinsic urban citizenship, the
entire city is placed relatively low on a national hierarchy. Within the city a single
oppressed minority group is harder to identify due to the multitude of migrants and
diverse groups who live in the city. Access to the city and better developed infrastructure
is instead determined by economics. Young people are ascribed with identities which
inform how they think about themselves, with national identities often occupying a
supporting role, while other affiliations are foregrounded. My ethnographic interviews
with Ammani youth reveal nuanced attachments to people and places based on shared
geographies, to identity concepts from a complex history of migrations, and to senses of
belonging at a variety of scales which challenge the importance of nationally bonded
identities.
Returning to Nayef’s quote at the beginning of the chapter, it is notable that this
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applies not just to Nayef, but to the majority of Ammanis who are born in Amman and
are both Jordanian, and yet not fully Jordanian at the same time. To understand this
seeming contradiction which is lived by Ammani youth in hundreds of tiny ways
throughout their daily lives, we need to understand how the entire city of Amman is
situated along an imagined continuum of Jordanian-ness as less Jordanian than tribal
areas. When I asked respondents to describe Amman many explained that Amman was
not Jordanian or detailed how certain parts of Amman are not Jordanian. There answers
were often in direct contradiction with one another, and which parts of the city are
labeled as more or less Jordanian are based on individual perceptions and are not
universally felt the same way. I expand upon this concept more fully in Chapter 8 as part
of my discussion of how some youth are attempting to embrace their Ammani roots.
After asking about the city, I asked how they think of themselves in the city.
Some of their answers reveal both the situated and sometimes paradoxical identity of
Amman and the city’s residents. This is exemplified by 26-year-old Sanaa’ who stated,
“Abdounis (a wealthy area of West Amman) are not Jordanian, they are mainly from the
Gulf and they are joked about in the rest of Jordan since they are all about money and
can’t do anything for themselves.” Sanaa’ works as an Arabic teacher for English
speakers and spends most of her work day in West Amman. Yet, despite proposing that
we conduct our interview in a coffee shop in Abdoun, she later shared that she is
uncomfortable spending time there outside of work and looked forward to returning to
her own neighborhood after we finished our interview. Coming from a tribe she has
wasta (cultural connections which afford privileges) but prefers to limit her time in the
wealthy parts of Amman which make her feel like an outsider.
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Meanwhile, an upper-class woman I met at book club took virtually the opposite
perspective as Sanaa.’ Sitting in a sushi restaurant decorated with elaborate origami
swans hanging like chandeliers at the top of one of the city’s most expensive hotels 28year-old Shereen shared, “Segregation by gender is not Jordanian- my people are
Bedouin and we don’t do that. They do that in East Amman and that isn’t Jordanian.”
During our interview Shereen lamented that life used to be simpler, that when her mother
and grandmother were living in the village they were never segregated by gender. She
expressed frustration that although she and her sister have relative financial freedom that
they are constrained by social norms which didn’t exist for previous generations in her
family who didn’t live in the city. Being in the city therefore both offers additional access
to spaces like this exclusive sushi restaurant and also imposes limits due to her gender.
While she can claim urban citizenship in places like the book club and high-end
restaurants, further opportunities for such claims would be limited in other parts of the
city.
Sitting in a humble home in East Amman, which served as my interview site for
the entire neighborhood and was facilitated by my affiliation with Hamzet Wasel, I
settled into a pristinely clean room adjacent to a small and basic kitchen. The doorway to
the small home was decorated with twinkly lights and although the furniture was built of
solid wood, the fabric was faded and worn. Treating the home as though it was her own,
22-year-old Ayat entered without knocking and when I asked her to tell me about herself,
she also referenced arriving to the city from elsewhere by explaining, “I am part Ammani
but not Jordanian, since I am mixed and part of me is Palestinian.”
Her response is evocative of the hybridity scholarship which is often considered
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as a way of understanding feelings of belonging to two cultures. Bhabha proposes
hybridity is an empowering way people being colonized adopt elements of the colonizers,
particularly language, to subvert their complete “othering” (Bhabha, 1994). Critics of
Bhabha’s hybridity have argued that it does not consider how the violence perpetrated by
colonizers motivates these acts (Acheraiou, 2011). Despite the criticism of hybridity, it is
still being discussed by scholars as a way of understanding the impacts of cultural
globalization on identity formation (Kraidy, 2005). Given the close proximity and mutual
linguistic and cultural norms shared between Palestinians and Jordanians applying
hybridity in Bhabha’s empowering post-colonial approach doesn’t offer much analytical
benefit. Likewise, hybridity as an impact of globalization on these two identities fails to
offer valuable insights since the cultural bonds in the Levant are of a regional nature and
not a global nature. Still, the feeling of being partially from two cultures was raised again
in multiple interviews and understanding the broader concept of hybridity, despite the
criticisms of it enhances my application of situated citizenship which allows Ammanis to
identify themselves and to be identified by multiple cultures simultaneously within the
scale of the city. I explore this more in chapter 6 when discussing the term “Urdastini.”
This sentiment was shared again in the same home about an hour later when an
aspiring pastry chef and I were sharing tea and sweets he baked and brought to the
interview in the same modest home. 19-year-old Sa’eed described himself by saying, “I
have a Jordanian heart whose beats are Palestinian.” Sa’eed explained that since he has
never been to Palestine his heart is Jordanian, but that he has learned about his homeland
from his family and lives feeling this connection to this homeland he hopes to someday
see. Later, Sa’eed called me to share the happy news that he had been hired as an
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apprentice in a pastry shop. When I went to the shop to visit him, he was delighted to
show off his chef’s hat and told me that he was planning to open a bakery in his
neighborhood after he learned and saved enough from his current job.
After Sa’eed left, another young woman, 20-year-old Rafara, entered and gave the
woman I had begun to think of as the neighborhood mom an update on her day before
sitting down for our interview. Compellingly she described explained herself as, “Not
Jordanian enough to work for the Government of Jordan.” Just like Ayat and Sa’eed
Rafara was born in Jordan but has Palestinian roots and she is expressing that her lack of
Jordanian wasta and her heritage would prevent her from working for the public sector.
Although she said she dreams of being a policewoman, she feels excluded from pursuing
this dream since she is Jordanian, but not ‘Jordanian’ enough since her paternal roots are
not Jordanian-Jordanian. Her situated citizenship limits her career goals due to social
practices.
Yazan, a 31-year-old became a key respondent almost immediately after our
initial interview. Before leaving our first interview Yazan opened his contact list and sent
five texts to his closest friends asking them to consider meeting with me since it would be
a rare opportunity to have someone listen to them. He went further and said that I am
non-threatening and funny so they would enjoy their time with me. His texts led to four
additional interviews, exposure to the LGBTQ activist community in Amman, and an
elder generation interview with his parents in his own home once my youth interviews
were complete. Additionally, when his artwork was being debuted at an exhibit shortly
before I left, I was honored to receive an invitation and to go support his work at opening
night. Yazan tied his own identity directly to what he sees as Amman’s struggle with
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identity by saying, “The older generation doesn’t think Amman is Jordanian, but this
generation thinks parts of it are Jordanian.”
Since his paternal roots are Jordanian, he doesn’t personally feel the impacts of
being considered not Jordanian enough like Rafara. However, he explained that he has
many friends who his parents and grandparents don’t consider Jordanian, and indeed his
Mother is Palestinian-Jordanian, and it bothers him that she is not considered Jordanian.
The generational movement is not monolithic however as some young people including
23-year-old Shireen differ from Yazan when stating, “Amman is not Jordanian.”
Shireen and I met near the University of Jordan where she explained that although
Jordan’s top universities are in the city and that she lives in the city, she is Jordanian, and
Amman is not Jordanian. For Shireen, Jordan’s best houses of education can be situated
in Amman but simply being in Amman excludes them from belonging to Jordan’s true
national character. Moussa, 32 compared himself to his mother by stating, “My Mom
considers herself more Jordanian than Ammani, but I am more Ammani than Jordanian.”
I met Moussa through an interview connection I made through Yazan. As an activist with
the LGBTQ community in Amman, Moussa explained that he couldn’t be himself or do
the work that he does in other parts of the country. We met at a café on Rainbow Street
which prominently displays that is it a safe zone for people of all sexual preferences on a
sign near the front door. While his mother supports him and his lifestyle, he feels that
other Jordanians outside of the city would dismiss him as too Ammani and he prefers that
label over being too Jordanian. For Moussa being too Jordanian represents conservative
values which would not welcome him. But he is able to leverage the city to claim
belonging among people who are framed as minorities.

136

Critically this case study diverges from the rest of the critical citizenship literature
since Palestinian-Jordanians comprise the majority of Ammani residents and therefore are
not the primary minorities who are the central focus of most critical citizenship
scholarship. Instead of focusing on just Palestinian-Jordanians, this study examines how
Ammanis must define themselves by other locations to be situated in the national
discourse of belonging.
Since belonging to the city situates one’s citizenship as less Jordanian than if one
is from the rural areas, the social hierarchy privileges group belonging beginning with
tribal Jordanians followed by other classifications of social and economic capital.
Therefore, a wealthy Iraqi can belong to Amman since their wealth situates them as nonthreatening to the delicate balance in the national population. Likewise, educated
Lebanese can belong to Amman as their social capital situates them as having something
to offer without challenging the status quos. Thus, Nayef’s seeming contradiction reveals
the larger dilemma which inspires so many Jordanians like Ghaida, 24 to declare, “No
one is from Amman- we are all from somewhere else.”
By the time I entered my third-year in Amman my dialect was improving to the
point that when people asked me where I was from, I felt comfortable using my
knowledge of situated citizenship in Amman to make a statement ensured to start a
deeper conversation than if I simply answered that I am American. My go-to
conversation starter was, I am originally from Salt and I cook mansef 35 better than your
Mom!” This statement showed that I not only understood the importance of belonging to
somewhere other than Amman, but that I could identify important tribal centers and could
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Jordan’s national dish made of lamb soaked a sour yogurt sauce called jamid.
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prepare Jordanian food. Invariably this statement negated some of my outsider status as it
demonstrated more nuanced understanding of unwritten social rules. This line was the
beginning of many rich conversations as well as bringing down prices when I was
bargaining in the souk. Usually however I would clarify by confessing that I am an
American living in Amman. While I used my knowledge of this social practice to try and
achieve greater belonging in Jordan, in Chapter 8, I explore exceptions to the rule and
how young people are beginning to reject Amman’s situated citizenship. In this chapter I
decenter the role of nationalism before illuminating the importance of geography, history,
and scale on young people’s senses of self.
Although Amman is a single geographically bound entity the experiences of
belonging within the city are diverse as multiple cultures are sprinkled across the jibaal
(hills) and wadiyaa (valleys) over which the city spreads. As I explained in Chapter 4, the
largest cultural division is visible in the bifurcation between East and West Amman.
However, I approach the city not as having one culture or two subcultures, but by treating
the multiple cultures within the city as distinct personalities which combine to make one
collection of communities. The entire collection is situated as “others” whose claims of
Jordanian-ness rely on external factors.
Traditional citizenship literature often approaches research by examining which
residents have fewer rights to the city based largely on who has lower legal status. In
contrast, in Amman, the majority of the residents have equal legal status. However, the
city itself is situated as a marker of less Jordanian-ness than the tribal areas. Accordingly,
even the term Ammani takes on multiple meanings within Jordan. Specifically, to be
Ammani often denotes that you are not of Jordanian heritage. I explore this contradiction
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throughout my dissertation, but Chapter 8 highlights how some of today’s youth are
beginning to challenge the idea that being Ammani means you are less Jordanian than a
tribal or rural youth who is aslyn min (originally from) a tribal area.
Yet, the cultural juxtaposition between the visibly more globalized West Ammanwith its proliferation of American restaurants, dominance of signage in English, spacious
homes, and liberally dressed residents versus East Amman’s tighter quarters, Arabic
signage, and conservatively dressed residents illuminates how generalizations which
define East Ammanis or West Ammanis as more or less Jordanian gained traction within
society. My interviews with young people revealed many misconceptions between the
two groups; some expressed a tourist-like desire to visit the “other” within Amman, to
explore life on the other side of the city.
Amman is excluded from the national identity building process by the
Government of Jordan and situated politically as an extraterritorial space specifically to
privilege the increasingly minority population of “Jordanian-Jordanians” from the tribal
areas (Daher, 2008). To support the privileging of rural areas, Amman’s urban heritage is
marginalized in state practices, tourism promotion, and orientalist discourses (Daher
2006). Daher argues this exertion of state power minimizes Ammanis of diverse origins
for regime self-preservation. Yet, contrary to the framing of Amman as an extraterritorial
space, the city contains one region which is framed as authentically Jordanian. As
outlined in Chapter 4’s cultural mapping of the city, Wast al Balad traverses the tricky
path of being both part of Amman and authentically Jordanian, a task which challenges
many young people in the city.
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5.2 THE ROLE OF GEOGRAPHY: A RIVER RUNS THROUGH IT
In Amman two primary identities are ascribed based on paternal lineage which is
traced to geographies outside of the city. These primary geographic identities refer to
where one’s paternal ancestors lived; more specifically, did they come from the East
Bank or the West Bank? This literally refers to the physical sides of the Jordan River and
defines a person with roots in Palestine as being from the West Bank, and a person whose
roots are in Jordan as being from the East Bank. With the shifting of the border between
these modern nation states complex new allegiances and national identities arose. This
results in people who are born in Jordan, and indeed whose parents were also born in
Jordan, being labelled as West Bankers. As an outside researcher, I found myself in a
myriad of uncomfortable conversations when people spoke about themselves and others
as either “pure” Jordanian which they also describe as Jordanian/Jordanian or as
Palestinian/Jordanian- which is implied to be “impure” Jordanian.
The role of geography on these ascribed identities is felt in intimate ways which
are often highly emotional and frequently reinforce attachment to people who are
similarly labeled based on geographic locations- including tribal areas within Jordan.
Youth reported over and over that they have only fleeting attachment to or indeed may
have never personally been to the location that plays such an important role in how they
are defined. Stereotypes are rife, and opportunities are influenced by familial (specifically
paternal) roots to specific geographic locations which do not align with nationally
bounded places of birth.
Jordanians who come from places beyond the borders of the Jordan River are
quite familiar with these geographic factors and are also asked to define themselves based
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on paternal familial roots. Someone born in Jordan, with a father and perhaps even a
grandfather born in Jordan but unable to answer the question, “where are you from” with
a tribal location in Jordan or a city in Palestine will be expected to answer with the
country of their great-grandfather’s origin. As I mentioned previously my rapport
building response to show that I understand is to say, “I am a Saltiyya (from Salt).” This
response invariably drew a laugh and allowed me to affectionately place myself into the
social system.
As I previously mentioned the geographic identity of a child is determined sole by
their paternal side, negating the lineage of the maternal side completely. Therefore, a
child of an East Bank father married to a West Bank mother is an East Banker, but the
child of a West Bank father married to an East Bank mother loses his/her “pureness” and
is deemed a West Banker. This is common regionally and is being contested by children
of Jordanian mothers married to non-Jordanian fathers in court (Al Hindi, 2017). Despite
being born in Jordan they are subject to higher fees at Jordanian Universities as they fall
under the foreign student designation with the associated higher costs. In this instance the
impacts of their situated citizenship places financial burdens on those who are unable to
claim full privileges of being Jordanian and therefore the lowest tuition costs.
Historically the peoples across the banks of the river could be from the same tribe
and intermarriage was quite common. Divisions between Palestinians and Jordanians thus
are often so minor that they are only represented by a small star on the flag or a color
difference in a tribal keffiyeh (checkered headscarf). Yet, these distinctions only gained
traction after the borders of Jordan were drawn and are not distinctions with longer
historical roots since Jordan’s flag was designed by the British as part of their national
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branding process during the mandate period. The red and white checkered headscarf now
quickly identifies Jordanian-ness and the white and black pattern signifies Palestinianness. My respondents were nearly universally unaware of when or why this color coding
emerged. This specific act of identification has been traced to the British Colonial Officer
Glubb whose autobiography explicitly and painstakingly details his motivation to create a
visible way to mark locals during the mandate period (Massad, 2001). As an Arabist who
is described as an admirer of Bedouin culture, he assigned the different colored “Arab
kerchiefs” which have since become accepted markers of Palestinian and Jordanian
nationalism (Massad, 121, 2001). These minor differences are alternatively reinforced
and erased based on social contexts.
As noted by Massad, “the urban youth’s donning of the red and white hatta
(shmagh) was, in fact following in King Husayn’s footsteps, as he had begun to wear it as
a head-gear much more frequently after 1970…” (Massad, 2011, 250). Following the
Civil War marking Jordanian-ness or Palestinian-ness even changed local speech
patterns. Dialects which used to vary based on rural/urban divisions took on more
significance in distinguishing between Palestinian men who used the softer accent and
Jordanian men who increased their pronunciation of a hard G to signify a masculine
connection to tribes and the security forces. 36 This practice continues today; however, it
is less rigid as one speaker might use the softer pronunciation to signify urbanity and
education and then the same speaker might switch to the more guttural sounds to signal
affiliations to tribal Jordan. Yet, while one speaker may choose to “pass” as being
originally Jordanian or Palestinian by shifting their pronunciation depending on the social
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Explored more in-depth in chapter 7.
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situation, this is a highly charged practice, as noted by Nayef at the beginning of the
chapter.
My respondents shared both painful experiences of feeling these geographic
differences and also expressed frustrations at the absurdity of this division. Some even
stated that these differences didn’t matter before the Sykes Picot agreement which
divided the Ottoman Empire into British and French controlled mandate zones. While
West Bankers are now widely unofficially acknowledged to be the majority of the
Jordanian population, they typically fill positions in the private sector and are
underrepresented in the Jordanian government and in the Jordanian Air Force. This
explains Rafara’s comment about not being Jordanian enough for government work. 37
This is despite her being born and raised in an old neighborhood in East Amman. The
label East Banker offers some additional cachet as it ascribes a “pure” Jordanian identity
which is linked to an idealized Bedouin past. However, the geographic identity of an East
Banker is treated with even more specificity.
Jordan’s society was explained by multiple respondents as “highly tribal” and
based on last names which locate your identity based on a communally imagined map. 38
Therefore, if your last name is Abbadi, the shared cultural map locates you from Salt, a
city north of Amman where the Abad tribes settled. The significance of this tribally based
connection became abundantly clear during my focus panel in a Mufraq, a tribal area in
the north near the Syrian border. The panel of twelve young men had proudly welcomed
37

Rafara is expressing her experience of being constrained by her lack of wasta or
privellege to work in the public sector since her roots are Palestinian-Jordanian and she
faces an uphill climb to be employed in the Government of Jordan.
38
Despite youth describing Jordan as highly tribal, chapter 7 highlights an emerging
Ammani urban identity which complicates the existing dichotomy portraying a tribal
versus urban identity.
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me into their community center stating that they are “pure” Jordanians and that it was

Figure 5.1 Flag on the left is the Jordanian flag based on the Great Arab Revolt and with
the Hashemite Star. The flag on the right is the Palestinian flag which is missing the star
per Sykes original design. The minimal difference between these markers can be
highlighted or downplayed depending on the circumstance.

Figure 5.2 King Hussein pictured on the left in the red and white Jordanian shemagh and
Figure 5.3 Arrafat pictured on the right in the Palestinian Black and White keffiyeh
good I wasn’t only talking to young people in Amman.
However, when I asked how their lives are impacted by Syrian refugees living in
their community, the response caused me to pause and double check my Arabic
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translation. In fact, the village of Mufraq is located so close to the Syrian border that the
small population is arguably the most impacted Jordanian community since the crisis in
Syria began. Still, I was surprised when the panel answered my question by revealing that
three of them are actually Syrians, seemingly contradicting their initial claims at being
pure Jordanians. My follow up question probing why they initially reported that they are
all “pure” Jordanian received a blunt response: “we are all Beni Hassan.”
Beni Hassan is a tribe which spans both Northern Jordan and Southern Syria. The
border between Syria and Jordan had little impact on this group of young men who
identified more strongly with their tribal geography than the official borders defining
national lines. For these youths, there is no contradiction in allowing Syrians from the
Beni Hassan tribe to retain their tribal connections within Jordan and indeed their tribal
connections afforded them a measure of status within the group.
However, Palestinians who live in Jordan are firmly disconnected from their tribal
spaces and tribal identities. It is as though the Jordan River absorbs their tribalism and
leaves them disconnected from their tribal roots. Amman’s increasingly cosmopolitan
nature also works to decrease tribal connections inspiring many tribal Jordanians to
commute into Amman from tribal suburbs to retain the full benefits of being tribal. Tribes
have not established regions within the city. Unlike famous places like “Little Italy or
Little China” found in other large cities, you can’t find “Little Karak,” or “Little Madaba”
with associated tribal enclaves in Amman. Although there are areas which are known to
be highly populated by ethnic minorities like the Circassians in Naour, the Chechens in
Sweileh, or the Christians in Fuheis, these areas are not exclusive, and these minority
groups do not stay entirely within these areas.
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Instead tribal power continues by attaching people to their tribal locations in the

Figure 5.4 Myriam, Ababsa. "Atlas of Jordan. History, Territories and Society." Atlas al
Urdunn. Al-tarikh, al-ardh, al-mujtama, Beyrouth, IFPO. 2013.Jordan’s Main Bedouin
Tribes and their territories circa 1950
mental mapping of Jordan. 39 One of my interviewees, who requested that his name not be
used due to his position working for the Royal Court, explained that although he would
like to vote in Amman, his father collects all of his family’s voter cards and drives them
together to the voting station in their tribal village. This is the only time he visits the
village and he looks forward to switching his registration to Amman, which he will do
“as soon as he sees a unicorn walk across the River Jordan.” This colorful sentiment
39

Chapter 7 explores how the tribal nature of Jordan’s society is being challenged by the
testing of the original social contract which favored tribal connections.
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highlights the constraints even a well- connected tribal youth (who was classmates with
and is a friend of the Crown Prince) faces when trying to reconcile living in Amman with
being forced to situate his identity based on a geography outside of the city in order to
retain his family’s tribal roots. Although he can both call on his wasta and enjoy the
modernity of the city, his urban citizenship is still situated due to cultural enforcement of
national practices such as voting, which require him to leave Amman, to be part of the
body politic.
So, while some tribal identities that cross national borders can supersede national
identities within rural areas of Jordan, other Jordanian tribal identities explicitly work to
minimize the role of Amman in Jordan. For the last two generations this minimization
has discouraged the creation of an Ammani identity. Further, as previously mentioned,
Palestinians in Jordan are labelled as non-tribal and their affiliations are bound to
geographic locations that they may have never even been allowed to travel to. Clearly the
power of geography on how young people think of themselves and how others think of
them goes beyond national identity formation and is rooted in Jordan’s tribal system. This
urban process of multiple geographies being imposed on identity formation is missing
from the current literature but occurs in the other former Ottoman cities as well.
Illuminating the role of geographic identities plays in situated urban youth identities in
Amman expands our understanding of urban citizenship in the global south by
highlighting the role of multiple situated identities on residents of cities with large
migratory populations. Another powerful force which informs how young Ammanis
define themselves and are defined is the role of historical migration in the region.
5.3 MIGRATORY HISTORY: INCLUSION AND THE VALUE OF HOSPITALITY
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The continual waves of immigration and how this impacts not only Amman but
Ammanis are overshadowed by the politics of the Palestinian issue, leaving the larger ongoing processes of continued migration underexplored. This gap in the literature hampers
our understanding of how Ammani youth are impacted by the history of these migrations.
Multiple scholars examine how refugees and other migrants’ first generational attachment
to their home country reveal a Janus-faced loyalty between the sending and receiving
nations. Further, they study how these attachments to home shifts more towards the
receiving nation as subsequent generations assimilate into their new cultures.
Yet, Amman is underrepresented in urban and migration studies literature, leaving
a city built by and largely occupied by generations of migrants little understood.
Although Palestinian Diasporas have been studied throughout the MENA region, in
Amman, Palestinians are simply one wave of many waves of migrants who have
transformed Amman and made the city their home. Observing the collective practices of
engaging with migration in Amman reveals the importance the historical movement of
peoples into the city plays on the production of urban youth identities.
To understand how the history of migrations to the city influences not only the
increasingly diverse and cosmopolitan nature of the city, but how youth living in the city
conceive of themselves, I will briefly outline the major migrations to modern Amman.
The migratory tribes who traversed the sands and lands of the Hejaz and the South of
Bilad al Sham were a part of the Ottoman Empire from 1516 until the Great Arab Revolt
in 1918. The role of Jordan’s ruling family in the liberation from the Ottomans is a
Hashemite narrative continually reinforced to solidify the legitimacy of their rule of
Jordan. As I previously mentioned, these native tribes had little attachment to Amman. It
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wasn’t until the first Circassian refugees began arriving in 1878, after escaping Russian
persecution, that the ancient city of Philadelphia began to remerge as modern-day
Amman. Circassians thus were at the forefront of building modern Amman and continue
to hold a privileged official role in the city through their designation as the King’s Royal
Guards.
The overthrow of the Ottomans and the arrival of Circassians are both narratives
which are represented in the official discourse as fundamental and admirable facets of
Ammani culture. These historical events were the catalysts which established Amman as
a city built largely by refugees. Notably in 1927 the Public Health Department was
already describing the situation in Amman by stating “the town is very much
overcrowded with its present population and several hundred refugees from Syria”
(Hacker, 27, 1960). Remarkably, this description fails to classify the Circassians as
refugees, even in the context of highlighting the stress refugees were putting on the
nascent city. Despite eliding Circassian’s refugee status, this statement reveals the
contributions of the numerous migrants who not only found refuge in Amman, but also
reciprocated by welcoming newer arrivals seeking safety or a better life.
The complex history of modern Amman being founded by refugees and offering
refuge to a myriad of different people has created a city and people with cultural norms to
absorb new arrivals. The two distinctive waves of Palestinians arriving in Amman, first in
1948 and then again in 1968 has been examined more in-depth than the other waves of
migrations to Amman. However, I argue that the broader impacts from continual and
subsequent waves of migration are effectively being obscured by the politics of the
Palestinian migration issue. Instead these migrations should be explicitly studied as a
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distinct ongoing urban process impacting how Ammanis perceive themselves and others.
Indeed, following the Circassian, Chechenian, and Palestinian arrivals the city
absorbed a wave of Lebanese migrants escaping their own civil war in 1975-1991. This
group of arrivals preceded the next group who began arriving in 1991- when Jordanians
(many with Palestinian roots) arrived as returnees during the Kuwait War. This mass
movement was followed by the arrival of more Iraqis in 2003 and a significant population
of Syrians starting in 2011 which continues to this day. During my interviews with
Ammani youth I sought to tease out how being part of a rapidly transforming city (not
only physically, but also socially) is impacting them.
Both during interviews and in personal conversations when I asked young people
about the impact of refugees and migrant Ammanis from other backgrounds, they
espoused the need to help others based on concepts which they initially attributed to their
religion, politics, or being the last hope for refugees- “because no one else is helping.”
Many youths like Lina, 28, fondly recounted driving to Syria as children for a lunch
outing or wanting to visit family living in Palestine. When I pressed them on why other
countries in the region who share their faith but have more resources (specifically Gulf
countries) didn’t accept refugees, they paused and offered a variety of vague responses. 40
However, no clear pattern emerged from this line of questioning. Instead they
talked about how different waves of migrants impact them. Many mentioned how Iraqis
brought money to the city, which many noted has a negative impact due to inflation, or a
consumerist nouveaux riche culture which didn’t align with Jordan’s more humble
40

Although this question was not part of my initial set of questions, it became relevant
after numerous respondents mentioned the importance as a Jordanian of accepting
refugees. I sought to explore this further within a regional context to place how distinct of
a marker of Jordanian-ness youth feel this is.
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culture. Or they spoke about how the city’s cuisine has improved since the Syrians
arrived. While some people lamented that most waiters are now Syrian instead of
Jordanian, this was usually followed up with commentary that Syrian deserts, jams, and
breads are all delicious. 41 They shared how their daily lives had changed because of these
new people. But even the most vulnerable among them, when discussing how these
hardships directly impacted their lives, expressed that they must help those seeking
safety.
Due to the ambiguity of their responses, this question is one that I followed up
with in my interviews with Ammani elders by asking: “What role do the waves of
immigrants to Jordan play in your life and how the society defines itself?” Their answers
were enlightening and include frequent responses such as: “since we are made of
refugees, we were taught to help others and it is in our blood to help.” When I asked who
or what taught them to help, the answers always included both family and King Hussein.
Nabilia, a 55-year- old Palestinian Jordanian, became visibly emotional
recounting to me that she sees King Hussein’s face when she wakes up in the morning; he
welcomed her family when they were in crisis and taught them to welcome others as
well. Likewise, when I sat with two couples in Jabal Amman, an older neighborhood near
East Amman, they proudly explained that they had been neighbors for 80 years. This
despite being younger than 60, because they began counting the time since their parents
were also neighbors in the same family homes. They self-sorted and defined themselves
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This discussion of Syrian deserts became a topic of debate when a new Syrian knafeh
(cheese-based desert) store began to become more popular. Jordanian friends began to
ask me if I thought Habiba (the Jordanian store) still had the best knafeh in Jordan or if
the new stand was better. This question was difficult to answer tactfully as lots of
national pride was wrapped up into the loaded question.
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to me as one man being Jordanian-Jordanian and the other three being PalestinianJordanian. However, they resisted the idea that these distinctions matter to them since
they are all part of the same adopted family from the block that was home to all of them.
Yet, they consider themselves to be neighbors from a time before they were born and the
fact that three quarters of them have roots as refugees to Jordan is declared to be
immaterial to them.
Although most of the youth in my interviews did not explicitly pinpoint why
Ammanis (regardless of origins) have a fairly homogenous acceptance of migrants, after
talking with their parents it became clearer. This trait is one that is taught generationally
in this space and is a value which binds people across socioeconomic levels and from
different origins. The elders described intentionally teaching their own children that
hospitality is part of “our way.” They recounted to me telling their children stories about
the need to share the only bread a family has with those who have none. A few elders
mentioned that the importance of hospitality in Bedouin culture. Stating that even if they
do not come from Bedouin tribes themselves that this value underlies their collective
responses since these values are imbued into the culture. Most revealed a pride that they
have been raised and socialized to accept others who need help. Among the elders I
interviewed, the common message can be summarized with the words, "all we have is
safety, but we are willing to share this with those who don’t even have safety."
The cultural narrative in Amman is based on historical movement of people and
reinforces the acceptance of people in need as a primary character of group identity. As a
geographer, I locate the social and cultural narrative created from the constant streams of
migrants in the place of Amman by grounding it in the theoretical cultural geography
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literature on the co-construction processes between place and identity. While my cross
generational interviews illuminate the cultural value of accepting refugees in Amman, I
applied a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to statements made by the Jordanian
government to determine how the state’s messaging resonates with Ammanis (Gee,
2014).
One year prior to moving to Amman to begin my ethnographic project I began
reading the Jordan Times newspaper daily. I continued that practice throughout the two
and a half years I lived in Jordan. The regime friendly newspaper often ran articles with
quotes from government officials or editorial pieces which support the role of Amman as
a place of refuge. The following extract is typical of these pieces and exposes the role of
the state in ingraining the co-production of the historic role of urban people and the city
both providing refuge:
“Because of the wars Jordan fought, and the waves of refugees the country has
hosted, the senator said that this has entitled the Kingdom to take on the role of a
peacebuilder. “Peace is what Jordanians practice and live every day,” said Majali.
She told The Jordan Times on the sideline of the conference that society’s
different sectors should build on Jordan’s experience to create a culture of peacebuilding,
put it into practice, and start helping those in need.
“We in Jordan are very lucky to have stability; we have to make sure to maintain
it and help our neighboring countries,” she added.”
-Excerpt from Jordan Times Interview with Senator Sawsan Majali (Jordan’s history as
refugee host entitles it to be peacemaker, senator says. Rula Samain - Dec 01, 2016)
By linking maintenance of stability with making sure to “help our neighbouring
countries” the senator reinforces the message of a Jordanian culture of accepting
refugees. This sentiment is very typical of Jordanian government representatives who
have, particularly since the Arab Spring, cautioned that reforms cannot come at the
expense of stability and so they extol the virtue of stability over reform. This reaction is
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one many of my informants reiterated, stating they realize they are lucky to have safety
and that it is their duty to help other Arabs, Muslims, or Levantine neighbors. This
portion of the governmental message fits with the reporting of youth who almost
universally express that it is their duty to help others who need refuge. Nearly two thirds
simultaneously express that safety isn’t enough for them to stay in Jordan, so they want to
leave Jordan. Both the “Stability First” messaging and the “it's our historic duty to
provide refuge” messages resonate with youth. These are unifying Ammani ideologies
which are taught both at home and through the spaces of communal acceptance of
“others” throughout the city. I will explore the Stability First messaging more in Chapter
7 as part of understanding youth reactions to on-going geopolitical pressures.
However, the youth diverge with the governmental claim that Jordanian youth are
entitled or obligated to be peacemakers. Providing refuge and creating peace are distinct
goals. While most youth supported and defined themselves by the need to remain
hospitable, they also expressed that the instability in the region is bigger than them and
that their personal goals were much more immediate. For youth like Ahmed, 32, growing
up in the shadow of the “biggest regional instability” (in Palestine) it has become
ingrained that peace was not just the role of their government, but of other bigger actors
who are “pulling the strings.” While many of my respondents were almost apologetic in
naming America as one of the bigger political actors pulling the strings in deference to
my being American, they had no similar compunction about naming Israel, Iran, and
Russia as among the bigger actors.
Indeed, after tensions flared between Israel and Jordan in July 2017, based on
perceived increased Israeli control to enter the Al- Aqsa Mosque and the deaths of two
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Jordanians in Amman at a home of an Israeli diplomat, the youth I interviewed were
despondent. Ahmad, 19, reported that he participated in two street protests, but that it was
merely a symbolic social gesture which he and his friends knew wouldn’t change
anything. Instead their focus was on starting their lives in fulfilling ways not centered on
being peacemakers. By decentering the importance of nationalism and instead
illuminating the roles of geography and the constant history of migrations into the city, I
am showing ways in which the areas and residents of Amman are perceived locally.
Before discussing the impacts of these alternate ways of belonging I will explore the final
factor of identity formation which arose from my research with youth. Thus, it is to the
issue of scale(s) that I now turn.
5.4 MULTISCALAR ASABIYYA: BEYOND NATIONHOOD
Ibn Khladun, a respected Arab political theorist, is widely credited as the father of
sociology and wrote about the concept known in Arabic as asabiyya (translated in
English as “group feelings”) in 1377. Using a new approach to historiography he sought
to understand the rise and fall of civilizations long before the establishment of nationstates (Rosenthal, 1967). Central to his analysis is the interplay between nomadic rural
tribes and urban dwellers. Critically Ibn Khaldun classified nomads as possessing the
purest form of asabiyya due to their connection with nature, their reliance on the tribe to
overcome harsh conditions, and their lack of luxuries.
According to his theory, civilizations contain within themselves the seed of their
own demise as they invariably undergo a process of urbanization which decreases their
asabiyya as urban populations embrace luxuries and lose their connections to smaller
tight knit communities. After three generations, he states that civilizations begin to soften
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making them ripe for groups with stronger asabiyya to overthrow them. At the time of
Khalduns writing, the tribe was the primary basis for analysis. However, in more modern
western analysis the nation state has become the primary basis to measure social
cohesion. Since Amman is currently in its third generation since its modern rebirth,
according to Khaldun’s theory, the settled city dwellers are due for to be overthrown by
rural Jordanians who are still connected through stronger asabiyya! However, in Jordan
the project of nationalism positioned urban dwellers of Amman as “others” who in the
public imagination belong to places outside of the urban borders. 42 Thus, for many young
Ammanis social cohesion is not primarily tied to Jordanian-ness. My interviewees defied
western perceptions of the primary role the nation has in personal or group identities.
Instead youth described themselves as belonging to a plethora of overlapping groups that
do not map onto the scale of the nation of Jordan.
The roots of this multi-scalar asabiyyah phenomenon can be traced to the
founding of Transjordan when the nation’s borders were imagined by the new ruler as
essentially placeholders. Further, the concept of the al-waṭan al-'arabi (Arab Homeland)
as a place of belonging transcends national borders and creates a regional sense of
belonging (Culcasi, 2011). Even the name of the Jordanian military reinforces belonging
to a regional Arab community. The Jeesh al Arabi (Arab Army) is bound to defend
“Jordan First,” but also theoretically obligated to come to the aid of other Arab nations
who request aid. In this section, I will explore scales of social cohesion among young
Ammanis to expose how ideas of belonging which both predate the nation and those that
are still be developed transcend the scales of belonging beyond nationalism. As discussed
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In Chapter 7 I explore how urban youth are beginning to challenge this conception.
156

in the previous sections being Ammani and Jordanian are often conceived of
paradoxically with Ammanis and spaces within the city being identified as less Jordanian
than those outside of the city.
Thus, the city itself plays a role in the layering of identities as “more or less”
Jordanian resulting in nearly half of the population (roughly 4 out of 9 million) having a
diminished place in the communal popular imagination. Beyond the newness of Amman,
Jordan is a relatively new nation-state and the concept of the nation-state itself is a much
newer creation than other group affiliations which still hold sway in the region. Fifteen
years ago, Frisch analyzed public speeches given by all of Jordan’s Kings and labeled the
discourse as an intentional political “fuzziness” which runs counter to the academic
models of a national identity formation (Frisch, 2002). The original intent of this political
fuzziness was the ambition of King Abdullah I to incorporate Syria into his nascent
kingdom and to facilitate a post-Ottoman independent Pan-Arab state controlled by the
Hashemites (Salabi, 2006).
Subsequently, King Hussein continued the project of building a national identity
as an ambiguous Jordanian identity which fostered fluid borders both politically and
culturally between Jordan and Palestine. However, the “ambitions of the Jordanian
monarch were clearly expressed in the school books of the 1950s where the entire
territory of the British Palestine was described as Jordanian” (Maffi in Ababsa, 146,
2011). While the dream of a Jordan that includes Syria and all of Palestine has long since
passed, the reality that Jordan has a high population of both Palestinians and Syrians is
nonetheless an issue that the current monarch, King Abdullah II faces.
During King Abdullah II’s reign, the Government of Jordan introduced national
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branding campaigns including “Jordan First” and then “We are all Jordan” meant to
lessen divisions between the multiplicity of Jordanians both aslyn min Jordan and alsyn
min other places. These movements did little to quell the rising nationalist anger from
tribes in the South of Jordan who openly challenged the King to remove this fuzziness.
They agitated for the Government of Jordanto constitutionalize the distinction between
themselves as “pure” Jordanians and “guests” in the wake of the Arab Spring, and for the
first time directly attacked Queen Rania as a Palestinian who was corrupt in an open
letter signed by 36 Bedouin tribal leaders to the King on February 05, 2011 (Habib,
2011). The fluidity of how the modern nation of Transjordan has been conceived invited
multiple scales of belonging and exclusion from the beginning of the nation state.
The concept of nationalism in Amman is felt quite differently from everywhere
else in Jordan. Here the typical urban processes of modernization, globalization, and
cosmopolitanism are at their zenith due to the geographic and historic path dependencies
I previously outlined. Since the city of Amman was created by refugees and continues to
offer refuge the above-mentioned paradox of a Jordanian city full of “others” who are
frequently deemed less Jordanian than those living in the villages is exacerbated. Yet,
these same Jordanians living in Amman have access to better educational opportunities,
more modern infrastructure, and neighbors from around the globe despite being
minimized in the collective imagination of Jordan. This effectively leaves these
cosmopolitan youths searching for their own communities of belonging.
The myriad of ways they affiliate through their “imagined communities” are
reflected not by the nationalist project of being Jordanian or the borders which outline the
nation state, but instead through macro and micro socio-cultural affiliations which
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converge and diverge with their national sense of belonging (Anderson, 2006). Many of
the respondents noted that their parents and grandparents were defined along a binary of
either being Palestinian or Jordanian, but for their generation the options were much more
diverse. The scales of belonging described by Ammani youth include both larger
identities such as tribal or quasi-Pan-Arab identities as well as smaller niche identities
such as interest-based identities.
Pan-Arabism
Some youth identified primarily by social affiliations including a Pan-Arab (or
quasi-Pan-Arab) affiliation this is at a larger scale than the geographic bounding of the
nation-state of Jordan. The concept of Pan-Arabism has shifted during Jordan’s history. It
was at its strongest after the Great Arab Revolt when the Hashemites were central to
overthrowing the Ottoman Empire. In this time Pan-Arabism was considered a positive
and powerful affiliation.
However, Pan-Arabism became a threat to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
during the height of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s popularity, when erasing borders meant
uniting the Arab World under Nasser’s regime. The threat of Pan-Arabism reached
critical mass in 1971 when violence broke out in Jordan and the regime expelled fighters
supported by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Pan-Arabism for the
grandparents of my respondents therefore had a positive connotation which would
expand Jordanian influence and territory. For their children (the parents of my
respondents) Pan-Arabism had a negative connotation which would have contracted
Jordan geographically and thus rejecting Pan-Arabism was about preserving the nascent
state of Jordan.
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For this generation Pan-Arabism represents a global community which can gather
via social media and doesn’t need to physically be part of one nation-state or Arab
Empire. Online communities like Maktoob offer locations for these ‘New Arabs’ to
gather and to create belonging in ways which were unavailable to their elders (Cole,
2014). Their understandings of the scale of Pan-Arabism is more detached from spatial
bounds and is a Quasi-Pan-Arabism linking them via a common identity more than a
common location. For Ammani youth, the attachments to both tribe and to the Levant are
scales of belonging reminiscent of Pan-Arabism and can be understood by the following
perspectives shared by my respondents. For example, when Sally, 25, and I spoke in
West Amman near the hotel she works in, she stated, “We are tribal and modern, we are
less individualistic which I like. I really feel being part of something bigger like the
Levant that is a special thing.” For her being part of a larger social group is positive and
offers her a political identity.
However, when Basher, 22, shared his perspectives about being part of a larger
tribe while we were sitting in café in West Amman he nervously glanced around before
confirming that his name wouldn’t before sharing, “I am stuck by being tribal, I try to
dissociate from this and to be modern, but then I would insult my family and lose our
tribe’s wasta.” For Basher the balance between tribal privilege and wanting to be modern
are in tension, a tension that, if broken, would insult his family. Wanting to focus on
meritocracy instead of familial advantages created anxiety for him and he continued to
glance around the café until our conversation moved to less sensitive topics.
Meanwhile, Omnia, 30, scaled up her sense of community beyond the tribe or the
Levant to the whole Arab community. Still, sitting in her private library in her home, she
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notes that belonging as an Arab is complicated by her appearance which she describes
differing from the how the majority of Arabs look, “I am a blonde Arab, I am full of
contradictions since I am a minority here. People think I am Circassian, but we aren’t my dad is Jordanian. My loyalty is to all Arabs.” Omnia has brown hair, however her
complexion is fair and her eyes are light, similar to my own appearance. As my Jordanian
dialect improved people started referring to me as blonde as well. I learned that this way
of categorizing someone is based on skin and eye color and not hair color, as noted by
Omnia the connotation is that you are not Arab if you are blonde. Despite her feelings of
being contradictory, she feels a strong allegiance to the Arab community and married an
Arab so her children would be Arabs. This offers her membership in the body polity of
Arabs.
It is clear to see that these affiliations and the sense of belonging to tribes, to the
greater geographic region of Bilad al Sham, or to a Quasi-Pan-Arabism do not map onto
the physical borders of the modern nation state of Jordan and represent different scales of
identity which are more important to these youths than the nationalist sense of self. It is
also clear that the concept of a Pan-Arab asabiyyah has shifted through the three
generations since modern Amman was founded. Others perceived themselves along a
more globalized scale which also decenters the importance of belonging to a nation-state
and expands the scale of belonging via generational or interest-based connections. These
cultural senses of belonging connect youth via technology or through shifting norms like
those expressed by Sadiq and Muath below who connect through typical modern youth
interests.
Sitting in the dining room of my home in Abdoun, Sadiq, 31, expressed his
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his modernity by saying “I am Circassian, so I am expected to marry a Circassian, but my
parents don’t know I date, drink, go to pubs. As the first born I have to make my own
way, but I am part of the global culture, we don’t see anything shameful in being young
and having fun.” He then told me the name of his favorite pub and said that despite being
Muslim he enjoys the vibe there and that I should check it out to see more Ammanis like
him and to have a good time. Likewise, Muath, 18 identified himself by his modern
pursuits when sitting at the English language center in our interview at the University of
Jordan: “I am a gamer, I am into online communities and I play sports. I don’t care about
politics or nationalities.” Both of these activities offer communities which he identifies
with more readily than potentially politically charged groups.
Other youth embraced political groups and identified first by global scales based
on their ideological stances or their roles as activists like Ibrahim and Yazan. A young
man I met through my volunteering with the American Embassy Speaker’s Bureau
Ibrahim, 29, invited me to his home along Airport Road. Walking into the home he
apologized that the garden wasn’t finished but explained that his father had left his family
and so his brother, mother, and he had recently moved in. The home was just finished
being built and we walked into a western style great room with an open kitchen with his
Mom standing at the stove creating amazing smells. Before I could even ask what was for
dinner, she offered us chocolates and tea.
Later, after I had enjoyed the tea and met his brother we began the interview, with
me asking Ibrahim to tell me about himself. He paused before saying, “I am a pacifist, a
human first, a good son to my mother, and then a Muslim, an Arab, and finally a
Palestinian-Jordanian.” Later during my elder interviews, I would return to interview
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Umm Ibrahim, and we developed a relationship allowing me to call both of them to ask
follow-up questions. 43
Another interviewee who invited me into his family home in East Amman assured
me when giving me directions that I would be safe. He said that the neighborhood is
known for drugs and “all bad things” but said that despite this reputation safety would not
be an issue. Umm Yazan also came from out of the kitchen when we sat in the parlor and
offered me homemade Arabic sweets and tea or coffee. After thanking her for her
generosity and complimenting her on the delicious treats, Yazan, 32, and I began the
interview. The home was decorated in dark reds and velvet fabrics and felt very
traditional, so it was a bit surprising when Yazan replied to my question asking me to tell
me about himself with this reply, “I am a bird, I float above these imaginary lines in the
sand, I am a feminist who fights for the LGBT community. My family is from one of the
biggest Jordanian Christian tribes, but I HATE wasta.” His description of himself as
activist who eschews wasta and identifies by his causes instead of nationality
demonstrates his way of claiming and trying to extend urban citizenship and belonging to
groups who he feels are marginalized in Amman- women, LGBTQ members, and
Christians.
For others, religion (or lack of) was more important than national identity as
expressed by Sami and Mussab. Sami, 24 in an interview in West Amman coffee shop
declared, “I am agnostic, I went to Uni(versity) in the West and had roommates from
around the world. My generation is frustrated and wants fast-paced results.” Sami
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Placing Umm or Ab before the name of a first-born son is an informal naming practice
which identifies a person as a mother or father. I am Umm Cameron which can be used
interchangeably with my name.
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embraced his agnosticism and was not worried who might overhear in the coffee shop.
He shared that his parents are also agnostic, but that they don’t tell anyone. His desire to
want fast-paced results was apparent when we waited for the bill for our lattes and he
impatiently tapped his foot under the table. Since our interview as over, I commented on
the décor in the Canadian branded coffee shop since it features Polar Bears and Moose.
After chuckling about these animals not knowing what to do now that they live in the
desert, he called a Careem on his smart phone and we quickly said our goodbyes since his
driving Captain arrived almost instantly.
My experience with Mussab, 24, in a traditional coffee shop in East Amman had a
more somber tone. The shop was sparsely decorated and had just a few simple plastic
chairs. I was aware that I was the only woman not accompanied by my family, but I
followed Mussab’s lead since he chose the location. His response to my opening question
asking that he tell me about himself set the tone for the rest of our interview. He started
with his religion immediately and said, “Above all I am Muslim. Then I am Arab, we
must help those around us, from the unsafe countries, we are all Muslim.” Identifying
himself faith, ethnicity, and then the need to help others, he asserted belonging to
multiple groups which cross national boundaries.
Since the original scale of the Jordanian national identity was fuzzy by intent to
include a larger territory and the city of Amman and its inhabitants have held a likewise
fuzzy place in the national imagination of Jordanian-ness, it is unsurprising that urban
youth are seeking new sources of belonging. The examples above culled from my
ethnographic encounters reveal a variety of scales of belonging which are more important
to youth than their national belonging and include scales both larger and smaller than the
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territorial bounding of Jordan. In the final section of this chapter I will explore how this
foundation of fuzziness and multi-scalar asabiyyah results in young urban political actors
whose choices and voices run counter to those being expressed in the Global North.
5.5 DISCUSSION: YOUTH GEOPOLITICS BEYOND NATIONALISM
One might expect the upsurge of nationalism in the Global North, seen with the
Brexit vote and the 2016 US Presidential election and the “Making America Great
Again” slogan, to be reflected among the youth of Amman. However, even the most
vulnerable of my interviewees- as we were discussing how their livelihoods and futures
are being negatively impacted by the high percentage of refuges in the country- insisted
that they need to keep their doors open and to protect refugees. While they spoke of
having very little to offer other than safety, they were adamant that they should share that
safety with those in need. This doesn’t mean they accept their fates and are willing to sit
idly by or that they are somehow completely altruistic. Many youths complained that they
would like more opportunities provided by the government or by larger countries in order
to meet their dreams, but they also expressed a willingness (some reluctantly) to leave
Jordan to meet their own goals instead of rejecting newer migrants.
Indeed, roughly two thirds of my sixty respondents stated they would leave
Jordan either short-term or long-term to reach their own goals. I must acknowledge that
as an American researcher it is possible that some youth respondents overstated their
noble intentions towards refugees. However, I attempted to mitigate this element of
human nature by conducting focus panels in which I asked the youth to discuss these
topics together instead of in a one on one interview format. The responses were
consistent with those reported during my semi-structured interviews. By exposing how
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the cultural dimensions of nationalism in Jordan have situated the city of Amman as a
lesser part of the nationalist identity I argue that Ammani youth thus make meanings and
belongings which are counter to the nationalistic sentiments occurring in wealthier parts
of the world (as in Istanbul: see Mills, 2017). Although this project defines situated
citizenship another research project would be necessary to study how this situated
citizenship impacts young Ammanis lack of a similar nationalist response that is
occurring in some western countries.
This chapter sought to add nuance to and build upon critical citizenship literature
focused on the global south by highlighting the case of Amman, Jordan. I began first by
decentering nationalism based on historic processes in Jordan. Then I laid out how
Amman was reborn as a city which situates citizenship in the Jordanian national
discourse through semi-structured interviews with youth, focus panels, cross-generational
interviews, and CDA. This data illuminated how young urban people feel this situated
citizenship differently based on socio-economic class. With this background established I
laid out the importance of paternal lineage based on geographies outside of the Amman,
how the history of continual migrations, and newer scales of group belonging are more
determinant in young people’s identity formation within Amman than nationalism. These
factors motivate the political responses of young Ammanis who are willing to leave
Jordan for opportunities in defiance to Global North nationalist trends.
Looking at the making of the meaning and belonging among young people, I have
shown how the city, the culture, and the state work to deemphasize spaces and people in
Amman. Yet, just as the state was unable to reorder Amman’s downtown by simply
replacing Wast al Balad with Al-Abdali, some youth are also unwilling to be labelled
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along a continuum of Jordanian-ness which the nationalist project designed to privilege
rural youth. Instead they are seeking belonging through micro-political acts of making
other non-nationalistic forms of belonging. Although the Hashemites have been
successful in co-opting the structures of a pre-existing tribal structure and producing a
new hybrid state fitting the colonial goals of the British, this third generation of Ammani
youth, the first who have witnessed the Arab Spring, are experiencing the fallout of
continual regional instability and are beginning to question their places in the original
national identity (Rogan, 1994; Salibi 1998; Alon, 2009). While their formal national
citizenship is difficult to contest, they are expanding and claiming belonging to other
cultural citizenship groups.
Instead, as I show more clearly in Chapter 6, youth are resisting this hierarchy and
asserting their identities and attachments based on cultural geographies, a still unfolding
history of migrations, and more nuanced scales of place than nationally bonded identities.
Indeed, this chapter worked to decenter the “territorial trap” which prioritizes the role of
nationalism by showing how young Ammanis think about their own meanings and
belongings and identities. In the next chapter, I interrogate the ways contemporary
geopolitical changes are impacting local urban experiences and practices among the
current youth population of Amman.
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CHAPTER 6
FIGHT OR FLIGHT: JUXTAPOSING RIGHTS TO THE CITY WITH ASPIRATIONS
OF ELSEWHERE
“My brother and I may fight, but we will fight together against our cousin, and all
three of us will fight against the enemy.”
– Arabic saying, repeated by multiple informants
In Chapter 5 I argued that urban citizenship in Amman is a situated citizenship
that involves leveraging or concealing attachments and relationships to places beyond the
city itself. Urban residents identify themselves and others on a spectrum of “Jordanian”
and “Ammani” belonging in ways that continue to link people to their families’ places of
origin, whether this place of origin is in other parts of contemporary Jordan or in
surrounding countries, and whether migration was a recent experience or occurred in
generations past (Daher, 2011). In this chapter I interrogate how these strong attachments
to elsewhere combine with new geopolitical pressures to discourage young people from
claiming their rights to the city or investing in any future in Amman. The realities of
these urban youth challenge the explanatory ability of contemporary urban scholarship
which needs to be expanded to incorporate the complexities of being a young Ammani
who struggles to claim a full Jordanian identity. Ongoing debates in urban scholarship,
including the need to examine the impacts of: gender, ethnicity, and class on cities and
their residents have challenged urban scholars to critically examine their approaches and
lenses into the “urban question” (Storper, 2016). Scholars critiquing the limits of theories

168

formulated largely in the Global North have also called for more focus on cities in the
Global South to expand the post-colonial turn in urban literature (Robinson, 2011; Roy,
2011). The emergence of Actor Network Theory (ANT 44) and work on assemblages by a
myriad of urban scholars seeks to preserve the importance of the city as a determinate
factor of identity formation, while also incorporating the urban question into other scales
(Storper, 2016). 45 This academic shift allows us to think about the case of Amman and
studying ‘rights to the city’ in a related and interdependent way that holds the city and its
inhabitants as part of urban as well as regional and global systems.
However, even within these critical turns, contemporary urban literature
presupposes that claiming belonging to the city and belonging to the nation are
interchangeable concepts. Yet in Jordan, claiming Ammaniness often situates you as a
lesser part of the nation. Thus, claiming rights to the city can work against your claim of
belonging to the “authentic” nation. Instead, claiming rights to the Levant, the “Arab
Homeland,” or the global community may provide greater acceptance (Culcasi, 2011).
Henri Lefebvre’s seminal “Right to the City” theory and its subsequent
elaboration by David Harvey (and others) treat belonging to the city and inclusion in the
making of urban space as a matter of social justice, viewing the disenfranchisement of
minorities as an urban issue (Lefebvre, 1996, Harvey, 2003). Harvey elevates the ‘right to
the city’ to the status of a human right stating, “the freedom to make and remake
ourselves and our cities is, I want to argue, one of the most precious yet most neglected
44

Popularized by Latour, ANT is a framework which attempts to “localize the global” by
focusing on following the “sociology of association” instead of predetermined theories to
determine what is actually important in a given location (Latour, 2005).
45
Applied by many post-structural scholars as a way of examining collections between
heterogeneous items. The work of Deleuze and Guattari from 1998 is the most
proximately cited assemblage work.
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of our human rights” (Harvey, 2003, p 1). For Harvey the ‘Right to the City’ is inherently
worth fighting for since he defines this right as being able to collectively circumscribe
both spatial and personal versions of society to work better for personal goals.
This presupposes an attachment to a particular urban space. The city itself is taken
as a given in the urban geography literature as a force which informs and shapes personal
and political identities and creates commitments among residents which compel them to
fight for their rights to this space. Studies of urban struggles over the right to urban space
have focused on planning (Tanja, 2005, Fawaz, 2014, Shatkin, 2015), gentrification (Ley,
2014, Janoschka, 2014), neoliberalism (Daher, 2008, Marcińczak, 2014), and informality
(Bayat, 2004, McFarlane, 2012, Johnson, 2014).
In Amman, however, basic problems of urban inequality combined with
historically situated citizenships and new regional pressures are the main forces
producing such struggles. Thus, in Amman, the long-standing urban justice question-“Who has the right to the city?” --is complicated by another question: “What happens
when those with rights to the city, or who might seek rights to the city, abandon the city
because they are more attached to locations beyond it or to pursue other opportunities?”
This chapter explores these new questions by examining how changing regional
pressures and new kinds of political instability since the Arab Spring impact
socioeconomically diverse Ammani youth in their daily lives: neoteric (newer versions
based on the same system) challenges are layered upon old divisions. I also explore how
the regional context 46 which is deteriorating in new ways, puts Jordanian youth in the
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Jordan is not only in the middle geographically of regional instability with conflicts in
Iraq and Syria, but also works to position itself as a nation which practices a moderate
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middle of instability posing new challenges, which are exacerbated by existing historical
challenges that were already pushing young people to leave the city. As increasing
numbers of Ammani youth look elsewhere to reach their dreams, fewer young people
form attachments to the city. Some youth are forfeiting their right to the city and giving
up on struggles for the city as the struggles over urban space are no longer the key
symptom of inequalities and marginalization.
Amman remains a place of refuge founded largely by and for migrants and
refugees. Only around 30 percent of Ammanis claim Jordanian heritage and it is in their
personal interest to maintain a strong sense of belonging in the place of their tribal
heritage. While the Balqa tribe increased their wealth by selling much of the land that is
today modern-day Amman to Palestinians and Circassians, many tribesmen wishing to
retain the full authority of their names remain in tribal suburbs to do so (Shyrock, 1997).
In addition to voting in their tribal centers, their imagined community is in rural locations
which allow them greater access to governmental jobs and a premier position in the
society as native sons. The remaining approximately 70% of Ammanis come from an
assortment of other places having settled in Amman by necessity or for better potentials
than home. 47 Therefore the portion of Ammanis without secondary attachments to other
locations is quite low (Shyrock, 1997, 40). Regardless of origins, nearly two thirds of my
respondents report being willing to leave either in the long or short term to reach their
dreams.

version of Islam allowing it to serve as a mediator between the East and the West
religiously.
47
Due to the sensitive nature of the division between Palestinian-Jordanian and
Jordanian-Jordanian populations the Government of Jordan does not publish data which
distinguishes between these populations.
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Many Ammanis have split attachments to other locations and experience
globalization and regional pressures in ways that push them from the relative security of
Amman to potential opportunities abroad. Thus, instead of a deeply rooted urban
population fighting for their rights to make the city, many Ammanis remain ambivalent
about the transformations of the city along neoliberal lines (Maffi and Daher, 2014,
Daher, 2016; Harvey, 2003). With the government struggling to absorb additional
refugees in any sort of organized fashion, neoliberal ideals underlie the rapid expansion
of the city based on consumerist goals instead of community and belonging. The exodus
of youth from the city is such a constant topic of debate that it was broached directly by
the new Prime Minister within days of his appointment when a young Ammani tweeted at
Razzaz saying:
“I can’t take it here, the economy is terrible. I plan to emigrate.”
and Razzaz tweeting back:
“Take initiative, help us rebuild the country. Don’t emigrate!”
-Prime Minister’s Twitter Feed, May, 2018.
This exchange illuminates one of the key tensions this group of youth is feeling
in Amman. However, it is not the only tension they are navigating, I begin this chapter by
providing supporting data from my ethnographic interviews to demonstrate how this
generation is managing the widest social rift from previous generations - that between
East Bankers and West Bankers. I interrogate the two primary spaces within Amman
which youth cite as fostering lingering tensions from the last generation: The University
of Jordan, and the soccer fields, which are characterized by strong rivalry between the
“Jordanian” and “Palestinian” Ammani teams. Then, I highlight how many younger
Ammanis, despite these spaces of tension, feel that the tensions between these two types
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of Jordanians are fading as time, class, gender, and career divisions increase due to
regional and global patterns of inequality and instability. In opposition to the main social
justice argument fore-fronting ‘Rights to the City’ as a vastly underexplored human right,
I outline which issues youth from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds cite as their
biggest challenge in Amman. These vary based on financial concerns to cultural issues
which are increasingly important as Ammani youth encounter peers from other regions
through globalization. None involve fighting for the right to urban space. Finally, I
enumerate the various dreams that youth shared with me and explain how they feel their
goals are impacted by on-going local, regional, and global processes, all of which inform
their thought about migration.
6.1 ECHOES FROM THE LAST GENERATION’S PRIMARY CHALLENGES:
PALESTINIAN  PALESTINIAN JORDANIAN  URDASTINI
The first time I heard the proverb “My brother and I may fight, but we will fight
together against our cousin, and all three of us will fight against the enemy” was during
my very first semi-structured interview. 48 When I heard it a second time about five
interviews later I paused to ask about the significance of the saying and was told it is used
regionally but takes on new meaning in the Jordanian context. Numerous youth quoted
the proverb during our interviews- each portraying the Jordanians and Palestinians as
brothers, with Syrians being their cousin and DAESH being their enemy. While this Arab
proverb is used throughout the region to discuss familial bonds, in the Jordanian case it
encapsulates shifting attitudes between Jordanian-Palestinians and Jordanian-Jordanians
due to newer threats from DAESH and the economic fallout from the Arab Spring.
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Arabic version: anna wa akhoii A’laa iben A’mmi, wa anna wa iben A’mmii A’laa elghareeb.
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30-year-old Farrah explained it this way: “Jordanian and Palestinians in Amman,
we were fighting over pebbles until we saw a spaceship fly overhead.” According to her
analogy, Ammani brothers witnessed a “spaceship flying overhead” in the form of facing
new waves of Syrian immigrants, an anemic economy, the rise of DAESH with economy,
the rise of DAESH with regional terrorism attacks, and the threat of further instability on
multiple borders. She explained that one of the Ammani brothers is “pure” Jordanian and
one is Palestinian-Jordanian, but they have temporarily put aside their “fight over
pebbles” (which Farrah characterized as the tensions between Jordanian-Jordanians and
Palestinian-Jordanians) and are now working together against other larger threats. 49
Thus, although during my interviews I occasionally heard simmering animosity
between East Bankers and West Bankers, the response I heard from two thirds of my
respondents is that the tensions between these two “brothers” is decreasing in
significance as newer more pressing issues take precedence. Later in the chapter I will
focus on which issues this generation perceives as most important in limiting their ability
to reach their dreams. These new issues are influencing this generation more than the
East Bank/West Bank tensions, which were the main urban conflict of their parents’
generation. While the East Bank/West Bank division isn’t resolved, it is an issue that is
aging and being superseded by this generation’s neoteric geopolitical pressures.
Thus, in the city this division was felt through employment differentiation and
and through both blatant and subtle racism (Brand, 1995). However, these informally
learned hierarchical layers of society, based on the paternal lineages to geographies
outside of Amman which I examined in Chapter 5, are not the only factors which
49

Although the term “pure” Jordanian is problematic from genetic and academic
perspectives, it is one that was frequently used by my interlocutors.
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fragment Ammani society and are fading as more pressing issues subsume these old
divisions. Yet the secrecy behind this East Bank/West Bank division adds
misunderstandings to the very divisions between Ammanis that the Jordanian regime
seeks to eliminate, and which many youths report that they would like to see disappear
altogether. Despite the consensus that these tensions are less important now that Jordan
has been thrust into what Ibrahim, 32, called “survival mode,” the divisions still linger.
During the course of my semi-structured interviews I did not ask my interviewees
about the what their religious affiliation. Most however, volunteered that information
during the time we spent together. Likewise, I intentionally didn’t ask about their familial
origins, yet nearly every respondent volunteered this information (as social convention
dictates). After this information was provided, I asked my informants to explain the
moment when they first understood that there are different types of Jordanians. Often
these stories were traumatic with many explaining that they were harshly exposed to the
idea of different categories of Jordanians at school.
Yet, to the person, none of the sixty youth I interviewed learned about the
Jordanian Civil War (known as Black September) from teachers at school. The official
narrative is thus overtaken by local narratives. Fructer-Ronen’s examination of Jordanian
textbooks explores this erasure of history, stating, “It is interesting to note that the events
of 1970–71 are not mentioned in the school textbooks of that period, and not even two
decades later. The authors preferred to ignore them” (2013). She further notes that when
this issue appears in textbooks beginning in the late 1990s it is treated tersely, with a brief
comment that a difficult period of three years ended with security being returned to the
state. Yet, despite the inclusion of this brief mention in the textbook, all of the youth I
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interviewed reported this issue was not addressed by teachers in the classroom. Instead,
issue is learned from the community, from family, and from whispers among friends. 50
Only a tiny minority proudly expressed that these divisions are significant for them and
that they personally held disdain for other types of Jordanians, indeed only a handful of
respondents stated that they wish “Palestinians would go home” or that without
“Palestinians civilizing Jordan it would be nothing.” While this layering based on family
origin remains, family place of origin was not the dominant marker of difference which
arose in my conversations. Socioeconomic class was instead mentioned more frequently.
Although I will outline two spaces where theses tensions remain at the forefront
by discussing the Wehdat/Faisaly soccer rivalry (which serves as a proxy for the tension
between West Bankers and East Bankers) and the tensions I witnessed at the University
of Jordan, it is worth reiterating that two thirds of my respondents felt strongly that the
East Bank/West Bank divide was more problematic for their parents than it is for their
generation. Yet the conversation I had during a cross-generational interview with Zain,
38, who is married with two teenage children offers additional insights to an expression I
heard from a few respondents attending the University of Jordan. 51 While sitting in her
office at an International Refugee Organization, Zain explained that Palestinians of her
generation must have two identities: they must be both Jordanian and Palestinian.
However, she can be just Jordanian because she has tribal roots and is pure Jordanian.
For her generation this is often encapsulated by referring to people as either JordanianPalestinian or Palestinian-Jordanian. Still Zain’s parents and the parents of her friends
50

Scholars observe the same erasure of contentious historical tensions in Lebanon
(Abouchedid, 2002).
51
Zain represents the generation prior to this generation of youth as a married woman no
longer living with her parents.
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had only one identity- they were either Palestinian or Jordanian.
Yet some of the youth I spoke with are beginning resist the assignment of two
distinct identities through their adoption of a new hybrid identity: “Urdastini”
(Jordastini). 52 Notably, it was in one of the keys spaces of heightened tension where I
first heard this new identity. I began my interview with a young female student while
sitting in a café near the University of Jordan by asking her to tell me about herself. She
shared that she feels a mix of two identities and doesn’t feel more Palestinian or more
Jordanian since she is equal parts of both. Further she explained that she and some of her
friends call themselves “Urdastini” to avoid being hyphenated. For her and her friends,
the three-generation movement from one identity to a dual identity and then back to one
identity for Palestinians in Amman is: Grandparents: PALESTINIAN  Parents:
PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN  Youth: URDASTINI. This term identifies them as
belonging to both cultures simultaneously and shows an attempt to return to a designated
form of identification that defies national boundaries. This movement towards a unified
identity comes from the third generation of youth to experience this social process
allowing them to transition from being Palestinian, to Palestinian-Jordanian, to the newly
coined "Urdastini”
A transition happening in an urban setting, where exposure to people from other
cultures is quite common.53Meanwhile, in a speech to Parliament, King Abdullah
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Urdastini is the new local slang term in Arabic that was used to mean half Jordanian
and half Palestinian. In Arabic the “i” ending denotes an adjective. In translating this new
slang term to English the “i” remains and the term becomes “Urdastini.” Elder
generation interviews were unfamiliar with this youth term.
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In the rural areas further analysis and ethnographic work would need to be conducted
to confirm or deny a similar generational transition. However, I have not heard reports of
this term being similarly adopted in second cities or in rural areas and suspect that in
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outlined the challenges currently faced regarding the Palestinian cause and Jerusalem. He
stated that there would be no breakthrough solution without a US push for the peace
process. Further, he stressed that without Hashemite support for Jerusalemites and
custodianship of Jerusalem’s holy places the shrines "would have been lost years ago."
Declaring the future of the Palestinian cause at stake as solutions are becoming more
difficult to secure, he also spoke with MPs about the assault against a police patrol in
Ma’an, In the speech he called violence against security agencies a “a red-line” that
should not be crossed. Additionally, he states that the Rule of Law needs to apply
indiscriminately to all and that “all have to look at Jordan as one tribe; Jordan is my
tribe” (Law, 2016).
Indeed, the public rhetoric from King Abdullah uses the Palestinian cause as a
rallying cry to unite all Jordanians under the Hashemite rule. In a speech to parliament on
August 05, 2017 King Abdullah states that the rule of law must apply to all
indiscriminately, that “All have to look at Jordan as one tribe; Jordan is my tribe” to
further unite all Jordanians. He explicitly cautions those in the tribal region of Ma’an,
which has proven to be restive area prone to protests, to follow the law which shall be
applied to all citizens evenly. By calling all Jordanians his tribe, he is challenging the
tribal Jordanians’ claim to greater Jordanian-ness and bestowing tribal-ness to
Palestinian-Jordanians as a continuation of older Jordanian discourses on Jordanian
nationalism (Culcasi, 2016).
This statement highlights the official Jordanian discourse which publicly seeks to
decrease tensions between Palestinian-Jordanians and Jordanian-Jordanians. During this
tribal areas the allegiance to being Jordanian would continue to be the primary identity,
while in Amman the high percentage of immigrants fosters new hybrid identities.
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time of regional instability, the King is calling for Jordanians to become tribal brothers
who are loyal to him and to not allow them to be divided or to challenge the tenuous
stability Jordan maintains. The Jordanian response to President Trump’s announcement
that the US formally recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in December 2017
provided another unifying source for Jordanians who peacefully protested this action with
sit-ins and calls for legislation against this action. Despite predictions of violence, the
reaction to the news was met by young people whose resistance was relatively calm.
Some of these same youth also talk about the diminishment of the East Bank vs
West Bank tension. In particular they note how common intermarriage is for them, but
that marrying across this divide caused great tension for their parents’ generation. They
also mentioned that while West Bankers are still largely underrepresented in the
government, that since the salary for most of the governmental jobs are not keeping pace
with private sector jobs that this is not much of a hardship. Notably the third who feel this
issue is worse for them struggled to pinpoint how they feel this discrimination. Instead
they mentioned the hot spots I outline below or talked about blatant racism that may have
simmered during their parents’ generations but that was now exposed openly on social
media. When I pressed them to describe to me how they feel this racism in ways that are
greater than the pressures their parents felt, they couldn’t cite concrete or systemic
examples and instead told personal stories of people they thought were friends whose
Facebook feed or subtle actions betrayed them. One young respondent in particular
explained that she unfriended half of her high school classmates after they posted what
she feels were racist comments after a particularly heated soccer match which her team
won.
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In another example, 22-year-old Rami shared a story of coming home on the
school bus crying in second grade because he didn’t know if he was Palestinian or
Jordanian. So he ran into the house and asked his Mom which one he is and her answer
left him even more confused. Rami told me he is slightly lighter in color than his three
older siblings and his mother leaned down close to him and told him, these three are
Jordanian, but you are Palestinian- just don’t tell your father!
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It was clear that this was

a family joke which has been retold many times since then, but at the time Rami was
genuinely confused and upset when trying to understand what the different types of
Jordanians look or feel like.
Another highly emotional story was told to me by 32-year-old Nour who works in
a prominent telecommunications office. She had a small ring which she wore and
described as an inexpensive bauble. It is a Jordanian flag which has the Hashemite star.
This marked her as a proud Jordanian of Jordanian heritage. She explained that several
years ago she left this ring on her desk in her cubicle and when she returned the star was
scratched off, with a note saying that the anonymous colleague had improved her ring,
the implication being that being Palestinian was better than being Jordanian since with
the star removed it now looked like a Palestinian flag.
As I outlined in Chapter 5, the distinction between national markers such as the
Palestinian or Jordanian flag and the two types of headscarves are minimal, but important
ways of identifying yourself quickly as belonging to one group instead of another. While
the cost of the ring was quite low, the impact of knowing someone she works with and
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At the time this happened Rami was too young to understand that his Mom was teasing
him by hinting that his father was not his real father. Later, when he understood her joke
this story became a way to tease his own father. Skin tone was not addressed by another
other respondents as a marker of heritage.
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trusted had violated her personal identity in this way made a strong impression on her.
Although she still works at the same office and has risen to management, she remains
suspicious of her colleagues and wonders how many of them feel the same way- that
being Palestinian is an improvement over being Jordanian. This makes her insecure but
also angers her as she points out that Jordan is not only her home, it is also the home of
whoever treated her this way.
Despite their seemingly memorable stories respondents couldn’t explicitly place
these experiences on a time continuum of improvement or worsening tensions since their
parents’ generations, reporting instead these stories as formative ones which hurt. So,
while old divisions do matter to some extent, the extent to which they matter is becoming
less meaningful. As I probed about the sorts of discrimination their parents and
grandparents would have faced, none of the youth talked about Black September or the
government's Jordanization of the military and government positions as a result of the
conflict. The choice to leave teaching this sensitive topic to the community instead of
providing a controlled narrative result in a disconnect where many young people feel
some vague sort of discrimination without the historical understanding of why the
Government of Jordan initially adopted restrictions on employment or how they are
systematically changing these restrictions.
Based on historical migrations, war, and government policies, perhaps the
Palestinian-Jordanians could fit into the ‘Rights to the City’ framing at the national scale,
but in Amman Palestinian-Jordanian are the majority of the urban population. Further, for
the majority of youth, this tension between brothers has by necessity become less
important because it is now largely a cold war fading into the background, while the hot
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wars in Syria and Iraq on Jordan’s northern border move to the forefront of concern in
Amman. These issues which are causing loss of life and the inability of their peers to lead
normal lives have unsettled the lives of young Jordanians by creating newer pressures
and challenges.
Before turning to the pressures resonating most with this generation, I will
illuminate three dynamics still dividing the city. First, I will explore the two spaces
within the city which continue to foster the tension between East Bank and West Bank
Ammanis: The University of Jordan and the Ammani soccer rivalry. Then I will highlight
how class dynamics and gender impact youth in the city. In addition to these spaces
which perpetuate the tensions between Ammanis and socioeconomic divisions, I will also
highlight how career choices are often based upon paternal lineage from outside of the
city, reinforcing the differences between Jordanian and Palestinian Ammani youth.
Despite my arguing that these differences are decreasing, they are still felt by Ammanis,
and in some places more than others. It is to these spaces which reinforce differences
which I now turn.
6.2 A CITY DIVIDED: LINGERING SPACES OF URBAN TENSION, INCREASING
CLASS DYNAMICS AND GENDER DIVISIONS ON DICTATED PATHS
Spaces of Lingering Division:
Existing divisions within the city prevent a cohesive attachment to Amman as
home. In other globalized urban cosmopolitan centers like New York, Istanbul, and
France, these divisions do not necessarily prevent attachment to the city and minority
groups do often mobilize to try asserting their ‘Rights to the City.’ Yet in Amman the old
divisions which I outlined in Chapter 5 and situate national citizenship work against the
kinds of solidarities that would allow broad struggles over urban space and rights.
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Though these old divisions are fading, the struggle for ‘Rights to the City’ remain
secondary as the city itself situates citizenship in problematic ways. These issues are
being further exacerbated by new divisions which are fostering a low level of attachment
to the city. I sought to better understand how youth feel and experience these divisions
and low level of attachment to Amman by asking Ammani youth about their spaces of
inclusion or exclusion in the city. I also asked what their biggest challenges were as
young people in Amman. While the majority of respondents said the economy was their
biggest concern, many also reported that “if my dad was here I would have to say
Israel/Palestine, but since he isn’t here, I can say what really affects me most which is…”
Although concerns were split across socioeconomic layers, all classes reported
two primary spaces serve to keep the focus on dividing Jordanians between JordanianJordanian versus Palestinian-Jordanian lines: The University of Jordan and the soccer
games between al Faisali (the East Bank team) and al Wehdat (the West Bank team).
Within these relatively controllable settings, the politics of language have been
constructed to allow the expression of concepts that have been deemed unacceptable in
other more “polite” portions of the city. In this way Jordanians have two acceptable
outlets if they want to express dissatisfaction with the “other” in ways which don’t
challenge the overall goals of the Jordanian government to unite the country by erasing
these divisions.
First, I will interrogate the social impacts Jordan’s largest (over 30,000 students)
and most renowned public university, the University of Jordan (UJ), exerts upon youth.
My interviewees described it as a space that perpetuates the most violence and that keeps
simmering internal tensions alive. Several young people pointed out the segregated
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admissions offices with tribes having distinct offices for admissions and counselling,
while “others” are lumped into a category which they felt marginalized them. Indeed, as
Cantini’s recent analysis of the University of Jordan concludes, “the university
contributes to the creation of differences between groups of citizens which are integral to
the regime’s survival strategy” (Cantini, 2016, 13).
To gain access to UJ’s secure campus I initially volunteered as a speaking partner
for the Language Department. As a volunteer my name was listed with the security staff
and I was given access to campus. My first experience entering UJ felt I felt quite
restricted despite the campus stretching across 300 acres and abutting a heavily trafficked
road. Each time I returned to this bustling urban campus the confining feeling still
permeated. Prior to each visit, I had to arrange access through contacts I built as a speaker
for the US Embassy Speakers bureau, through my being a language partner, or through
scheduled appointments, and I couldn’t simply enter the campus. To facilitate less
restricted access to students I arranged to meet them at a small local coffee shop across
from campus. It was here in this small coffee shop where I first encountered the term
Urdastini and Jordanians like Nadar below who expressed that UJ is a rare place in
Amman because people from different socio-economic backgrounds mix with each other
easily.
For 23-year-old Nadar, “attending UJ brought me out of my bubble, I went to
private schools my whole life, I graduated with the Crown Prince from King’s Academy
and thought all Jordanians had similar lives. I was so ignorant of the racism and struggle,
but I couldn’t ignore it at UJ.” If there hadn’t been a health issue within his family, Nadar
would have attended an Ivy League college in the US. However, Nadar told me that he is
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grateful to have his bubble burst, because now he feels the discrimination and the poverty
and says that for the first time knows the “real” Jordan. As a public university, UJ has
students from a variety of economic classes. Therefore, while it serves as location which
reinforces tribal differences, it also serves as a place where Jordanians from different
classes can interact. While attending prestigious private schools and living in gated
communities, Nadar only interacted with upper class peers. He states that he wouldn’t
have been exposed to people from other classes who are struggling with poverty if he
continues in his sheltered life unless he went to UJ and mixed with middle and lowerclass Jordanians.
Indeed, when I asked a University of Jordan professor from the Nursing School
during a cross-generational interview how students experience the differences between
Jordanians while on campus, her blunt answer startled me. Without compunction she
stated, “We teachers discriminate, we give lower grades to Palestinians, you can tell from
their names where they are from.” As a Jordanian-Jordanian she felt within her rights to
make sure Jordanian-Jordanian students received the highest grades. In her perspective
Palestinian-Jordanians deserve lower grades and this practice is one she attributed to
other Jordanian-Jordanian teachers at the university. As I explained earlier it is routine
practice for Jordanians to place each other on their shared mental mapping of Jordanianness by asking for a full name so they can associate the person with a particular tribal
area or with a city in Palestine, allowing teachers like this one the ability to categorize her
students. In special circumstances when a name is known to come from both a town in
Palestine and from a tribal area of Jordan, it is common for the person to pointedly ask
for more details by saying, “are you the Qubains from Salt (in Jordan) or from Nazareth
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(in Palestine)?” This method of identifying someone new upon meeting them is how
teachers would initially use students’ names to place them on a scale of Jordanian-ness.
The professor went on to explain that as a Jordanian she isn’t allowing her son,
who just won a Fulbright, to travel to the US and to enroll in the university because he
would face discrimination there and would lose his commitment to Jordan. She believes
he has very little of commitment to Jordan already and expressed that this hurts her
deeply. By positioning her son as an outsider in the US who would be expected to face
outright discrimination, she is justifying her discrimination of those she feels are “others”
in Jordan. She is also making a claim that if her son- a “pure” Jordanian leaves Jordan
that he will not want to return as he would lose his commitment to this space. Thus, for
her it is a sacrifice to stay in Jordan, but one that her son should make since he is a native.
Beyond the segregated admissions offices, her disclosure reveals another way which
students at UJ experience the disciplining of the institution: through some teachers’
biased grading techniques.
In addition to tribally segregated admissions offices, career tracking, and grading
biases, students at UJ also witness, experience, and at least some participate in annual
bursts of violence surrounding the election of their student body. 55 This parallels the
problematic allocation of seats in Jordan’s parliament, which are disproportionally
allocated to sons of the tribes who run on tribal platforms. The day the results are of the
UJ elections are announced invariably brings violence and celebratory gunfire as security
forces tightly monitor the reactions but allow a controlled amount of fist fighting between
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“Career tracking” refers to the way East Bankers are more easily able to enter the
public sector, while West Bankers have great difficulty working for the government and
typically enter the private sector. I explored this in Chapter 4.
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the tribes (Cantini, 2016).
Aside from the physical violence other students witness after elections, the
allocation of seats on the student council ensures that only select youth from tribes loyal
to the regime are given voices to raise select student concerns. Echoing the positioning of
Amman in the legislature, the majority of the student body is largely silenced, leaving
only the privileged tribal minority the controlled ability to speak. Since only roughly 50%
of students pass the tawjihi (national high school exam), admission to public universities
is highly competitive. 56
Typically, in Jordan the sons and daughters of people with privilege study in the
United States and Europe, while the sons and daughters of tribal Sheikhs study at
Jordan’s public universities, and Palestine children often study at private universities
(Cantini, 2016). Yet for those who are admitted to a Jordanian University by scoring well
enough on the tawjihi (national exam), being given admission based on ‘privileges of the
King’ (makrumat al-malakiyya) due to their parents’ military service, or who pay for
admission through the higher cost parallel system, the path after admissions continues to
be wrought with daily reminders of the differences among Jordanians. Students reported
that their perceptions of social difference and inequality among university students at UJ
was in sharp contrast to their perceptions prior to coming to the university. At the
university Jordanian-Jordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians are brothers who are fighting
each other without having this tension diluted by the more pressing arrival of their Syrian
cousin or their enemy- DAESH. Instead they are in competition with one another in their
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Although the tawjihi exam impacts academic placement for those relying on free
admissions to public universities, those able to pay for entrance through the parallel
program or able to gain admission by ‘privileges of the King’ are free to choose their
academic paths.
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courses, for the student body, and with academic rankings in a relatively isolated setting.
The other “hot spot” which reinforces tensions between the brothers of Jordan and
fosters a low level of ownership of the city is the rivalry between Amman’s soccer teams.
Al Wehdat is the Palestinian-Jordanian team which was founded in the New Amman
refugee camp in 1956 and has a large fan base in East Amman, while Faisly is the tribal
or Jordanian-Jordanian Ammani team which was founded in 1933 and has large tribal,
suburban, and disparate support throughout the city. This rivalry is so intense that the
Jordanian Football Association ruled that games between the two teams would be played
to empty stadiums to prevent further escalation of violence. Based on a review of fan
chants and signage the Association ruled that fans were stoking aggressive ethnic
divisions instead of simply supporting their preferred team and that disciplinary action
including monetary fines was necessary.
According to MacClancy, “Sports… help to define moral and political
community. They are vehicles of identity, providing people with a sense of difference
and a way of classifying themselves and others” (1996; 2). This is particularly true in the
post-colonial Global South where national teams are tied to imported sports teams, but is
complicated in Amman where the city has teams which represent Ammanis with ties to
two different nationalities. The spatial element of sport is amorphous as it extends beyond
the stadium and follows fans around the city, yet Hague argues, soccer “plays an
important role in the development of local identity, culture, and shared “social memory”
of living a place (Hague, 1998).
Wearing your team’s jersey identifies you as belonging to a particular group
wherever you travel. Al Wehdat’s red and green soccer jersey is commonly worn by their
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fans who would be identified as Palestinian-Jordanian, while wearing the distinctive light
blue jersey to support the Blue Eagles Faisly team would typically identify you as being
Jordanian-Jordanian. However, this issue come to ground in Amman as in and out groups
are marked by sports allegiance in physical spaces including the Palestinian refugee
camps of East Amman who support Al Wehdat (the team based team in the Al Wehdat
refugee camp) and in the tribal suburbs which support Faisly. Using Paul Gee’s “figured
worlds” (a framing for discourse analysis), I interpret this sports rivalry as one which
travels throughout multiple locations in the city as fans occupy new spaces during their
days where they must confront, conform, and perform their roles as both Jordanians and
fans of a particular soccer team within the city (Gee, 2014)
I was first made aware of this highly charged rivalry by Mohammed, a ten-yearold Jordanian-Jordanian boy with strong tribal connections from Salt to whom I taught
English. Nearly six months into volunteering with Mohammed the subject came up
unexpectedly when we were sitting at an outdoor café reviewing his lesson. As a car
drove past with the radio on Mohammed’s whole demeanor shifted and he became
visibly agitated, shaking his fist at the car and yelling. When I asked him if he was ok, he
replied, “yes but that was Wehdat’s team song and I hate them so much!” While I wanted
to explore this more deeply with him, specifically to ask him why a boy of his age would
have so much hate for Palestinian-Jordanians simply for supporting Wehdat, due to his
age I instead started to incorporate questions about this tension into my semi-structured
interviews and doing additional research.
While academic scholarship on the rivalry was not available, it did draw the
attention of the US Government, who wrote a classified diplomatic cable in 2009 (which
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was later released by Wikileaks) about the political meaning of this intense sporting
rivalry inspiring violence and increasing local tensions. The sporting periodical, World
Soccer, also listed this pairing one of the sport’s greatest rivalries due to the “symbolism
of what both teams represent to their respective communities that gives the game its huge
political significance in Jordan and beyond” (Montague, 2015). Noting that no real
Jordanians could support Wehdat, Suleiman, an Oxford professor, also observes in the
World Soccer article that despite very personal cheers asking King Abdullah to divorce
his Palestinian wife, the regime allows the venting of tensions between these two groups
of East Bank and West Bank fans as it is a controllable and predictable way to let off
political steam. While violence is regular at these sporting events, fans of both teams
often support the national team which combines players from both clubs for matches
against other nations. 57 This echoes the sentiment from the beginning of the chapter,
simply replacing the Faisali and Wehdat teams which represent the Jordanian and
Palestinian brothers who when they play one another are enemies, but when they face an
outside challenger are simply brothers.
My conversation with Mohammed suggests that children as young as ten years of
age also experience these tensions between these “brothers.” Indeed, it would not be the
last time Mohammed and I would experience this issue together. Nearly a year later while
sitting at another café, Mohammed made a hand gesture to the waiter by hooking his
finger over his nose, a gesture of support for Faisly which went viral as a way to taunt AlWahdat. This inflamed the waiter who began chanting and soon Mohammed was
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State attempts to foster national identity in the global south through sports coverage
was analyzed in Istanbul following a strong World Cup performance (Kösebalaban,
2004).
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outnumbered by a café full of Wahdat fans cheering and mocking him. Since he was the
only Faisly fan and a youth under my charge, I had to step in and remind the room that he
is a young boy and that the issue would be decided on the pitch that night.
However, just as this tension enflames and polarizes by exposing the social
divisions and marks of social difference within Jordanian society it also mixes them with
the fervor and aggression of sport. Conversely, this also fosters a sense of belonging as a
supporter of one club or another. For fans of Wahdat, it is easy to claim rights to their
Palestinian refugee camps in East Amman by superficially decorating these spaces with
fan memorabilia and filling the air with chants to support their team. However, it is
harder for Palestinian-Jordanians who live in the urban refugee camps to claim deeper
rights to the city since their spaces are explicitly places for “others” who maintain them
as places of martyrdom which must be understood as temporary homes until the
occupants return home to Palestine.
I myself participated in creating a sense of belonging as a supporter of the Faisly
soccer team when I was conducting a focus panel in a largely tribally connected and
poorer suburb of Amman and I heard the young men discussing the upcoming game.
Knowing the room, I hooked my finger on my nose and won a cheer of support which
allowed the focus panel to begin with rapport having been instantly established. This
simple act of showing support for one soccer team allowed me to become more of an
insider than if I was unaware of this rivalry: most importantly for my study, the formation
of social and political boundaries of belonging or exclusion based on affiliation with
sports teams shows the fluidity of identities within the city.
In both these hot spots of urban tension, the speakers and audiences are
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Figure 6.1 Hooked nose- “pure Jordanian” support for al Faisly Soccer Team while
wearing the Red Shmaagh instead of the Black and White Palestinian head covering.
http://kalemanews.com/Article.aspx?id=23260&c=2&nt=1#.WdX0qmiCxPY
participating in conversations as part of a specific “figured world” where public
expressions of the animosity between Jordanian-Jordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians
are possible, while in the rest of the city it would be unacceptable to blatantly act the
same way (Gee, 2014). Fan signs, fistfights, and harsh language which would be entirely
inappropriate in other locations in the city have become accepted forms of discourse as
long as they remain within the set boundaries of UJ and the soccer rivalry and do not
extend to political action beyond the university or the soccer pitch. While these spaces
allow political steam to be vented, these spaces of urban tension primarily impact the
daily lives of youth as they are the most likely to frequent both the university and to
participate in this soccer rivalry. The inescapable layering of the society which emerged
time and time again during my research was related to class. Indeed, class distinction
greatly influences how young people from different economic classes use (and imagine)
the city.
Increasing Divisions: Class Dynamics and Gender
With an estimated 50% of Ammanis attending private schools, class divisions
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crystallize early. Economics also have a large role in how gender is felt by young peopleparticularly women who felt extremely constrained by the need to represent their family’s
names based on social expectations among their economic peers. Bassel, a 24-year-old
architect, was the first to paint the socio-economic layers of the city for me. He described
the city as consisting of a large lower class, a shrinking (or non-existent) middle class,
and a tiny upper class that use spaces in the city along layered physical dimensions
starting from the ground upwards. Bassel appeared to be part of the upper class since his
father is a doctor, he graduated from German Jordanian University (a prestigious private
university) and drives his own car- yet he self-identified as being from the disappearing
middle class. Thus, the relative deprivation among young people in Amman reflects the
larger trend of increasing income inequality felt not just regionally, but globally in the
last several decades. Subsequent interviews also confirmed the class elements of spatial
use in Amman, an issue already being explored by other urban scholars working in the
global south who are looking at enclaves in India (Galonnier, 2015), in Bucharest during
economic transition (Marcińczak, 2014), and in Gating in Malaysia (Tedong, 2015).
As I discussed briefly in an earlier part of this chapter, in addition to the insecurity
brought by the Arab Spring and the social constraints, youth are affected by economic
inequalities: like political and social tensions, economic inequality in Amman is also
much more than a local issue, dependent on regional and global contexts. Jordan has been
largely dependent on foreign aid since its modern founding, first from British patrons and
now from American donors. Lacking natural resources, the Government of Jordan has
tried to market their human resources and moderating role in the region as their biggest
assets.
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Yet with youth employment in Jordan at 11% for young women and 47% for
young men and a foreign work force of 1.5 million, the issue is not straightforward (ILO
Study, 2014). As I alluded to earlier, the social coding of jobs follows a strict cultural
hierarchy. Jordanians are often discouraged from taking work in the home (despite higher
pay) leaving many domestic jobs filled by Filipinos and Egyptians. Likewise, many
service jobs are looked down upon and often filled by Syrians (Wickham, 2008). Further,
an unemployed man brings greater shame to the family, so they are often given
preferential status over women in hiring.
Numerous youth spoke about the mismatch between the degree they had to pursue
for family honor (the most prestigious are engineers and doctors) and the limited number
of available jobs in those sectors. The typical time from degree completion to
employment is 36 months for men while Jordanian women have among the highest
unemployment rate in the region and may wait close to 10 years to find employment
(Abuqudairi, 2016). In addition to these new pressures based on regional instability,
cultural norms, and economics many youth expressed that their dreams (which I explore
in section 6.3) are either not possible in Amman or not supported by their families or
culture.
Although the government defines poverty levels based on the minimum wage
salary of 2.1 JD per hour ($2.96 in October 2017), I asked the youth themselves for their
perceptions of the defining characteristics of the lower/middle/upper classes and had
them identify themselves using their own definitions. Those who self-identified as being
from the lower economic class talk about using the city at the street level, where they
played growing up and where they spend time hanging out with friends now. A coffee
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and cigarettes that cost less than 1 dinar (about $1.40, in October 2017) are the extent of
their discretionary spending, although they can be found window shopping in wealthier
areas of the city. Middle class youth talked about frequenting restaurants, coffee shops
and malls (with their segregated hours for single men and ubiquitous security screenings)
where they could spend from 5JD-25JD per evening ($7-$35, in October 2017)
(Schwedler, 2017). The upper class spoke of being in the pubs where they could access
alcohol or spending times at each other’s homes in order to have privacy; discretionary
spending appeared to be of little consequence for this group who implied they could
purchase what they wanted without worrying about the cost.
Answers to questions like “What is the largest problem facing young people in the
city today?” predictably re-inscribed class lines. Those who identified themselves as
lower class spoke of needing jobs, wanting to save enough money to start a family, rising
inflation, and the competition from lower salaries or dowries accepted by Syrians, an
economic reality reverberating and increasing throughout the region since the Arab
Spring (Ceritoglu, 2017). The middle class spoke of educational opportunities and the
mismatch of their degrees to the available jobs in the market in Amman. The upper class
talked about cultural challenges including LGBT discrimination, lack of artistic and
personal fulfillment, and the struggles of not being heard by elders in their society.
Likewise, those from the lower to middle classes spoke of wanting to leave
Jordan for locations to the East and the frustration of the Gulf being essentially closed for
Jordanian workers since the economic downturn of 2008, leaving nowhere to turn for
jobs. The middle to upper classes looked more to the West for education and high paying
jobs, places that are still open but not guaranteed due to Brexit and Trumpian efforts to
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restrict immigration. In 2016, 11 of 13 top Jordanian students went to the US for higher
education. In 2017 after the election of President Trump only 1 top Jordanian student
even applied to the US (US Embassy speech by the Public Affairs Office, 2017). This
shift primarily impacts the middle and upper classes who can afford to travel abroad.
However, even as their families felt the students might still be welcome in the US, they
didn’t want to risk not being able to visit their children if US travel policies and rumored
Muslim bans were extended to them and therefore directed their children to apply to
schools in the region or in Europe.
While class issues permeate how young people experience Amman, this division
is felt differently by men and women. Each face unique challenges based on religious,
cultural, and social norms. Compared to other nations in the region such as Saudi Arabia,
Iraq, and Afghanistan, Jordanian women face relatively fewer legal restrictions on their
social and physical mobility. Thus, it can be surprising that even as Jordan seeks to
politically position itself both as a moderate nation whose role as the guardian of Islamic
holy sites in Jerusalem allows it moral standing within the Islamic world, and as Western
leaning, Jordanian women have the lowest rate of employment in the region at 11% (ILO
Study, 2014). This tradition of being a mediating force between the East and the West
serves Jordan well as it retains favor from both its de facto sponsor (the US) as the
recipient of the largest per capita aid money from the US without the same concerns
about gender inequality being continual sources of international discussion (Sharp, 2017).
Yet Jordanian women are faced with what Fida Adely, in her examination of
women’s education in Jordan, calls a paradox. This paradox is that despite an increasing
number of young Jordanian women receiving higher education, their participation in the
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work force remains doggedly low (Adely, 2012.) While the pressures on young men to be
breadwinners who establish a home and a way to provide have long informed their paths,
the path for urban Ammani women has been changing recently. To be considered a good
“catch” Jordanian women must be educated and willing to work to help provide, yet
culturally they are also seen as competition to men who are already facing low
employment rates and high competition from other job seekers.
Bassel, a 24-year-old architect who first described the socio-economic layered use
of the city to me, struggled to explain this paradox I asked him “what makes a good
Ammani woman?"58 His quick response was that she would need to be educated and
willing to work to help him provide income for their family. When I probed and asked
what type of job she should have, he hesitated and grew flustered. He explained that his
Dad retired from the Army after 30 years as a doctor (marking him as JordanianJordanian) and that his mother is quite educated but never worked. He elaborated that his
uncle who owns a big business hates to hire women because he invests money into their
training and then when they marry or have children they leave. He was not able to
determine which jobs women should have based on his family but felt that with newer
economic realities in Amman his ideal wife should work somewhere.
This paradox has been explored further lately in both popular literature and film.
The Bride of Amman incited controversy in 2015 when the author brought to the
forefront the pressures young Ammani women face to marry in his realistic fictional
novel (Zaghmout, 2015). This book, written by a Jordanian man also exposed the cultural
taboos surrounding courtship including: cross marriage between a Christian and a
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I also asked respondents “what makes a good Ammani man?”
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Muslim, incest, a young woman being married to a gay man, and the shame being a
spinster brings to families. In addition to illuminating the taboos against dating,
Zaghmout focused on the lengths young Ammani women must go to in order to be
marriageable, with discussions between the protagonists about education, careers, and
whether or not to wear the veil in order to be most marriageable.
This same issue was brought to ground again in the Jordanian film, When
Monaliza Smiled, based on a fictional young East Ammani woman who was the subject
to a litany of familial requirements for education, work, and marriage that left her with
little opportunity for choice before she makes a radical decision to defy social norms by
pursuing a relationship with an Egyptian man (Hadad, 2012). Although the film ends on a
seemingly happy note, it left me with many unanswered questions. In the real world, this
young couple would face not just social stigmas, but the male suitor could not gain legal
citizenship in Jordan through his wife, and their children would not be legally Jordanian
since he is Egyptian.
Yet, the dream and power of this Jordanian-made film is that is shows a worndown and quite poor woman from East Amman fighting back against a system which
suppressed her. While this focus on how poor Ammani women’s lives are scripted for
them is particularly poignant since they are the most vulnerable population, it also came
through clearly in my interviews and is something that resonated across classes. While a
feminist approach to the rights to the city literature could conceive of Ammani women as
an oppressed group struggling for their collective rights to shape Amman, such a group
did not emerge during my interviews with youth, or indeed during my time living in
Amman and conducting observations. Other pre-existing and new more recent divisions
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discourage women from bonding together to claim access to making the city.
Prescribed paths
Not being able to choose their own career futures was a top concern listed
amongst all socioeconomic levels of youth. 59 One clear cause of these dictated paths can
be traced to the East Bank/West Bank division which funnels “pure” Jordanians to the
public sector and Palestinian-Jordanians towards the private sector. As I described in
Chapter 5, Palestinians in Jordan are separated from their tribal identities, and ascribed
identities based on the locations of their ancestral homes in Palestine: their social and
political identities in Amman are thus indelibly linked to geographies outside of the city.
However, this is not viewed as an entirely negative process of identification by
Palestinians themselves, as many urban Palestinians frame tribalism as backwards and
profess that when their early ancestors arrived in Jordan they civilized the land by
bringing technologies the nomads of the region didn’t possess (Shryock, 1997). The place
of origin of their ancestors thus provides an opportunity for them to assert a position of
potential superiority in Jordan’s private sector as they are not obligated to serve in lower
paying public-sector positions.
Again, this highlights the need to expand the “rights to the city” framework since
status in Amman’s private sector is most easily attained by “others” who are neither
obligated nor able to claim tribal Jordanian heritage. These obligations allow rights to the
city but steer native Jordanians towards the lower paying public sector, which they argue
excludes them from being able to advance their economic class. Even as intermarriage
59

Although the tawjihi I exam impacts academic placement for those relying on free
admissions to public universities, those able to pay for entrance through the parallel
program or able to gain admission by ‘privileges of the King’ are free to choose their
academic paths.
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between Palestinian- Jordanians and Jordanian-Jordanians becomes more common, local
generalizations often reinforce the imagery of tribal Jordanians content to lazily work for
the Government of Jordan (particularly in the security forces) while commercially
oriented Palestinian-Jordanians work hard to make more money in the private sector.
Although these generalizations erase hard working Jordanians and ignore Palestinians
working in the government, they are rooted in divisions which began as a result of the
Black September Civil War and the subsequent Jordanization of the government.
This labor division is perpetuated by the institutions of higher education which
witnessed a proliferation of new private for-profit universities following the unexpected
return of Palestinian-Jordanian workers from the Gulf during the first Gulf War. Now 11
of 13 private universities in Amman are owned by Palestinians (Cantini, 2016 p 32).
Although Jordanian students connected to the Jordanian government through their
parents’ employment have the advantage of legacy admission in the form of reserved
seats at state universities, new private universities allow more admissions for degree
tracks aimed at the private sector (Cantini, 2016).
In addition to the systematic funneling of youth into the private or public sector
based on familial lineage, the transformation of the higher education sector also informs
the career paths for many youths. These social factors highlight the depth of hopelessness
Rafra feels when she lamented in Chapter 5 that as a Palestinian-Jordanian she would
face too many obstacles attempting to be a policewoman. While Rafra is from a poor
family in East Amman, and attended public schools, even from elite youth I heard over
and over that their path was dictated for them by the need to follow the path that would
bring the most prestige or honor to their families. Omar from an upper-class family in
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West Amman decried how his soul was being killed every day working for the Royal
Court, but to leave and pursue his dream of revolutionizing Arabic poetry would shame
his family who are so proud of his engineering degree. Wealth and connections may
afford more prestige, but do not buy freedom of education and career choices.
Throughout the city, youth are pursuing career goals and degrees which are in line
with their lineage as either bound for the public or private sector based on their East or
West Bank status. Yet, these dreams rarely seem to align with the globalized visions the
youth have for themselves. The thaqafat al eib (culture of shame) permeates and informs
which dreams youth are able to pursue. The aspiring Jordanian-Jordanian Arab poet who
graduated from a prestigious American university and the elite King’s Academy High
School, before taking a position at the Royal Court in a “soul-sucking” job said he was a
victim of Jordan’s thaqafat al eib since he needs to stay in a job he hates to bring honor
to his family. Equally, the young Palestinian-Jordanian woman who lamented she
couldn’t lower her dowry to compete with Syrian brides stated she is subject to thaqafat
al eib since her family expects her to bring in a certain price for her marriage. All across
the spectrum youth are subject to cultural expectations which apply pressure to their life
choices.
Of course, East Bank and West Bank are not the only ethnicities of young people
living in Amman. I also spent time with Syrian, Saudi, Libyan and Iraqi young people,
many of whom have “guest” status preventing them from participating in legal
employment. While education is open for foreigners willing and able to pay the price,
once they graduate many of these guests in Jordan are unable to work. As Omnia, 22,
from Iraq stated, “I have nothing invested in fixing the problems in Jordan, they don’t
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want me here, just my family’s money. I can’t work here so I will try to go to Europe
where I can work.” 60
Returning to East Amman, the second of the four regions of the city I described in
Chapter 4, demonstrates how parts of the city encourage young people to feel strong
attachments to places outside the city. My discussion of East Amman began by
illuminating the prominence of Palestinian refugee camps in that part of the city. These
spaces within the city work to evoke belonging to another place: in the cases of the alWehdat and Jabal Hussein camps, the place of primary belonging is imagined to be in
Palestine (Feldman, 2015, and Khalili, 2005). While the majority of youth I interviewed
agree that the tensions between East Bankers and West Bankers are becoming less
significant, and the government has long campaigned on the need to unify Jordanians,
there still remain spaces within the city which reinforce this divide. The social meanings
of these spaces dictate allegiance to homelands the youth are marked as being aslyn min
(originally from), in their present-day realities each time they are asked for their last
names or which neighborhood they live in, allowing other Jordanians to place them on a
map situating them as belonging primarily to Palestine instead of Jordan.
These spaces also impact youths’ futures by dividing their allegiances and
dictating their potential career paths for the future. If your home in East Amman is
maintained as a space which is connected to the right to return to Palestine and you are
excluded both by the state and from your own social obligation from participating too
deeply in the government, this ties your future to the cause of a nation you don’t live in.
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These perspectives illuminate how non-citizen youth attach to the land and location of
Amman. However, they are beyond the scope of this project which focuses on Jordanians
with full citizenship rights and looks at how citizens attach to the city.
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The youth are continually instructed to retain these extra-urban attachments to areas
outside of the city or even beyond Jordan’s national boundaries through soccer matches,
enrollment at the University, through class and gender issues, and through prescribed
career paths. Before delving into the dreams the youth I interviewed shared with me, I
will highlight the more pressing geopolitical pressures which are impacting young
Ammanis more than the older East/West Bank divide.
6.3 DREAMS FROM AMMAN: BEYOND Al A’MAN
While the bulk of this chapter explained how old divisions and economic
inequality combine in the pressures of daily life, this last part of the chapter explores how
youth envision their futures, given these constraints. It struck me when I asked, “What
are your dreams?” that numerous youth responded they don’t get asked this question
often. Yet one of the key tenants of the UN Global Convention on Youth held in Amman
in 2015 states that it is critical “to consider ways to give youth a greater voice in
decision-making at the local, national, regional and international levels” (The United
Nations Security Council Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security, 2015).
Compellingly, academics writing in New Cultural Politics in the Global South
and North, a recent special issue on Being Young and Muslim, argue that western scholars
who previously failed to predict the transformative youth movements which were drivers
of the Arab Spring are now doing a disservice to Arab Youth whom they have only
recently identified as political actors by framing them through old dichotomies instead of
talking to them directly for nuanced understandings of their lives (Herrera, 2017). The
collection also critiques policy makers and development workers for lapsing into easy
tropes about youth as either: potential destabilizers who need policy and development
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programming to prevent them from radicalization; or peaceful entrepreneurs who simply
need empowered to solve their own economic and social problems (Sukarieh, 2017). In
this section I honor this scholarly critique of an Orientalist gaze by instead bringing the
voices of this group of young people to the forefront.
As discussed previously, external factors which heavily influence which dreams
youth have and pursue include socio-economic class, familial lineage, and the national
education system. Similarly, when asked the young people they think Amman means to
the Middle East as a region, “safety” was their most frequent response, but again they
were emphatic that this is something they had spent little time considering and is another
was a question many said they have never been asked before. Although Amman is a safe
haven for many in the region, the youth don’t regularly deliberate on Amman’s regional
role; instead, Amman as a place of safety is a given since they are taught from youth to
be hospitable.
Although native Arabic speakers would not confuse the two words, the Arabic
word al-a’man 61 (security) bore so much similarity to the word “Amman,” that I was
struck each time I heard it. As part of my journey of studying Arabic, the link between
the Arabic words for safety and the word Amman was inescapable. Despite this merely
being a linguistic coincidence, it resonated with me since several youths stated that all
they have in Amman is al-a’man (safety). Many of the same people who said that
Amman represents safety to the region also stated that they don’t take this safety for
granted, and that security is not enough for them. Their dreams are bigger than simple
survival and they want the opportunity to reach these dreams.
61

The pronunciation is distinct in Arabic as the city (ɑ:ˈmmɑn) is pronounced using a
guttural “a” sound and has a hard stress on the m.
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This sentiment was reiterated during a key interview when the Dean of a
prestigious private university told me with a heavy heart, “this is not a place to fulfill
dreams.” Although he has undertaken a study to combat brain drain, the Dean admitted
that his students don’t want traditional jobs working in the public sector for the Jordanian
government, but want sophisticated jobs which pay better than salaries in Jordan. He
even sheepishly confessed that his wife and kids had been increasingly pressuring him to
accept an opportunity to leave Jordan. Although his university does not keep statistics of
how many graduates leave Jordan immediately after graduation, he estimated that only 510% stay since they are in high demand in Europe.
Another factor relating to education also sends youth abroad, at least for shortterm goal fulfillment. Upon arriving in Amman in the summer of 2016 I observed an
ongoing battle about the education system in Jordan. The royal family, particularly Queen
Rania, has been a vocal advocate pushing to reform the national curriculum. According to
Dr. Omar Razzaz, (who was the Education Minister at the time, but became Prime
Minister in May 2018) the goals of the education reform movement are to increase
critical thinking and to decrease reliance on rote memorization, as well as to increase the
percentage of Jordanians who pass the tawjihi (national high school exam). 62 This reform
movement has been met with fierce opposition by religious elements that oppose these
changes and charge that the reforms are actually seeking to decrease the influence of
religion in the school system. It is within this environment that the city’s most globalized
generation, many of who will eventually fill jobs which were not created when the
national curriculum was drafted, are dreaming of their future education and career paths.
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Speech at the Harvard Arab World Conference at the Dead Sea, March 11, 2017.
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As the curriculum battle continues, a high percentage of the upper class goes abroad for
higher education. This only exacerbates the existing cultural tensions among
socioeconomic groups as youth exposed to Western liberal universities return to
traditional spaces and attempt to “make the city” alongside middle and lower-class
Jordanians who have remained at home and who cite much different issues as their most
urgent daily challenges.
Throughout the Arab World degrees in the hard sciences and more particularly in
engineering and medicine are most desirable. In Jordan this is also true, although there is
some increased acceptance of work amongst the upper classes in the social sciences, due
to the Royal family’s embrace of International Affairs degrees. These types of work
(engineering, medicine, law) have historically been the most prestigious private sector
work while work in the government has been prized for the benefits and honor it brings. I
will explore the shift away from these highly sought-after jobs in Chapter 7 in more
detail. What I want to bring from that topic to this chapter on how young people living in
Amman stake their claims to the city through their connections to places outside it, is that
the government jobs are typically thought of as most proper for people outside of Amman
who retain their tribal connections. In Amman itself, private sector jobs are often more
prized. Despite the regional preference for hard science careers, these types of jobs only
ranked third in the list I created from the various kinds of dreams youth described in our
interviews.
The most popularly mentioned “dream jobs” collectively fall into an “activist 63”
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The high percentage of NGO’s and International Organziations working in Jordan as a
regional platform has increased the number of jobs available in this line of work. These
jobs are now much more present than previously.
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category and run the gamut from women’s empowerment to refugee and LGBT jobs. The
second most popular dream was to work in languages, which is seen as a way out of the
region. English, Japanese, Chinese, and Spanish were all languages that my informants
are studying so they may open new opportunities to leave Amman. After engineering and
medicine, young people mention self-employment, indicating they want to work on-line,
with start-ups, or on developing new uses for technology. Outside of these larger
categories a variety of service-oriented dreams were mentioned including being a baker, a
make-up artist, and a wedding planner.
Still others mentioned personal dreams that do not relate directly to career goals.
These include: climbing Mount Everest, being openly atheist, and breaking free from the
pressure to be a shoekh (plural for sheik- with an implicit obligation to be a
tribal/government leader). These personal aspirations are impacted by Amman’s position
in the middle of regional instability and further highlight how youth are not only tackling
existing divisions and limitations, but also attempting to overcome newer stresses in
order to reach their globalized dreams. When I asked if their personal or professional
dreams are attainable in Amman, the resounding response was “No!” Although some
from the lower and middle classes felt the upper classes would be able to reach their
dreams in Jordan, the universal response was that young people do not get to direct their
own paths which makes reaching their goals in Amman very unlikely.
Although some dreams are quite bold, others are notably humble. 24-year-old
Said who lives in East Amman and takes public transport 2 hours each way to UJ (a trip
which by car would be less than 30 minutes) dreams to finish his degree and become a
professor. In Jordan, a career in academia is not among the most desired paths since it is
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not as esteemed as a career in the hard sciences, and although scholars do enjoy the status
of the title "Doctor", they are not among the economic elite. He described himself as
hungry and said, “the wolf climbing the mountain is always hungrier than the wolf on top
of the mountain.” Yet despite this hunger, Said was uncertain if he would be able to
complete his degree and to teach due to the financial pressure to stop school and work
full time.
Shaden’s dream was humble as well. She told me with great frustration, “I never
knew that a 4JD ($5.65 in October 2017) cupcake existed until I went to Abdali, but now
it is just another thing that I can only dream about but never have.” The new elite spaces
of consumerism are tantalizingly close, but financially very far away for this 20-year-old
from East Amman, whose dreams now include an expensive sweet which she didn’t
realize existed before the neoliberal transformation of the city (Daher, 2008).
Finally, a teary 19-year-old Rima shared her dream with me, “Syrian women have
sweet tongues and ask for a lower mahr (dowry). 64 My dream was to get married and
have children, but even now that dream is not possible- what am I gonna do? - Lower my
dowry to 10JD when it is already low at 3000JD for my neighborhood?” Rima’s daily life
is being impacted by the on-going geopolitical issues which brought additional (and
cheaper) competition to the marriage market. This is affecting her both in the short-term,
but she fears it will also impact her long-term chance of getting married. Dreams large
and small are getting harder to reach in Amman as the geopolitical situation impacts the
youth and they are simultaneously exposed to new possibilities via social media and the
internet. Their relative deprivation has reached higher levels now through globalization,
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making the basics no longer quite enough.
6.4 CONCLUSIONS: ONE TRIBE - BUT WHO IS MAKING THE CITY?
Dr. Al Alhoui of German Jordanian University lamented during our interview that
students arrive to his school missing any attachment to their home place and that they
simply don’t feel any ownership here. Thus, he trains them, and they leave Jordan for
Germany or other prime offers in Europe “without looking back at Jordan.” However, he
expressed sympathy with his students who are not taught that it is possible to reach their
dreams here; instead they are taught that staying in Jordan is a sacrifice which creates a
“Jordan-phobia.” He faults the system for teaching them to look for other places to reach
their dreams instead of providing them opportunities and showing them local success
stories.
During another key informant interview at TAG Education Services, Ab-Osbeh
bluntly stated, “the coming generations can’t live in Jordan” due to low wages and
insecurity. He followed up by saying that when he graduated only 5-10% left Jordan and
they did so with the intent to make money and then to return home to establish their lives.
However, this generation is wise to leave and not return- something he framed as a big
but understandable mindset change. I argue that an anemic economy is not the only cause
for this change in mindset, but that having situated citizenship which limites prospects
also encourages young people to seek their futures elsewhere.
Low levels of attachment to the urban setting could also be an underlying cause
of Amman’s endemic littering situation which is prevalent even in the wealthiest of
neighborhoods. The lack of community in my neighborhood also created a feeling of
isolation which worked against attaching to the space. Living in Abdoun, in West
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Amman, I didn’t know many of my neighbors. The village feel of East Amman is entirely
absent as people escape into their gated residences. However, I was introduced to several
neighbors roughly six months after moving into our flat when I shepherded my husband
and children outside to gather litter from the road to clean our street. Neighbors I had not
seen prior, nor after, scattered out telling us to stop collecting the garbage. They assured
us this was not work meant for us; instead they urged us to call the government office
that has the responsibility to clean up. While speaking at UJ, I mentioned this example
and asked the students for their opinions, the results were mixed. Most agreed with my
neighbors that it wasn’t my responsibility to collect other people’s garbage, however a
few mentioned that I had the right to improve my neighborhood as long as I wasn’t
interfering with others. None of them had considered doing a similar neighborhood cleanup, despite all of them agreeing that garbage is an issue in the city.
In this chapter I sought to expose how the urban justice question, “who has the
rights to the city?” fails to fully capture the key urban issues in Amman. This chapter
demonstrates how situated citizenship is complicated by both existing divisions (although
the East/West Bank divide is lessening) including hot spots which work to keep these
divisions alive, and neoteric issues following the Arab Spring, all of which combine to
create low levels of attachment to Amman. With two thirds of my respondents reporting
that they would like to leave Amman, it raises questions about levels of commitment to
remaining in the city. Thus, both young Ammanis and the city suffer not from
exclusionary conditions limiting who has the right to make the city, but from residents in
survival mode who not only claim and are labelled as belonging to elsewhere, but many
of whom feel they must look elsewhere to make their dreams.
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While situated citizenship in Amman amplifies the specific complications of
young Ammanis who face the choice between fighting for their ‘rights to the city’ or
taking flight to places with greater opportunities, these complications are not entirely
unique. Herrara applies Guy Standing’s term the “precariat,” which combines precarious
and proletariat, to all youth in the MENA region (Herrara, 2017). She argues we should
look at this region’s generation of youth as part of a neoliberal “precariat” whose primary
struggle is to find a way to secure their own economic stability in a globalized economy
which prefers precarious employees. She asserts that although this term was coined based
on Eurocentric scholarship, that this pressure is strongest on youth in the Global South as
they are the most likely to need to leave their homelands to seek opportunity.
Another unifying feature of this region’s generation which El-Sharnouby
highlights is that the young Arabs who participated in the Arab Spring differ from prior
revolutionaries who had clear and specific goals to topple colonial leadership and to
replace it with native leaders from their own ranks. Instead, he notes, this generation of
post-colonial revolutionaries did not attempt to seize power for themselves, instead they
continue to occasionally take to the street to express their desire for “bread, freedom, and
social justice” (El-Sharnouby, 2017, 85). By recognizing that this generation is not
seeking to grab power in their specific locations, he argues that they understand how
interconnected the problems they face are with the global system.
This reveals a generation of new neoliberal political actors who are globally
connected and may be less rooted to the concept of fighting for their ‘right to the city’
than to their rights for economic opportunities in a globalizing labor market (Schwedler,
2012). The case of young Ammanis aligns with other examples of youth who are
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connected globally. This illuminates how this once localized social justice approach
needs to be expanded beyond the urban scale to reflect a newer generation who are more
concerned with access to the global market than fighting to change their local urban
space, particularly as their city fails to provide them with the identities and opportunities
they seek.
Yet, despite the desire of the majority of my respondents to pursue their dreams
elsewhere, a small number of urban activists including Turath, Hamzet Wasel, and
Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development (JOHUD) are working in Amman to
foster a sense of neighborhood and civic participation with the minority of passionate
residents who are invested and interested in creating Amman. In Chapter 8 I explore how
this generations’ attempt to claim Ammaniness offers the best hope for these activists to
succeed in their mission of fostering an informed group of urban citizens, who would
benenfit from a greater sense of citizenship and could become committed to the
development of the city. Before we turn to that discussion however, I will delve further
into how globalization is testing Jordan’s social contract within the city in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 7
BEYOND JORDAN’S SOCIAL CONTRACT: MESSAGES TO CREATE YOUNG
NEOLIBERAL CITIZENS
“I am pro-Hashemites but recognize they created a structural problem when they paid off
the tribes for our loyalty. Now the public sector is built on inequality because as nonJordanians they needed to create a rentier base, but one without natural resources.”
Ghaida, 28
In Chapter 6 I highlighted how neoteric geopolitical pressures collide with
Amman’s situated citizenship (from Chapter 5) to discourage young Ammanis from
claiming their ‘Rights to the City.’ These unfolding urban processes mean that “for many
Amman is also a city which suffers from a lack of urban identity and a place to which
some residents have a weak sense of belonging” (Daher, 2008, 39). However, this lack of
urban identity and low attachment to place is occurring due to local historical events and
on-going regional and global pressures and transformations. One major cause of this
alienation is the structure of the original social contract.65
This chapter tells the story of how Jordan’s original social contract built an
economic and political hierarchy based on a newly created tribal elite who gained
privileges, including employment within the Jordanian government, in exchange for their
support of the Hashemite regime. This story is unfolding as I write, and I explain how
65

Starting from the 17th century with Thomas Hobbes philosophers including John Locke
and Jean-Jacques Rousseau have each written about a ‘social contract’ as the unwritten
agreement made during the formation of a state between those to be governed and the
government. This contract is an implicit agreement among the members of a society to
cooperate for social benefits as they become citizens subject to the rules of the land.
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contemporary population changes and neoliberal reforms are testing the original social
contract in the broader context of social and physical changes across the region. The
fading of this social contract results in an uncertain economic and political hierarchy and
contributes to young people wanting to leave Jordan as their futures are no longer
guaranteed to proceed along a single clear path. I end the story by interrogating what
messages are filling the void created by the fraying of the social contract and how young
people are instead transitioning from purely royal subjects into neoliberal citizens.
In the first section I outline the making of Jordan’s original social contract. As I
explained in Chapter 1, when modern Transjordan was being built, Emir Abdullah
needed to win over the support of the local tribes he hoped to rule. This practice of nation
building through a social contract exchanging tribal support for governmental privilege
continued throughout the mandate period, so by the end of the mandate in 1946 the tribes
were fully integrated into the state and played an integral role in it (Alon, 2007, 146).
In addition to the pressures from large influxes of new Jordanians who don’t
belong to the native tribal hierarchy, globalization is also adding stress. These stresses
include local desires to become a global city which is coalescing with new requirements
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) to enact
neoliberal reforms. I illuminate how the neoliberal shift which began under King Hussein
took on new urgency once King Abdullah II ascended to the throne. Jordan’s transition to
a neoliberal economy during King Abdullah’s reign allowed Amman to participate in a
global oil boom, but also exposed it to the subsequent global economic bust in 2008. This
boom and bust period dramatically affected not only the city but also the social contract,
which no longer offers enough for many Ammanis, who are instead left searching for
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newer opportunities. It is in this context of a fading social contract and increased
interconnectedness that I interrogate pacifation messages meant to and contain youth who
no longer have the same level of access to employment within the Government of Jordan
due to regional and global pressures.
In the conclusion I explore the uncertainty and contradictions which are filling the
void created by the contraction of state employment. Instead of a clear-cut social contract
that provides state employment in exchange for tribal support, there are now multiple
narratives focusing on redirecting young people’s futures. As Peck and Tickell (2002)
illuminate, neoliberal reforms which “rollback” state services are often simultaneously
accompanied with messaging that citizens should be responsible for activities formerly
provided by the government.
Thus, while messages directed towards Ammani youth allege to empower them
as they include encouragement for: youth activism, youth as peacekeepers, and
entrepreneurship; these messages create a paradox for youth who are perhaps unwittingly
reinforcing the status quo through their participation as neoliberal global citizens. Indeed,
Ammani youth may be paradoxically extending the status quos through their activities,
leaving their generation without adequate employment or a replacement social contract
which addresses their fundamental needs. Unlike in other regional monarchies, the
messages in Jordan to create global neoliberal citizens are being pushed as a survival
strategy by a combination of public, private, and aid organizations instead of being
simply a state-led social engineering effort. 66 These include redirecting youth energies
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As in Jones's investigation into what he argues is “an ambitious state-led social
engineering campaign in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where leaders aimed to
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towards: Stability First, Activism, Youth Peacemakers, and the Entrepreneurialism in line
with neoliberal ideologies. To understand how young Ammanis became the objects of
these transformative messages, I will begin the story of today’s political and economic
paradoxes at the founding of modern Transjordan.
7.1 BUILDING A SOCIAL CONTRACT: FROM MANDATE TO INDEPENDENCE
As modern Transjordan was being founded during the British Mandate the
question of which local leader would lead the nascent nation-state demanded an answer.
During the mandate period British field officers preferred the nomads of Jordan who they
saw as noble, to the settled tribes of Palestine, who they saw as “mixed race tribes”
(Alon, 2007). Despite not being from a tribe native to the newly bounded lands, Abdullah
I was a “true Bedouin” and he was able to quickly build personal relationships with
important sheiks from powerful tribes using two discursive tools: his claim to be directly
descended from the Prophet Mohammed which afforded him legitimate religious
authority, and his family’s leadership role in the Arab Revolt which freed the Levant
from the control of the Ottoman Empire engendering gratitude from a newly liberated
people (Khalidi, 1991).
Notably, during the 1916-1917 Arab Revolt the Hashemites led a tribal
confederacy similar to the kind of decentralized governments which ruled the region for
centuries. This confederacy of tribes was not cheap to maintain, as “they paid them large
sums of money expecting them, in return, to pledge their allegiance to the Arab alliance,
join it and on occasion even fight for it” (Alon, 2007, 16). Yet, Ghaida, the daughter of a
prominent tribe, whose quote began the chapter, makes a direct link between the
encourage more entrepreneurial, market-friendly, patriotic, and civic-minded citizens,
who were still loyal to the regime” (Jones, 2017).
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Hashemites not being aslyn min a Jordanian tribe and an unstable social contract which
was needed to “buy tribal support.” 67
As a researcher on the economy and the employment sector at a local NGO,
Ghaida is acutely and uncommonly aware of the economic challenges in Jordan. While
Bayloumy notes that “Prior to its economic reforms in 1989, a social contract in Jordan,
similar to most in the Middle East, provided economic goods in return for political
quiescence,” Ghaida adds more specificity to Jordan’s contract (Bayloumy, 2008). She
states that the Hashemite regime’s need to secure the loyalty of the native tribes, by
exchanging governmental privileges including employment, underlies contemporary
inequalities which make the Jordanian social contract unstable.
Understanding the current social contract requires returning to the modern
founding of Transjordan. During the mandate period, Jordan’s national identity was
linked to an idealized image of the Bedouin by “Pasha” Glubb, a British colonial officer
(Alon, 2007). Glubb was instrumental in creating Jordanian traditions which associated
this new national identity with both the Hashemites and the migratory desert tribes
(Hobsbawm, 2012). The tribes themselves participated in the Bedouinization of the
national identity (Alon, 2007; Massad, 2001). This process was facilitated through the
adoption of a Transjordanian flag (with the Hashemite star), the valorization of mansef 68
as the national dish, and the invention of the Jordanian military uniform all of which
evoke Bedouin imagery. Later in 1949 when a local currency was introduced to
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I met Ghaida at the local book club I attended monthly while living in Amman.
Lamb or beef cooked in sour yogurt and mounded over rice which is shared
communally and traditionally eaten by hand. This dish was not eaten by Bedouin in this
manner, as they didn’t serve rice until the British arrived. Instead, the dry jamid ball
(dehydrated sour yogurt) and hard meat were eaten.
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distinguish from the Palestine Pound, the Jordanian Dinar (JD) adopted pictures of
Jordan's New Kings wearing native Bedouin dress. By linking the Hashemites to an
imagined Jordanian community, which actually consisted of disparate Bedouin tribes, the
social symbols of Jordan reinforce the role of the tribes in the government.

Figure 7.1 A Jordanian Dinar (JD) 50 banknote displaying King Abdullah II in Bedouin
dress. Author’s photo.
To turn Transjordan from a tribal outpost into a modern nation, a functioning
bureaucracy needed to be established. As in most developing countries, the government
was a primary driver of the economy. While many scholars have argued that Jordan’s
current political stability stems from the hybrid government which Emir Abdullah created
by layering the British style central government over top of the existing tribal system,
Fathi instead argues Jordanian exceptional stability is more complex than simply coopting the tribal system. Instead he highlights how Emir Abdullah and Glubb created the
new tribal elite and entered into a symbiotic relationship with these new elites. These
same new elites then became the Government of Jordan's base, continually imbued with
powers and privileges in order to maintain both the authority of the regime and the tribes
(Fathi, 1994). This symbiosis changed both participants as it created a “Hijazi” form of a
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colonial government. It required the nomads to locate where the new state services were
available so they could attain upward mobility from the patronage they received through
the social contract and added tribal logic to the new government (Fathi, 1994).
In Jordan, before the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) was initiated,
approximately 75% of East Bankers were employed by the state (Bayloumey, 2008).
While wasta is ubiquitous and well documented throughout the region (Loewe, 2007; AlRamahi, 2008), in Jordan, the systemic use of wasta guided the very foundation of the
state. When the sheiks of powerful tribes participated in supporting King Abdullah I’s
ascension to the throne, their sons were granted wasta and became mustawazirun
(destined to be ministers). Abdullah needed the legitimacy of the tribes to rule, but he
lacked the resources to continue to buy their support on his own. Thus, Jordan’s rentier
economy and the East Bank dependency on external aid started from the beginningalthough it was initially tied to British financial support (Knowles, 2005).
Electoral representation in the Parliament was gerrymandered to skew to the
countryside. Ababsa and Daher argue that cities contributed little to nation building in
Jordan since allegiance to the King trumped all and Jordan’s cities are a mix of people
from within and beyond Jordan’s borders whose allegiance to the regime “is most
suspicious” (Ababsa, 2011, 45). Thus, the “political identity and expression of urban
dwellers is therefore highly controlled and under-represented” (ibid.). This political
control gets to the heart of why Ammani identity can be both important as a source of
exclusion in the process of nation building in Jordan and why it has historically less
important in the formation of personal identities. These scholars highlight how the army
comes from the countryside, as does national identity which harkens back to the tribal
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support for the King. From the currency used, the food that is eaten, the flag that is
saluted, to the national anthem- the link between the Hashemites to the Bedouin culture
reaffirms the original social contract between the tribes and the Hashemite rulers.
Bringing this forward to a contemporary moment, as my informant noted in
Chapter 5, he is socially obligated to keep his voter registration in the tribal area despite
spending virtually no time there. Yet, this must be done to maintain the strength of tribal
representation within the elected body. Elections are determined along tribal lines instead
of party or issue based platforms. This is one method of maintaining the original social
contract which assured tribes a place of privilege in the state. By maintaining voting links
to spaces beyond Amman, youth who have family ties to the countryside are participating
in the work to exclude Jordanians without links to prestigious tribes (imagined to be pure
Jordanian) from equal participation in the government.
Returning to the creation of the social contract, Emir Abdullah was under
pressure from the French in Syria, and raiding parties from the South in modern day
Saudi Arabia, both of whom made attempts to expand into Transjordan (Massad, 2001).
He needed the allegiance of strong tribes to keep the country safe and together. Since he
didn’t have deep pockets to pay large bribes, he “lavished other privileges on the most
important leaders” cars, tax cuts, public recognition, state trips, official positions in the
government, etc… (Alon, 2007, 42). Throughout the 1930s the British ran the
Transjordanian Mandate with only 20 British officers in the country which both enabled
and required Abdullah to rely on Sheiks to help indirectly rule the population. Of
particular importance is the formation of the Arab Legion (predecessor of the JAF) and
the formation of the central government in Amman.
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Both bodies were filled by prominent sons of the tribes who benefited from the
relatively lucrative salary and their new prestige. Colonel Glubb further enabled Abdullah
to continue to use customary law and to bring the tribal sons into the state government by
the establishment of the “Desert Patrol” (Alon, 2007, 99). This juridical-military
foundation laid by the British colonizers was both repressive and productive (Massad,
2001). While key military positions were appointed through wasta to members of the:
“Bani Sakhr, Huwaytat, Sirhan and the Shammar” tribes when the armed forces were
being formed in the 1930s, it not only meant the exclusion of those without tribal wasta,
but it also produced the role of the Hashemites as leaders of the tribes who were the
primary defenders of Jordan (Massad 2001, 218). 69 Throughout the mandate period the
newly created tribal elite continued to be interwoven with the state.
The period just before formal independence produced rapid social change in
Transjordan. While the orientalist image of the noble Bedouin had been adopted as the
national image of a Jordanian, most of the tribes had begun to limit their nomadic ways
and began to settle. Despite this more settled life, trade in Jordan was still was looked
down upon as a profession. Other Levantine nations including Syria and Palestine already
had a long history of trading by the time of the Second World War, but commerce in
Jordan remained stigmatized (Rogan, 1994). This changed rapidly when the sheiks
closest to Abdullah gained licenses for trading and emerged as the elites who took
advantage of WWII as the “decisive factor in the development of the merchant class in
Transjordan (Rogan, 1994, 175). Extending the patronage of the King to the creation of a
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It is important to note that women were excluded from this process. Tribal connections
were entirely gendered during this process, so in addition to urban residents, Palestinians,
and Ottomans, women were kept out of the armed forces during the mandate period.
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merchant class allowed nomadic tribes to expand their control of the formation of the
country. As land was privatized, it was the tribal leaders who had monetary resources to
purchase large tracts of land. While the tribes continued to retain their importance in the
Jordanian government and by serving in the security forces, new revenue streams in the
form of trade and property ownership also became available as a result of their continued
social contract with the King.
Just as Jordan was preparing to expel the British in 1942, the Muslim Brotherhood
arrived in Jordan (Bondokji, 2015). The timing of the emergence of the Brotherhood in
Jordan, when the regime was beginning to agitate for independence, set the tone for the
relationship between the state and the Brotherhood. Like the tribes, the relationship
between the Government of Jordan and the Brotherhood was founded on a symbiotic
arrangement: “the Jordanian state established its relationship with the Brotherhood and
allowed it to work to achieve a set of goals that the state and society find necessary and
important for building social cohesion to support state policies and positions”
(Gharaybeh, 2014).
In 1946 when Jordan gained independence from the British, who were weakened
from fighting in WWII, the cost of employing the majority of Jordanians through
employment in the government required new support. Internal support came in the form
of “loans” from the patrons to the Amir who covered his personal shortfalls when British
allowances were not enough or subsided, these were effectively grants and not loans, as it
was known they wouldn’t be repaid (Rogan, 1994). External support which had
previously been provided by the British now came from a variety of donors including the
United States, international organizations founded during the postwar moment, and
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countries from the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC). However, a major shift from British
sponsorship to American sponsorship was complete by 1951, when the Eisenhower
doctrine went into effect and the US began giving Jordan $1.4 million dollars of aid
annually. In addition to securing new financial support from outside sponsors, breaking
from Britain also required an anti-colonial identity. Massad argues that this new anticolonial identity was ready-made in the exclusionary new version of Bedouinism which
occupied the military, and which become the “true national identity” (Massad, 2001,
164).
7.2 TESTING THE CONTRACT: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO GLOBALIZATION
The East Bank/West Bank population divide and globalization are the two major
forces testing Jordan’s social contract. Both the current population divide and the
processes of globalization have origins in earlier historical developments. In 1948 the
massive number of Palestinian refugees threatened to overwhelm the resources and
culture of the native population of approximately 750,000 (Alon, 2007). Since the
Transjordanian national identity was based on the newly produced Bedouin elite and a
social contract which favored the tribes, the task of assimilating the Palestinians
presented multiple challenges. As previously mentioned, given the sensitivity of the
population balance, it remains the practice of the state to not publicly acknowledge
population ratios which distinguish between East Bankers and West Bankers. However,
in contemporary Jordan it is an open secret that native Jordanians are the minority
population. The shift to Jordan being peopled by more Palestinian-Jordanians than
Transjordanians began almost immediately after independence and resulted in a social
contract which only works effectively for less than half of the population.
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When a second large wave of approximately 300,000 of Palestinians arrived in
Jordan in 1967, following the Arab loss in the Six Day War, many Palestinians had
already begun to develop the private sector (Alon, 2007). While Palestinians with formal
Jordanian citizenship can serve in the JAF, they hit a glass ceiling which prevents them
from receiving further training or promotion opportunities. Likewise, Palestinians with
full citizenship rights could also work for the government but were constrained by their
lack of tribal wasta and would struggle to reach higher ranking positions.
The post-civil war program of Jordanization returned clarity to a social contract
which always favored the tribes. However, from 1948-1971 the Jordanian Government
was attempting to balance the social contract of favoring the tribes, with assimilating
Palestinians in to the nation. This occurred while simultaneously expanding Jordan’s
borders as the West Bank formally became part of Jordan. Following the Civil War, the
survival of the Hashemite regime was again dependent on receiving the full support from
the tribes. Once again, the tribes supported the King, and were rewarded with a
strengthening of their privileges. Two forms of wasta developed: as the public sector
required tribal wasta which worked to exclude Palestinians by virtue of making them
non-competitive, while the private sector developed its own form of wasta based on
personal connections.
Starting in 1980, members of the JAF became even more privileged when the
government began: offering children of the military reserved seats in and scholarships in
Jordanian Universities; creating special duty-free shops for the military; and ensuring
lifetime healthcare benefits for both parents and children of service members (Massad,
2001, 219). This military patronage continues to ensure the primary role of military
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economic interest in supporting the regime. While government wages were not
necessarily commensurate with those in the private sector, the prestige, sense of duty, and
other associated monetary privileges still compelled many tribal sons to pursue
employment in the Government of Jordan.
In 1987, this exclusion became formalized with the passing of the first law
distinguishing between native and naturalized Jordanians. This law prohibited naturalized
Jordanians from holding “political and diplomatic positions and positioned established by
the parliament unless 10 years has passed since his acquisition of Jordanian nationality”
(Massad, 2001, 44). With the formalization of the exclusion of many PalestinianJordanians from the public sector, West Bankers essentially occupied a parallel economic
and the secondary wasta based system emerged in the private sector.
Tensions remain among West Bankers who felt underrepresented and excluded
from the government. However, the social contract held as Ammanis (many of whom are
aslyn min Palestine) sought to expand the private sector. With the East Bank/West Bank
divide already straining the original social contract, globalization also started exerting
additional pressure. Palestinians unable to secure work in Amman travelled to the Gulf
for work and started sending remittances home to Amman. When the ability to climb
social economic classes had been previously achieved primarily through governmental
work, which was primarily controlled by East Bankers, now Palestinians were also able
to advance via the private sector (Jureidini, 1984). New sources of income including
remittances and new sectors of commerce allowed West Bankers to move beyond the
monopolies created through patronage in the private sector during WWII. They brought
new capital into the city and the new economic mobility fostered the creation of a nascent
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middle class.
If the first King Abdullah created a new tribal elite and entered into a social
contract with them in exchange for their support, the second King Abdullah’s policies
created a new elite class of economic advisors who speak the language of neoliberalism,
while still being very loyal to the Hashemites. 70 The balancing act between these two
groups of elites reflects the balancing act within the broader Jordanian population. The
strength of the new elites who gained both prestige and wealth as Jordan sought to
modernize by embracing globalization presents another genuine test to the original social
contract, as evidenced by the shifts within the public sector (section 7.3 I outline some of
the discourses the Jordanian government utilizes to maintain this balance).
First, I will identify a major shift in public sector employment which was
occurring simultaneous to the West Bank actions bolstering the private sector. Youth
hoping to work for the government feel this shift as jobs which once seemed plentiful
now according to my interviews take years “waiting on the roll” hoping that you name
will be chosen. The only youth who confidently told me they would be working for the
government were those who were going into the military following family tradition and
with the ability to employ wasta. Bayloumy argues that when the regional economic
depression in the mid-80s (caused by the oil bust) compelled the Jordanian government to
reach out to the IMF for help, that it resulted in the imposition of the SAP and ultimately
an increase in “military welfare” to stabilize the economy (2008). SAP hit Jordan hard
when governmental oil subsides were removed as the nation has little in the way of
natural energy sources.
70

When King Hussein died of cancer in 1999 his son Abdullah II ascended to the throne.
He remains King.
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The restive area of Ma’an ardently protested this removal of the oil subsidies
since they are a transport hub without many other drivers in their economy. As I noted
previously, prior to SAP the state employed approximately 75% of Jordan’s work force.
The expansion of Washington Consensus free market ideology through international
financial institutions meant imposing economic policies throughout the developing world
in the early 1990s, which required governments to “tighten their belts” and to reduce
general population welfare (Stiglitz, 2002). Although globalization was introduced as
way to diversify and drive the economy, it also imposed restrictions. As Jordan’s new
primary financial external supporter, the US encouraged military welfare instead of
general governmental employment. The shift towards a more robust military required the
rest of the state budget to decrease.
Indeed, the military increased three-fold from 1961 to 1975. In 1975 one-fourth of
the domestic labor force was in the security services (Bayloumy, 2008, 62). Such
guaranteed employment and preferential treatment did not make the rural Jordanian
population economically better off, but provided them with a guaranteed, steady income.
Of particular note was that, “domestically, the lion’s share of jobs was in the civil service
and army” (Piro, 1998, 40). With nearly half of the economy driven by government
employment in the JAF or civil services, and 1/3 of GDP coming from remittances, only
16% of the economy was from the private sector.
“The military and security services were the only sector growing in structural
adjustment. Instead of subsidizing Jordanians or East Bankers in general, the state began
to target its social largesse to a sub-group of East Bankers — the military” (Bayloumy,
2008, 301). A separate economic system, via the “dual income structure,” blossomed as
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West Bankers received remittances and private sector salaries, without subsidies
(Bayloumy, 2008, 281). Palestinian-Jordanians didn’t overtly protest the dual structure as
they were making more money than many Jordanians who held more privileged social
standing. A period of high inflation due to an influx of oil money from the Gulf meant the
government increased public sector subsidies for state employees. Inflation spiked further
during the great “Return Period” when remittance workers “Jordanians” of Palestinian
descent who barely knew Jordan returned in droves during the first Gulf War. However,
the returnees brought cash with them. $1 billion USD flowed into Jordan and small
businesses were born overnight (Bayloumy, 2008).
The return of excess highly educated labor, unable to be absorbed into the state
sector and intentionally excluded from the security services, set off a period of highincome polarization. This tension was partially abated through the large influx of US aid,
an economic measure which bolsters the military element of the regime’s base. US
military aid to Jordan increased significantly in the 1990s, and jumped even more after
2003 following the first Iraq War. During the 30 years prior to 2001, the US provided
Jordan a total of $4.5 billion. Since 2003 the average has been over $750 million per
year. In 2003, to negate the effects on Jordan from the Iraq war, the amount of aid from
the US increased to $1.5 billion. From 2004 going forward the amount Jordan received
from US hovered around half a billion dollars (Bayloumy, 2008, 160).
Approximately half of all US aid 71 was designated for military expenditures,
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In a speech attended by author on February 14, 2018 Secretary of State Rex Tillerson
announced a $1.25 billion annual aid package per annum to Jordan lasting for five years.
The speech was held at the US Embassy in Amman as part of the Secretary’s regional
tour. He greeted the embassy community and American Boy and Girl Scouts were
requested to attend. The author took her Girl Scout.
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including: military equipment, policing, training, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism,
and border control. Jordan is also one of the five largest USAID recipients worldwide
(Sharp, 2018).
Jordan’s small size does not indicate that it should receive such a preferred status
for US funding. However, the regime’s willingness to invest in and use its military’s
Special Forces units to support international efforts against terrorism has made it a key
coalition partner.72 The significant American investment in Jordan’s military can also be
explained by Jordan’s geographic location and the regime’s willingness to be a western
leaning interlocutor with other Arab nations. To create support and funnel welfare to the
populace, the government turned to reliance on the military. This welfare is largely
received by East Bankers who serve in the security forces.
Thus, the Government of Jordan was shrinking due to SAP pressures in all areas
except the military, which was growing through financial support from the US.
Meanwhile, a budding middle class had started to develop throughout the region as
economic changes driven by petrodollars brought rapid physical changes to urban
centers. The authors of the anthology The evolving Arab city: tradition, modernity and
urban development illuminate how Arab cities across the region began changing during
the 1990s as a result of excess capital from the Gulf, which was seeking a place for
investment (Elsheshtawy, 2008). While Amman is often left out of literature on Middle
Eastern cities, this collection is divided into two types of Arab cities: struggling and
emerging cities.
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Prior to his unexpected ascension to the throne, King Abdullah II was in Jordan’s
Special Forces and anticipated remaining a solider as his uncle was the Crown Prince.
Thus- his nickname… the Warrior King.
229

All of the scholars in the anthology are from the MENA region and attempt to
situate the changes within their cities from a subaltern perspective instead of from the
perspective of western scholars. This effort slightly predates Roy’s heavily cited call to
extend urban theory beyond theories being created in the Global North to capture
occurrences not accounted for in the Global South by producing theories in the Global
South 73 (Roy, 2009b). Notably, Malkawi highlights how the ‘global cities’ concept erases
the regional and historic significance of Arab cities as it is framed exclusively on a city’s
economic impacts on a global scale (2008). This new framing ignores other cultural and
historic framings. Amman’s importance as a center of refuge, Mecca’s religious impact,
and Fez’s cultural significance disappear if the only measure becomes global economic
contribution. Yet in each of the region’s struggling cities, it was local residents
themselves who strove to place their city on the ‘global cities’ map.
Amman is identified as a struggling city since it is the recipient of investment
dollars from the Gulf. The emerging cities are those which are generating the oil wealth.
Amman became one of several cities which actively sought to attract investments to
make it competitive as a suitable Global City where these funds could be invested
(Daher, 2008). Thus, elite Jordanians entered into competition with other regional cities
including Beirut, to remake Amman a city ripe for investment.
In the case of Amman, public discourse suggests that the Jordanian government is
a passive participant in the neoliberal transformation of the city. However, when King
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Numerous scholars either worked in parallel to the Elsheshtawy anthology or
responded to Roy’s call to produce urban theory in the Global South. Some of the most
prominent theories include the Comparative Gesture (Robinson, 2011), Regional
Urbanism (Ren, 2015), Postcolonial Urbanism (Hentschel, 2015) and Globalization in the
Global South (Weinstein, 2008; Bayat, 2004).
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Hussein died in 1999, it ushered in a new era of development in Jordan. Again, it is
important to recognize the regional trends which were unfolding in the late 1990s. During
this time, Bahrain, Morocco, Syria, and Jordan all experienced the changing of their
heads of state. This new crop of rulers was all younger than their predecessors and each
embarked on a program of modernization within their countries.
In Jordan that meant that the western educated King Abdullah II began the move
away from a large public sector towards public/private partnerships. He placed a
premium on economic advisers who were dubbed the “New King’s Men” (Perthes,
2004). Those around the King embraced the one-sided discourse to advance the city
through technology and modern development based on investing capital through building
projects. Globalization didn't invade Amman: the red carpet was laid out for it to enter.
Although King Abdullah II included a plethora of young economic advisors,
many of whom were educated in the West like himself, in his inner circle, they did not
entirely displace the “influence of older and more security-oriented segments” (Bank,
2004, 35). 74 While these New King’s men were critical to the King’s vision of economic
expansion and moving Amman into strong competition for investment dollars as a
‘Global City,’ the King was keenly aware of needing to honor both the security needs of
Jordan and the social contract which essentially means that the “security-oriented
segments” are the East Bankers. Thus, as long as the prestige of being within the King’s
inner circle and being respected as the mukhabarat (security services) was not decreased
by the inclusion of the new Economic Consultative Council (ECC), whose focus was to
modernize and drive the private sector, the social contract continued to work for the
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Like Abdullah, these men were between the ages of 35-45.
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‘original Jordanians.’
While King Hussein had been primarily occupied with stability and navigating the
politics between Jordan and Israel, by the end of his reign he had begun to include the
cause of economic reform into his rhetoric. King Abdullah announced at the start of his
reign that reforming the economy was a top priority (Bank, 2008). Many of the
envisioned reforms were aimed to allow Jordan to participate in international economic
organizations. The race towards a neoliberal transformation in Jordan began in earnest
with the launching of the al-Urduun al-jadid campaign (The New Jordan) which was
ubiquitous throughout the country (Bank, 2008). As part of these reforms a Young
Entrepreneurs Association (YEA) was formed, public works were partially privatized,
Jordan become the fourth country to enter into a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the
United States, and several Special Economic Zones (SEZ’s) which complied with
International Monetary Funds (IMF) regulations were established (Bank, 2008, 43). 75
Social contract tensions between Jordan’s population of East Bankers and West
Bankers reached a climax during the Civil War but were lessened as US military aid
allowed the government to bolster the minority population of Jordanians through the
security forces (Bayloumy, 2008). In 2002, Massad declared, “Jordanian armed forces
[were] a privileged sector of Jordanian society” (Massad, 2001, 221). However, the value
of this privilege has been decreasing due to the development of a secondary economic
system in the private sector, which has been aided by globalization. While globalization
created possibilities for being prosperous in the private sector, it also exposed Jordan to
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Despite the Washington Consensus advocating for total privatization in Jordan, “Large
scale privatization would endanger if not entail a total breech of the implicit social
contract that has been the base of regime stability for decades” (Bank, 2008, 51). Thus,
privatization was only partially accomplished.
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pressures from the shrinking of the state and the introduction of new taxes which are
required by the IMF. Compellingly, most Jordanians profess to be pro-Hashemites and
compartmentalize the new taxes as being the fault of the corrupt parliament. Schenker
argues that this generation of youth is more likely to protest the imposition of new taxes
which were rumored to be placed on popular cell phone apps than to protest
Israeli/Palestinian issues (2017).
When I asked my respondents about attending protests, many said they do attend
protests. However, the lack of fervor they shared with me about their attendance seems to
support Schenker’s argument. Many informants echoed Tala’s comment: when I asked
about the recent protests against an Israeli Diplomat embroiled in an investigation of the
murder of a Jordanian, Tala said, “I went to the street to participate in the party
atmosphere- we know we aren’t going to change anything so we brought music and
managed to get out of the house for a night.” Another youth sent me a Whatsapp message
while protesting the American policy, “I know you live near the Embassy, we have lots
of food here and I could bring some sweets over for your family if you are home.”
Although I thanked her for her thoughtfulness and explained that I wasn’t home, the
impression she gave of the protests was much less political than social.
However, rumors about new taxes shook the society in 2017 when popular items
including cigarettes, alcohol, bread, rice, meat, and jamid were all allegedly going to be
targeted for new taxes. Protest movements including boycotts and demonstrations caused
the government to take out a full-page ad in local papers with pictures listing protected
items (Schenker, 2017). Historically, only 3-5% of Jordanians pay annual taxes, but when
the 16% General Sales Tax (GST) was introduced it affected the whole population, many
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of whom live near the poverty line.
Even though the Parliament is typically targeted as the boogieman for any
decrease in services or increases in taxes, the Government of Jordanreluctantly takes
these steps to appease requirements from the IMF. Under pressure “to balance the budget
and meet its International Monetary Fund (IMF) economic reform commitments, the
kingdom needs

Figure 7.2 This Jordanian government advertisement tries to quell the fear of rumored
new taxes by delineating which products are excluded from taxes. Petra News published
in April 2017. http://www.petra.gov.jo/Include/Main.jsp?lang=ar, Accessed April 28,
2017.
to curtail subsidies and raise nearly $2 billion in revenues (Schenker, 2017). As noted in
an opinion piece published in the Jordan Times, most Jordanians don’t have an accurate
understanding of the goals of the IMF program and therefore, “there is not serious
popular resistance to the programme” (Fanek, 2017).
This implies that if more Jordanians understood that decreased services and
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increased taxes are being motivated by agreements with international organizations, then,
they would be more likely to resist. In late May of 2018, Prime Minister Mulqi was
forced to step down due to anti-austerity protests. While some social media
commentators accused him of being an IMF puppet, most simply said the government
was inept and shouldn’t be introducing new taxes on people who were already hurting.
Again, the local government was blamed for the tax increases and the IMF delayed
Jordan’ second performance evaluation in order to give the new Prime Minister, Omar
Razzaz time to study the tax situation.
Although East Bankers working for the state have begun to complain publicly that
their salaries are not keeping pace with the cost of living in Jordan, thus far they have not
blamed international organizations for their experiences transitioning from privileged to
underpaid public servants. One focus panel I conducted addressed this topic when I asked
about people's dreams. After the first young man said he is expected to work for the
Government of Jordan since his fathers and grandfather worked for the government,
several others nodded their heads in agreement. After asking for a raise of hands for who
felt the same way, I asked who was looking forward to this path. No hands were raised in
response to this question. Instead youth spoke with one another about not necessarily
wanting to follow their fathers into the public sector. These young men spoke about
wanting more for their lives than “boring careers” with little opportunity to use the skills
they learned at university.
Bayloumy supports their sentiment by focusing on the financial impacts:
“what was initially a reward is fast becoming a curse under the new economic
arrangements. For the regime, the downside, apparent in economic liberalization, was the
lack of a Jordanian private sector with which to ally. Because the private sector was, and
remains, predominantly Palestinian, a significant Jordanian or East Bank bourgeoisie did
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not exist. The class was simply not large enough. Nor was there a substantial Jordanian
middle class separate from state employ” (Bayloumy, 2008, 281).
The tensions straining the Jordanian social contract are continuing to increase,
particularly in Amman, as population challenges and the effects of globalization are most
obvious in Jordan’s most developed city. As I discussed in Chapter 6 now even some
East Bank children feel they must leave Amman to reach their dreams. This signifies a
larger failure of the original social contract than previously anticipated. If the pressures to
the social contract essential nullify the contract, even for the minority group it was built
for, then it is critical to examine what is being said about the potential paths forward en
lieu of the original social contract.
Specifically, in Amman, which is largely made of residents whom the contract
was not intended to support, Ababasa states, “challenges to Jordan’s social contract are
made worse by the “constantly building” nature of the city” (Ababsa, 2011, 40). The
constant building is motivated both by population fluxes and neoliberalism. Certainly, the
government works hard to prevent widespread protests and instability, by employing
narratives about stability, anti-terrorist activism, and entrepreneurship to maintain the
status quo in the face of an outdated social contract.
7.3 BEYOND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: MESSAGES TO CONTAIN YOUTH
The stresses to Jordan’s original social contract were the backdrop to the new
messages Ammani youth began hearing during the Arab Spring. However, the radical
messages of regime overthrow which spread through the region did not gain salience in
Jordan. Instead, other messages targeting Jordan’s youth began to be propagated by the
medley of actors who pursuing a neoliberal path. These narratives are a large part of the
societal response to Jordan’s challenges which seek to encourage youth to maintain the
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status quo and to find their own solutions to challenges instead of relying on the
government for employment. While some narratives are produced by the government,
others arise from a multiplicity of factors including the entrenchment of the neoliberal
ideology. These discourses serve to constrain and contain a large youth bulge whose
employment needs and energies are unable to be met by the current system. These
messages include: Stability First, Youth as Peace Activists, and Entrepreneurship.
Previously, I outlined how Jordanian youth are funneled towards career paths in
either the public or private sector based on their paternal lineages. Thus, JordanianJordanian youths whose positions in the public sector are failing to keep pace with the
cost of living in Amman are facing a new form of vulnerability that their parents didn’t
face during their employment with the state. Given the high percentage of youth aslyn
min Palestine in Amman, only the minority of youth are guided toward public sector
work. Throughout my field work in Amman and in my meetings with key informants it
was repeatedly stressed that youth outside of the city may feel more connected to Jordan
and are more likely to stay in Jordan. The assumptions relayed to me are based on the
popular generalization that smaller urban zones and villages have higher percentages of
native Jordanians, who subsequently would have stronger wasta in the public sector,
enabling them to work for the Jordanian government and to subvert high youth
unemployment rates.
While the scope of my study remains the city of Amman, early in my study I
conducted a focus panel in Murfuq, a rural area near the Syrian border, to compare how
youth outside of the city perceive Jordan’s and their own current geopolitical situations.
Contrary to the expectations of many Ammanis, during this interview with 12 young
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men, 11 reported that they would like to leave Jordan, despite having wasta and access to
work in the government. 76 Their answers disrupted the narrative I heard in Amman and
exposed just how strained Jordan’s social contract is among youth. I returned to Amman
with these unexpected responses and began asking young people about their ambitions.
As I outlined in Chapter 6, it was striking that despite my sample being mixed
East Bankers and West Bankers, very few youth reported that their dream job was to
work for the state. Instead, “activist” jobs (NGO’s, refugee work, gender empowerment,
and LGBTQ work) and self-employment were the most desirable. 77 I met with key
informants at local universities, training centers, prominent businesses and activists to
identify the narratives that arose most frequently during my interviews and were thus
most influential in developing youths’ new perspectives.
The first and most dominant discourse which I heard during my interviews
Ammanis can be summarized as ‘Stability First.’ This narrative is closely associated with
the Hashemites who use discursive measures to link Jordan’s stability to the Great Arab
Revolt by highlighting how the Hashemites’ ancestors led local tribes to liberation from
the Ottomans. In May-June 2016 Amman was decorated with banners and pageantry
celebrating the 100-year anniversary of the Arab Revolt. The centennial was billed as the
nation’s largest festival and included a military display complete with Royal Jordanian
Air Force air shows, a camel parade, and fireworks. Notably, this celebration links the
Hashemite involvement in Jordan’s stability to a time before modern Transjordan existed,
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More fieldwork would need to be conducted both in the north and in the south to draw
more reliable conclusions. My one focus panel simply provided more questions and a
focus for my work in Amman.
77
Since the Arab Spring Amman’s role as a regional hub for international actors working
with refugees and focusing on activism exposes youth to these jobs more frequently.
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while also reinforcing the Hashemites’ narrative of military enforced strength.
While this message has been used for generations to calm internal tensions, it became
even more firmly rooted during the Arab Spring as the Jordanian government and many
members of the community were determined to prevent the instability occurring in
surrounding nations from spreading to Jordan. Democratic reforms had begun prior to the
Arab Spring. The King notoriously gave an interview shortly after the Arab Spring
began, professing that he would prefer his son to simply be a beloved monarch in the vein
of Queen Elizabeth, instead of having to shoulder the responsibility of being a monarch
in the same all-consuming manner that his position entails (Goldberg, 2013).

Figure 7.3 “The Centennial of the Great Arab Revolution and the Renaissance.” Al
Quds, 06 2016, http://www.alquds.com/articles/1464933210738957700/. Accessed 0306-2016 A Jordanian military parade for the 100-year anniversary of the Great Arab
Revolt
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Figure 7.4 https://www.arabrevolt.jo/en. accessed 03-06-2016.The Jordanian symbol of
the 100-year anniversary of the Great Arab Revolt.
However, these purported reforms to lessen the power of the monarch failed to
emerge after the Arab Spring. Instead, a population intimately aware of the struggles
refugees face was quickly subdued by reminders that the Hashemites have brought
stability to Jordan and “at least we are safe, God willing” (Tobin, 2012; Ghafour, 2013).
In Jordan, the Arab Spring protesters motivated the King to take away weapons from the
security forces who were instead sent to the street with water and juice to placate the
crowds and to reinforce that the Hashemites in Jordan are different than other
authoritarian regimes in the region (Goldberg, 2013).
I first travelled to Amman in 2011 when I was living in Tunisia and my Arabic
had a noticeable Tunisian accent. Friendly, but suspicious, Jordanians told me that
although they were impressed that Tunisians had managed to overthrow a dictator that in
Jordan, they wanted to slowly approach reforms so as not to cause chaos. Although
‘Stability First’ was not a formal advertisement campaign (unlike “We are all Jordan,”
and “Jordan First”), it emerged as the key lesson young people learned from the Arab
Spring.
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According to Shereen it is important that they, “Don’t rock the boat!” Ayat
echoed a similar message by saying “Stability and safety are more important than
democracy. At least we have safety. We are caught in the middle of the FIRES!” For
Arwa, the message of Stability First was reinforced by actions she saw around her:
“Arabs didn’t appreciate stability in their own countries; those nations brought suffering
upon themselves. Instability worries me.” Similarly, Ruba condemns the Arab Spring by
stating, “It was negative and made me appreciate the stability of Jordan.” Finally, Farah
expresses her initial interest in the Arab Spring when she says, “I was cheering for it, but
then the street got “too noisy” and dangerous!” For each of these young women the Arab
Spring reinforced their beliefs that Jordan should prioritize the relative safety they enjoy
without upsetting the status quos.
Other youth talked about their leadership as a way of embracing the Stability First
messaging. Tellingly, Shireen a member of a prominent tribe declared, “Who would
control the tribes without the King? We need him to make them balanced.” Her comment
is based on the commonly held belief that since the King is not a member of a Jordanian
tribe, due to his family being Aslyn min an area outside of Jordan’s tribal regions that he
is uniquely able to balance tribal politics. Sally, who is also from a prominent tribe
offered a very similar sentiment, “We are so tribal, if a revolution happened we wouldn’t
become a democracy we would just have unbalanced tribes- that is why we need the King
for balance.”
Instead of explaining the perceived value of the King in maintaining harmony
among Jordanian tribes, Ibrahim compared the King favorably to other leaders when he
told me, “Democracy is not worth dying for, our King is a good man, but Trump was
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chosen by democracy and he is not a good man.” Ibrahim shared this sentiment with a
heavy heart while we were sitting in a Starbucks in a mall in West Amman. He used to
dream of moving to America and spent one of his high school year’s studying in the
United States. However, he was adamant that his dream was shattered with the election of
an American President who he deems to be “not a good man.” Mohammed also spoke
about King Abdullah in a positive manner as a way of affirming the need to prioritize
Stability First when he said, “People here said, 'we are hungry, but we love the King' - we
don’t want a revolution, just reform and help to fight corruption.”
Other young people focused on the negative impacts which they attribute to the
Arab Spring as reasons why they are focusing on Stability First. Hadeel spoke of the
protests this way, “The Arab Spring freaked us out. Protests are common here, we have
them like we have coffee, but these were different. They taught us we are “lucky” to have
stability.” The difference in these protests according to Hadeel can be seen in the
prolonged violence in surrounding countries. However, for Diana the Arab Spring
protests were negative because they resulted in additional constraints, “It held countries
back-it turned too violent, now our speech is even more limited and we are afraid to
speak up because we will be censored.” Also focusing on pragmatism was Bashar who
explained that his lesson learned from the Arab Spring is to value, “Stability over reform.
Democracy is too abstract and safety is concrete.”
Although a few people admitted that they initially participated in protests or
hoped for reforms as a result of regional protests, the overwhelming response was that
once Jordanians saw the turmoil the protests unleashed in Syria, that the reforms they
want are not worth potentially destabilizing their own society. While the Arab Spring
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protests in Jordan were anti-climactic and passed fairly quickly, a byproduct of the Arab
Spring was introduced to Jordanian society via DAESH, which served to inform and
constrain youth protests.
Sharp notes that Jordanian fighters supporting DAESH increased each year until
2017 when Jordan became the second highest exporter of foreign fighters to DAESH
(Sharp, 2018). Jordanian support for DAESH rattled the Kingdom particularly hard in
April of 2014 when a group of Jordanian DAESH fighters in Iraq posted a YouTube
video burning and shredding their Jordanians passports and personally vow to slaughter
King Abdullah as a “worshipper of English” (Schenker, 2014). Evidence of how little
was able to be done to control the increasing internal threat of extremist groups was seen
in the town of Ma’an.78 In August 2014, the al-Qa’ida flag flew in Ma’an’s central
square, which was reported through multiple outlets, but not removed for at least a
month.
Although support for DAESH appeared to be increasing and the fear that
that accompanies terrorism was palpable at times, support for radicalism was by no
means the dominant Jordanian perspective. Several key moments prompted the silent
majority to actively and loudly begin disavowing Jordanian support for DAESH: the first
was when DAESH burned the Jordanian pilot, Muath al-Kasasbeh alive in January 2015.
This moment unified an outraged population to begin loudly condemning DAESH and
extolling their youth to turn away from terrorist groups. Multiple campaigns encouraging
people to report suspicious activity online and changes in people they knew emerged. The
government also began the most robust anti-terrorism campaign in its history as they
78

On page 117, I mentioned Ma’an’s restive nature when outlining the town’s
participation in protests during the first Iraq War.
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enlisted teachers, clerics, and local influencers to join the ideological fight against
extremism (Reed, 2014). When nine Jordanian professed supporters of DAESH attacked
tourists in Karak Castle in December of 2016, civilians assisted the security forces in
regaining control in another strong key moment of robust anti-DAESH public sentiment.
In Jordan the culture of being a place of refuge and the reality that they are
geographically surrounded by instability reinforces the notion that the community itself
must be active participants in their own national security. Thus, the “trapdoor of
community” which shifts the burden of state activities to citizens without shifting the
necessary training, resources, or authority required to perform these tasks is strong in
Jordan (Herbert, 2005). By 2016 when the Karak attack occurred, many Jordanians had
not only been exposed to generations of the Stability First message, but they had also
seen the gradual rollback of state functions. Additionally, many young people had
received anti-terrorism messages at the Mosque and at school. “Stability First” places all
other youth desires like reforming the social contract, democratization, and greater
participation in society on the back burner. The message that the youth are responsible
for ensuring Jordan’s stability is the first discourse that young people relayed to me. The
second message young people shared with me were their beliefs that they had new
opportunities to improve their situations or those of others by becoming activists.
Indeed, by turning Jordanians into reporters who assist the mukhabarat in
identifying and preventing the spread of terrorism to maintain stability within Jordan, the
Jordanian government invited a form of citizenship activity which they traditionally
suppress: youth as political activists. Jordan has a low level of civic participation and
activism is highly controlled. Activists who participate under the umbrella of Royal
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NGOs, through international NGOs sponsored by donors important to the regime, or
through professional organizations which stay within prescribed limitations constitute the
vast majority of activists (Larzillière, 2016). As discussed in Chapter 6, the University of
Jordan and soccer matches offer limited spaces for youth political activism. Within
certain boundaries, young peoples’ protests are permitted as a way to blow off steam.
This echoes Skelton's conclusion that governments around the world draw boundaries
around youth’s actual and potential political agency with activism and citizenship
(Skelton, 2013).
During our interview, noted activist Raghda Butros described activism in Jordan
as existing in a “playpen.” Sitting at a café with a medley of appetizers in front of us, she
shifted the plates around and pointed at them. These things: Palestine (mutabuhl) and
Israel (haloumi) these are the things my generation was allowed to get into the playpen to
yell and scream about. This generation feels like they have a bigger playpen- they can
now work on women’s empowerment (french fries), LGBTQ rights (kubeh), and
neighborhood projects (falafel) but none of this actually changes the table: we are still
stuck with the same macro-level issues. We have been co-opted into reinforcing the
neoliberal framework. While we might make one neighborhood or persons’ lives better
we have accepted the rules of the game and have become ‘social entrepreneurs'".
For Raghda this was made crystal clear in Jordanian young peoples’ responses to
the American decision to move the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. This
controversial decision legitimizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel was met with
peaceful protests (in which she participated) reminiscent of Tobin’s analysis of Arab
Spring Protests in Amman, as they were like “yelling against the wind” since many
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Ammanis felt they had already lost (Tobin, 2012, 100). They went because they felt they
couldn’t be silent, but they knew that their actions would not produce any changes. The
table would remain just as it was before their protests and the status quos would be
maintained. Thus, in 2016 when the University of Jordan saw an increase of protests,
focused primarily on tuition prices being raised, these protests were tolerated as they
remained in the playpen (Goussous, 2016).
While Youth Activism was not an official state discourse rolled out with a formal
ad campaign, the message of Youth as Peace Builders has been actively and publicly
disseminated. In August 2015 Jordan hosted the first Global Youth Forum under the
auspices of the United Nations. The convention produced the “Amman Youth
Declaration” which was billed as a recipe for global youth to become active in
“countering violent extremism and promoting peace. Youth have made their voices loud
and clear, and it is the responsibility of all actors to recognize the vital role that young
people can – and must – play in peacebuilding and preventing violent extremism,” said
Ahmad Alhendawi, the United Nations Secretary-General’s Envoy on Youth.
Despite the Amman Youth Convention being touted in the West, of the sixty
youth I interviewed, less than ten had heard of the convention. When I explained that the
convention was advertised in the local newspaper as open for all young Jordanians to
participate in, the majority expressed skepticism that the event was actually open to them.
The vast majority of my interviewees also reported that they don’t trust the newspapers
and get their news from social media instead. This aligns with global trends of young
people interacting with news sources primarily online (Loader, 2007).
None of the sixty participated, but the few who were aware of it described it as a
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proud moment in which the Crown Prince’s debut on the international stage was well
received. Despite opinions that this event was exclusionary, when I followed up and
asked how they felt about Amman’s young people being encouraged to take an active
role in peace building the responses were skeptical and included: we don’t have jobs,
people don’t listen to us, how do we possibly scale this up and make an actual difference?
The message of Ammani youth having an obligation to be peacemakers is also often
disseminated through public speeches and interviews from Crown Prince Hussein, whose
portfolio within the royal family includes youth issues in Jordan.
So far I have outlined two major messages youth have been hearing as a result of
a fraying social contract and they are that they must: maintain the nation’s stability by
“not rocking the boat,” and that they have an obligation to use their time for building
peace or other “pre-approved” activist activities that stay in the playpen. The final
message young Ammanis shared with me was that they should also actively solve their
own unemployment problems by being self-employed or becoming entrepreneurs. As
stated earlier, in Jordan the message of creating global neoliberal citizens is promoted as
a survival strategy by an amalgamation of public, private, and aid organizations instead
of being simply a state-led social transformation like those occurring in other regional
monarchies (Jones, 2017).
Due to Jordan’s high dependence on foreign aid, messages coming from donors
and development agencies are often highly prioritized. Indeed, Robehmed’s conclusion
that young entrepreneurs are often unwittingly participating in and supporting the
existing development model in Jordan by accepting their role in the global hierarchy as
“underdeveloped” echoes Raghda’s comments on youth activists, who are likewise
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passionate about making a difference, but also unwitting participants in supporting the
status quos (Robehmed, 2015, 6). Although there is an Arabic term - reyadii al amal - for
entrepreneurship, none of the young people or key informants spoke to me using the
Arabic phrase. Instead they used the borrowed English term "entrepreneur". Development
agencies have been hyping this word since the late 1990s and the buzz around it has
ensured that young people who are interested in working for themselves are well
acquainted with and comfortable using the buzzword instead of the Arabic term.
Just as the contraction of the state shifts responsibilities to the community for
maintaining Stability First, it also leaves a shortage of available jobs for young people.
This, again, follows the neoliberal logic that the community should be responsible for
creating jobs lost during privatization. While talking with Sally in a Bohemian café near
an eclectic shopping area, she had a difficult time staying focused on the interview. As
the Personal Relations Executive for a prominent hotel, she needed to respond to her
phone at least five times during our hour-long interview. I met Sally via a snowball
referral from an interview at the University of Jordan. The initial respondent referred me
to her cousin Sally when we started talking about entrepreneurial opportunities for youth
in Amman.
Returning to the table after our third work related interruption, Sally said she
wants to create a start-up and to become her own boss. She acknowledges that she is
lucky to have such a good job in the private sector and that because of her family
connections she could work in the public sector, but that she wants something different,
to have more control of her own life. This sentiment reflects how some youth are taking
responsibility for jobs previously provided by the state. Global messages such as “a rising
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tide lifts all boats” reached Jordan just as King Abdullah II was focusing on how to
improve Jordan’s economy. Despite guaranteed salaries and associated perks from
working for the state, many youth recognize they will have limited buying power due to
lower salaries in the government, and thus many are embracing the ideology that they can
become wealthier if they create their own careers.
Innovative Jordan “is a nationwide campaign celebrating the achievements of
Jordan’s innovators, entrepreneurs, and creative youth which was officially launched in
May 2017 by Oasis500, the leading seed investment company and business accelerator
anchored by the King Abdullah II Fund for Development (KAFD)." 79 However,
Robehmed traces the roots of Innovative Jordan back to a USAID funded trip which
featured King Abdullah and a hand selected group of young potential entrepreneurs
travelled to Silicon Valley in 2015. Declaring in the opening speech of the meeting that
two simple words drive Jordan’s commitment to supporting entrepreneurship, King
Abdullah explicitly cited “public interest” as the motivation behind attempting to turn
Amman into “Silicon Wadi, [explaining that] Amman has become the regional capital for
startups, and the tenth best place to start a technology company in the world” (King
Abdullah’s speech quoted in Robehmed, 2015).
The official acknowledgement that starts ups and young entrepreneurs are
essential to the “pubic interest” followed Jordan’s information and communications
technology (ICT) “breakthrough [which] came in 2009 when Maktoob, a Jordanian
internet portal, was sold to Yahoo for $175m” (Economist, 2013, 2). Currently, while
75% of the Arabic content online is created in Jordan, the breakout success of Maktoob

79

https://innovative.jo
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has yet to be recreated, despite it inspiring numerous projects.
Waugaman optimistically declares that a youth inspired revolution has been
unfolding in Jordan as “a culture of entrepreneurship, fueled by a boom in the ICT sector,
is quietly transforming the country by creating new businesses and jobs" (2012, ii). Other
journalists have declared a “Startup Spring” has emerged in the region, following the
more famous Arab Spring (Schroeder 2013; Economist 2013, MacBride 2013). However,
when discussing why youth are pursuing entrepreneurship during a meeting with two key
informants: Rasha (Endeavor Youth Initiative) and Shereen (an independent economic
analyst), their perspectives were not as optimistic as the media narrative. Likewise,
despite declaring that:
“ICT startup entrepreneurs are central figures in development narratives in Jordan,
embodying ideals of private sector growth, neoliberal individualism, and the knowledge
society, in an economic context of high youth unemployment and a diminished public
sector following structural adjustment policies”
Robehmed concludes that Ammani start-ups should not look to turn Silicon
Valley as a model due to the unique challenges Jordan’s entrepreneurs face (iii, 2015). In
her role at Endeavor, Rasha works with youth who enter trade careers instead of
attending university and Endeavor typically attempts to place Jordanian youth within the
private sector. She argued that youth are pursuing entrepreneurship out of necessity, not
out of self-motivation to reform Jordan’s failing social contract. She elaborated that East
Bank youth have fewer options to work for the public sector since registering on the civil
service roster is ubiquitous, but an actual job offer can take years to receive. While Rasha
observed that the Government of Jordan is not hiring at the same pace or level they once
did, other sources say state employment “dropped precipitously” due to economic
liberalization starting in the late 1980s (Assaad 2014, 34).
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The job market looks bleak for young Ammanis: government hiring is drying up,
options to work in the Gulf are extremely limited, and the private sector (according to
Rasha) doesn’t want to hire Jordanian youth due to what they see is a larger “skills gap.”
The “skills gap” is the term frequently used in the private sector when they complain that
most Jordanian youth are unprepared for even the most basic positions. Shereen pushed
back at this alleged “skills gap” and instead cited the answers from nearly 200 youth she
had surveyed for a recent economic report. 80 In their answers they eschewed work in
basic positions like: the garment sector, agriculture and other factory work because they
have what she termed an “expectation gap.”
Defining the ‘expectation gap’ she listed the youths’ stated top requirements for
accepting a job: #1 Take- home salary - many listed a take-home salary of 260JD ($367
in 2018) per month, which is near the poverty line, as their reserved take-home salary.
This reflects their calculation for out of pocket expenses including transportation, meals
while at work, and cigarettes. 81 #2 Career development path - which will allow them to
advance #3 Personal fulfilment - via positions with some form of personal knowledge
acquisition instead of repetitive work which doesn’t engage them. #4 Work-life balance which allows them time after hours to engage in personal pursuits instead of commuting
or working at home after hours. Dismissing the ‘skills gap’ rhetoric of the private sector,
Shereen said “on the job training in these industries only takes days or weeks.” Instead
she argues that employing foreigners is common because the social coding of menial jobs
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Although she stated that she had already completed the report, it was not publically
available yet.
81
Shereen noted that although many economists would not include the cigarettes as a
mandatory cost of living deduction, the majority of youth included this expense in their
calculations of take-home pay.
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means Jordanians are not interested in that work and the private sector has the ability to
pay lower wages to foreigners.
When I asked both key informants if they think interest in entrepreneurship or
self-employment has changed from their generation to this generation, they both gave a
resoundingly affirmative answer. Calling it a “paradigm shift” based on the lack of
available prestigious and rewarding employment with the state, they both stated this
generation is attempting to fill the gap. Since the social contract is no longer viable for
the majority of Ammani youth, they are left to try and create their own opportunities.
Despite this not being a formal national policy, they both agreed the shift of
responsibility from the state providing jobs to the youth, to the youth themselves needing
to create jobs, is a change which benefits the regime.
While Waugman calls youth entrepreneurship in Jordan a revolution driven by the
youth, in a regional study of Entrepreneurship Education in the Arab States the analysis
concludes Jordanian policymakers have created and are promoting a variety of initiatives
to promote entrepreneurship; including the 2003 Educational Reform for the Knowledge
Economy (ERfKE) initiative (Masri, 2010). Masri argues that spurring innovation in the
absence of natural resources and a shrinking public sector has led educators and
policymakers to promote entrepreneurship as a form of modernization.
Describing the current entrepreneurial environment in Jordan, as a result of these
efforts, Dr. Munther Masri, Former Minister of Education in Jordan, wrote that although
“the policy framework for EPE [entrepreneurial education] is well developed, there is a
need for improvement at the implementation level, regarding skills-oriented teaching and
learning” (Masri, 2010, 5). Dr. Masri’s conclusion that the framework for teaching
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entrepreneurial education is in place, but that the implementation needs improvement
sheds light onto the debate between Rasha who serves as a proxy for the private sector
and Shereen who was representing the perspective of young potential employees. In
Chapter 6 I illuminated the on-going debate in Jordan over reforming the education sector
from rote memorization towards more analytical skill building. By pushing young people
towards entrepreneurship without providing enough analytical tools, society is addressing
a failure of the social contract; however, the results may produce both ‘skills’ and
‘expectation’ gaps.
Regardless of the potential pitfalls, public support for entrepreneurship filters
through initiatives such as the Annual Queen Rania Al-Abdullah Award for Outstanding
Teachers which was initiated in 2006 with the “objective of enhancing the culture of
innovation and entrepreneurship by spreading awareness about excellent performance
concepts and providing incentives for outstanding teachers” (Masri, 2010, 25). In
addition to public support for teaching entrepreneurs, Royal NGOs, including the Queen
Rania Center for Entrepreneurship which supports university level entrepreneurial
education and an incubator iPark which supports startups have blossomed since the early
2000s. Governmental Organizations and international organizations such as INJAZ 82 and
the Arab Centre for Human Resources Development (ACHRD) also contribute to
spreading positive messages about entrepreneurship. Both initiatives include courses or
training in entrepreneurship. INJAZ started as a USAID funded project in 1999 with the
sponsorship of Queen Rania. The youth focused organization states its mission statement
is “to inspire and prepare youth to become productive members of their society and
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accelerate the development of the national economy,” with entrepreneurship being listed
as one of INJAZ’s areas
While youth self-employment in the informal or “grey sector” does not meet the
development use of the word in Jordan which focuses so heavily on the ITC sector, it is
critical to recognize that many young people see work in the informal sector as being
entrepreneurs. According to recent IMF reporting the informal sector represents 26% of
the Jordanian economy, but Shereen places it at closer to 40% of the economy.
Highlighting the inherent risks of participating in “what is sometimes called the “grey
market” [which] promotes low levels of labor force contribution to government social
security programs and exposes participants to higher legal risks and lower access to
capital” reveals the long-term costs of informal employment (Adely, 2004). Yet, the
informal economy allows young people to take ‘off the books’ jobs including: driving for
Uber or Careem, being street vendors, or working in service sectors. 84 While precise
figures are difficult to obtain due to the illegal nature of these positions, work in many of
these paths can meet the short-term expectations of youth whose options are limited by an
eroding social contract.
7.4 CONCLUSIONS: CONTAINING AMMANI YOUTH BY MOLDING THEM INTO
NEOLIBERAL CITIZENS
Young people are “often imagined as both the solution to societies’ ills and the
greatest threat to the social order. As such, considerable effort is devoted to cultivating
citizens who will engage in behaviours seen as ‘legitimate’ or appropriate” (Staeheli,
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Both Careem and Uber were still illegal when I completed the research phase of my
project. Therefore, I did not conduct interviews with drivers. However, since this work
has been gaining legal status, this could open additional avenues to reach young people in
the future.
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2013, 3). Indeed, youth in Amman are also often imagined to be both the solution to and
the problem with Jordanian society. At the same time that they are stretching the
applicability of Jordan’s aging social contract and being deemed risks for joining radical
movements, they are also envisioned to be peacemakers who put stability first, improve
their communities through activism and create their own jobs through entrepreneurship.
Yet, just as Staeheli noted with regard to youth protesting increased university
fees in the United Kingdom, in Jordan only certain acts of citizenship or behaviors are
deemed legitimate or appropriate. After examining how students are taught to be
responsible citizens in South Africa Staehli states “neoliberalism is supported by a set of
ideas regarding the optimal relationship between citizens and the state, whereby citizens
take responsibility for themselves and each other through actions in civil society”
(Staeheli 2013, 6). By highlighting how the Jordanian government has encouraged youth
to participate in specific social and entrepreneurial programs as the social contract
became less desirable, I also illuminate how they are creating young neoliberal citizens.
According to Cole, “the New Arab” is one who has seen the possibility of major
political change through their experience in the Arab Spring (Cole, 2014). Yet in Jordan,
the Arab Spring was never envisioned as a revolution, instead the requests from the street
were for modest reforms. In this chapter I illuminated how the Arab Spring molded the
way young Ammanis request reforms. In Amman the chaos that was unleased by the
fallout of the Arab Spring taught youth to reinforce the status quos out of fear of
instability. Although the message of Stability First predates the Arab Spring, it took on
new nuances as neighboring Syria descended into and continues to experience a brutal
civil war. The new salience of this message hit home in Amman even as the original
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social contract is facing additional pressures making it less applicable or desirable for the
vast majority of the city’s youth. This includes both Palestinian-Jordanians funneled
towards the private sector and Jordanian-Jordanians who recognize that the value of
working for the state has not kept pace with their expenses or expectations.
Instead of being empowered by messages encouraging them to become activists,
peacekeepers, and entrepreneurs young people are perhaps inadvertently fortifying the
status quo as they become neoliberal global citizens. Instead of offering new long-term
solutions to the “bulge” of young highly educated people who cannot rely on the same
system of employment that their elders relied on, an assortment of NGOs, international
donors, and the government are encouraging youth to embrace ideologies of
entrepreneurship and civic engagement as replacements for the state providing
employment. Yet as Raghda wondered about social entrepreneurs, these activities may
simply keep young people busy and feeling like they are making a difference without
actually addressing the structural problems. Indeed, Ammani youth may be paradoxically
leaving this generation without adequate employment or a system which addresses their
fundamental goals through their actions which are extending the status quo.
While Jordan’s original social contract worked to intertwine the fortunes of the
tribes with those of the Hashemites during the formation of a new state with citizens
willing to be governed by someone outside of the local tribal hierarchy, this unwritten
agreement is no longer as applicable. The contract accomplished the goals of creating
loyal Jordanian citizens who accept the Hashemite regime as the legitimate leaders of the
state; however, since the state lacks the resources to continue to support this arrangement
without external support, it has to comply with the requirements of its outside
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benefactors. These include lowering levels of state spending, increasing free market
activity, and increasing state revenue through taxation. All of these requirements
negatively impact an already precarious group of young people who are part of
Generation C. 85 The very connectedness of this generation of digital natives is being used
to define them in the same vein that The Greatest Generation was defined by World War
II.
Indeed, in this chapter I argued that connectedness through globalization
increased pressures as King Abdullah II’s leadership team embraced making Amman a
global city and Ammanis global citizens. As the Government of Jordan stepped back
from providing traditional services and embraced neoliberal building projects, Amman’s
path to becoming a global city has left it with the “rotting corpses” of mega-projects
which were unable to be completed after the 2008 market crash (Daher, 2016). While less
visible, the project of creating global Ammani citizens has also been occurring.
Becoming a global citizen necessitates participating in the world along neoliberal terms.
In Jordan, like most governments, “there are many efforts to shape youth as
citizens, giving them opportunities, skills, and rewards for engaging in particular kinds of
political acts” (Staeheli, 2013, 22). As neoliberal but loyal citizens, Ammani youth are
left with very limited options to participate in the previous social contract and instead are
being paradoxically empowered and constrained by new narratives which encourage
them to solve issues which used to be the responsibility of the state. Roy argues that
many modern cities, particularly in the Global South, create paradoxes of civic
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Generation C is the moniker which has been applied to the generation of people who
have been born as part of the Connected world of social media, smart phones, and the
internet.
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governmentality which reproduce inequalities within their current social hierarchies
(Roy, 2009). Ammani youth fall within this trend of reproducing inequalities through
their inclusion in civic governmentality via their efforts towards: Stability First,
Activism, Peacekeeping, and Entrepreneurship. In the next chapter I illuminate how
some of Amman’s youth are resisting being constrained by narratives that constrain them
from embracing their Ammani identity.
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CHAPTER 8
REDEFINING AMMANINESS: HOW YOUNG PEOPLE ARE CONTESTING AND
CLAIMING BELONGING TO THE CITY
“Amman is not Jordanian, it is Middle Eastern. I am not Ammani, I don’t even know
what that is—no one would even be clear what that would mean. Amman was built by
Circassians, no one is from here.”
Hatem 22
As I outlined in Chapter 5, the modern rebirth of Amman was predicated on
situating the citizenship of Ammanis lower along the scale of authentically being
Jordanian. Recall that this process incorporated non-native Jordanians moving to Amman
from places to which they still held strong attachments. Based on the people in Amman’s
situated citizenship in the national imagined mapping of authentic belonging, the
designation “Ammani” has historically been deemed less authentic than the designations
of any other Jordanian city. Therefore, being an Ammani is not exalted like being a
Saltiyya (from Salt) or Irbidi (from Irbid): claiming Ammaniness is thus an inherently
political action.
However, Amman’s increasingly cosmopolitan and heterogenous nature is
beginning to disrupt the traditional uniformity of needing to always be aslyn min
elsewhere as associations with different parts of the city have different meanings. Those
with tribal privileges may still benefit from retaining their links to locations outside of the
city in particular cultural situations, however they may also be asserting some claims to
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Ammaniness in circumstances where education, modernity, or private sector
employment are valued. Likewise, while there may be cultural pressure and selfmotivation to retain linkages to other locations outside of the city including to Palestine,
Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Circassia, in particular cultural situations members of these
groups may also selectively employ their Ammani identities. But being Ammani is not
just an identity: it is an act of urban citizenship used strategically to open economic,
professional, social, and political opportunities. However, this strategy must be
selectively employed through changing accents, clothing, and employment techniques in
order to honor links to external heritage sites and to fit particular cultural situations.
Since Jordanian-Jordanians benefit from maintaining their links to tribal centers
and large populations of forced migrants also have vested interests in maintaining their
focus on ‘returning home,’ claiming full-time Ammaniness would be detrimental to the
dominant groups living in Amman. The loss of “home” is a unifying factor for people
from Circassia, Chechnya, and Palestine, all of whom set about building their new city
while maintaining dreams of returning home. Claiming Ammaniness for these groups
could mean giving up on their pre-determined dreams of home. Likewise, for
Transjordanians coming from rural areas, forsaking their privilege by claiming primary
Ammaniness would be harmful to their inherent privilege and use of wasta.
Despite these external and internally driven obstacles, a nascent sense of
belonging to Amman is building across groups of young Jordanians. As the hope of
returning “home” fades and the difference between development in Amman and rural or
secondary cities crystalizes, more youth are embracing the strategy of being from
Amman. Indeed, with parents and potentially grandparents who have grown up in
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Amman, this is the only true home many young people in the city know. Returning to
somewhere else is an illusion which betrays young peoples’ sense of belonging to the
urban space of Amman. Thus, despite the social incentives not to exert claims of
Ammaniness one third (20 out of 60) of the young people I interviewed made exactly this
claim: that they are Ammani.
This chapter explores how the narrative of what an Ammani is has different
meanings to different Jordanians, reflecting diverse opinions and perceptions of what
Amman represents. While some youth state that Amman is Jordanian, others declare that
only parts of Amman are authentically Jordanian (compellingly there is disagreement as
to which parts of the city are actually Jordanian), yet others conclude that Amman is not
Jordanian at all. I explain how young “native” Jordanians I interviewed define, perform,
and claim their Ammaniness in the city, including illuminating how these claims were
seldom not exclusive as young people often mediated their identities based on how severe
the repercussions would be or how they can best leverage multiple and alternative
identities. I also detail the similarities and differences in how “others” including
Palestinian-Jordanians and other migrants also create and claim this title.
8.1 WHAT IS AN AMMANI?
Depending on who is asking this question and who is answering, the response to
this question will be quite different. When Jordanians greet each other there is invariably
a familiar dance which unfolds. It begins with each person using their full names to
identify themselves. Then if the last name is immediately identifiable as belonging to a
prominent Jordanian tribe, statements such as “ah you are Obeidat- you are from Irbid”
follow. If the last name has clear links to cities in Palestine, then the conversation makes
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note of that mapping. Those with names not immediately recognizable by being linked to
tribal locations or cities in Palestine typically hear a follow up question asking where they
come from. The answer of, “I am from Amman” would rarely be accepted in the context
of Jordanians who are meeting each other for the first time. However, as an outsider, I
hear “I am from Amman” frequently. Just as Jordanians do, I could probe further to place
someone without offending them, however most outsiders would hear the simpler
answer, “I am from Amman,” without the full dance playing out. For outsiders an
“Ammani” can be a person born or who moved to the city and now lives there. For
insiders, “Ammani” is the start of more questions.
As the population of Jordan grows and more people from outside of the borders of
Jordan are incorporated into the social fabric, they learn this mental mapping of
belonging. However, it is becoming more complicated, and, according to some of the
youth I interviewed, tedious to keep track of everyone. As Amman blossomed from a
rural outpost to a bustling urban center with 4 million people, these labels are beginning
to become more onerous. Yet, these labels do serve a purpose in identifying who has the
right to claim being “pure” Jordanian. By dismissing Amman as a city of outsiders or a
place where East Bankers simply live or do business (but not where they come from) a
social hierarchy is maintained.
Indeed, to understand the significance of the word Ammani, it is helpful to
understand what Amman means to young people. During my interviews I asked a series
of questions including: ‘What does Amman mean to you?’ ‘What does Amman mean to
Jordanians?’ and ‘What does Amman mean to the region?’ Some of these answers
directly contradict one another. Many of the young people I interviewed contextualized
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Amman in relation to their perception of its Jordanian-ness. For Mohammed, a 23-yearold from an East Bank family:
“Amman is not Jordanian. People here are selfish; they are not humble and are
too busy. Growing up I played marbles in the street but in the city they are the YOLO 86
generation who is inside on their iPads. I am Ammani, but my parents are not
Ammani. My Dad is from Tafeleh and my Mom is from Iraq.”
While Mohammed is identified as being “pure” Jordanian due to his father’s
lineage as an East Banker and he could have a vested interest in making the statement
that Amman is not Jordanian to preserve his claim to being more Jordanian than those
without links to tribal places like Tafeleh, he instead embraces his Ammaniness. While
he simultaneously denigrates the city as lacking the characteristics typically associated
with native Jordanians including being “humble” and “having time for one another,” he
also identifies as Ammani. By distinguishing himself from his parents, who he declares
are not Ammani, he accepts the stereotypes about the city as part of his identity but
disassociates those characteristics from his parents. For Mohammad, Amman is not
Jordanian and while he is Jordanian, he can also be Ammani.
Despite Mohammed saying Amman is not Jordanian, another East Banker,
Ahmad, 25, said:
“Amman is Jordanian. Real Jordanians, you know- Bedouins, live in East
Amman with Palestinians, but the majority of West Amman is Iraqi. People in East
Amman count on themselves only, while people in West Amman rely on their fathers’
money- they are soft like girls. I am Ammani and my parents are as well.”
Although both men may have a vested interest in limiting the role of Amman in
the scope of Jordanianness, since they both have tribal roots, and both state they are
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YOLO stands for “You only live once” and is used by young people to indicate that
they shouldn’t waste time and should pursue what they want. This expression is often
used to explain behaviors that could be considered reckless.
263

Ammani, Ahmad directly contradicts Mohammed’s sentiment that Amman is not
Jordanian. By distinguishing between self-sufficient people who are not “soft like girls”
he is dismissing the majority of West Amman as outsiders from Iraq. Instead he is
highlighting that both Palestinians, who are his neighbors, and Bedouin people who he
affiliates with, are insiders and thus the city and his family can be both Ammani and
Jordanian. Instead it is the characteristic of those who are fafi (slang for “pretty boys”
who don’t like to get dirty and can’t do basic things) that prevents them from belonging.
Duaa, 27, likewise believes some parts of Amman are more Jordanian than other
parts of the city:
“Abdoun is not Jordanian- I don’t even like to go there. I stayed in my small
neighborhood as a kid and everyone knew each other. The city is so segregated, and it
wasn’t that way when my grandparents arrived in Fuyhes 87. My parents moved to
Swehleh 88 and now they don’t even recognize the city. But they got here before the
crowds. So, they are Ammani and I am Ammani.”
Just as with Ahmed, she thinks West Amman is not Jordanian. Duaa dismisses it
as a foreign place where people don’t know each other. After highlighting that her
grandparents moved to Fuyhes, she commented that this area is currently populated by
many Christians. She then waved at the hijab she is wearing and said she now lives in
Sweileh. For her, the distinguishing feature of being Ammani does not have to do with
religion or being from the tribes- instead it has to do with when people arrived in
Amman. Since West Amman was settled the most recently, her family is more Ammani
and more Jordanian than those living in West Amman. They got here and after settling on
the outskirts, moved further inside of Amman. Abdoun in particular for her represents a
place where she doesn’t feel a sense of belonging.
87
88

Fuyhes is on the outskirts of West Amman.
Swehlleh is socially identified as East Amman.
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This characteristic of Abdounis being “soft like girls” or not belonging is explored
in popular culture. The television comedy sketch show “The Rania Show” features
several characters in rotation, including Madam Ghalia (Mrs. Rich/Expensive). Madam
Ghalia perpetually makes social faux paus as she comes from the nouveau riche and can’t
quite seem to fit in. In episode after episode she is portrayed speaking like an Abdouni
with a high-pitched affect and a nasally voice as she mixes Arabic and English. Her
sporadic use of English is a marker of wealth and education, but her daughter is portrayed
as barely speaking Arabic. Each episode features Madam Ghalia’s catchphrase
“FaDeeHa” (expose) which has her attempting to expose someone as not being classy
but results in her being exposed as a fake.
In this way, Madam Ghalia portrays the stereotypes about those from West
Amman, and Abdoun in particular. Ghalia is performing her social class in ways that
isolate her from other Ammanis including Duaa and Ahmad. Yet, compellingly economic
class did not impact the response from Haya who comes from one of the wealthiest
families in Jordan and declared:
“Tribal values are underestimated in West Amman, but this country is tribal to its
ROOTS. I don’t think of myself as Ammani, because I am nothing like people in West
Amman or Abdounis, I am Jordanian but not Ammani.”
For Haya, being Ammani was incompatible with being Jordanian. Yet when I
walked into her rather luxurious home in Jabal al Weibdeh, it was abundantly clear that
she could mix with the elites in West Amman if she chose to. Her financial means were
obvious from the minute I stepped beyond her gate and onto the driveway where several
European luxury cars were lined up. From her front reception room, I observed a baby
grand piano sitting underneath a two-story chandelier. We moved past the reception room
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Figure 8.1 The Rania Comedy Show. Madam Ghalia is in the center wearing a skirt and
western style upper class clothing. https://www.facebook.com/TheRaniaShow/about.
to her sitting room which contained numerous signs of wealth, including very plush rugs
and works of art which gave the room the feeling of a museum. Although we drank tea in
the reception room, we conducted our interview in her library which featured more casual
seating and a gas fireplace. When Haya offered me additional tea two hours into our
interview, she did so by ringing a bell for someone to bring the tea to us from the kitchen
downstairs. Based on her socio-economic standing it is a distinct choice to identify
herself by tribal heritage which is not only missing in West Amman, but also makes her
not want to not identify with the city itself as she is nothing like ‘those people.’
While these perspectives reflect the idea that West Amman is less Jordanian than
other parts of the city, I also heard from Yazan 31, who takes the reverse opinion:
“Amman is the ‘last untouched’ Arab city. It is my hometown, but I know other
Arab countries are less tribal. We really have two cultures in Amman. In West Amman
(where he lives) it feels like people conduct themselves and have living conditions with
respect and openness. In East Amman, they have a closed society full of judgement and
taboos. There is some truth in how East Amman looks at us but not all. They see our
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women without hijabs and they think we have lost faith but hijab doesn’t mean faith.
East Amman is not part of Amman really- it is a part of a whole different country. I get
lost there. West Amman is Jordanian. The older generation thinks Amman is not
Jordanian, but this generation thinks it is…. Jordanians outside of Amman stay here and
don’t leave, but Ammanis could and do leave.”
The idea of open and closed mindedness surfaces in these comments. Yazan feels
judged by people in East Amman based on his perception that he and “his women” would
be considered less faithful based on their clothing choices. While he acknowledges that
there is some truth in being seen as different than those who live in East Amman, he
disputes that he is less faithful. Instead, he labels East Amman as part of a whole different
country; the implication is that a strict conservative interpretation of Islam doesn’t align
with what he considers the more Jordanian “more moderate interpretation of Islam.”
Amman for him represents connections to the outside and is a door through which
Jordanians can leave. His statement that older generations do not think Amman is
Jordanian is one that I will explore further in section 8.3 when outlining the generational
trends of performing Ammaniness.
Each of the above scenarios portrays Amman (or parts of Amman) in relation to a
perceived level of Jordanian-ness. However, unlike how paternal lineage defines
Jordanian-ness in people, the city is defined as more or less Jordanian based on perceived
values. When some young people focus on the bifurcation between East and West
Amman, they highlight the tensions between values including: authenticity/modernity,
humbleness/arrogance, and open/closed mindedness.
Yet others added more nuance by stating that Amman is made of many cultures
and values and that this cosmopolitanism is the character they attribute to the city and
part of what they want to claim with stating they are Ammani. Thus, the difficulty for
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some who are hesitant or resist entirely the concept of being labeled or claiming
Ammaniness can be better understood by tracing the multiple cultures and
understandings of the city itself. Ayat, 22, explores how she feels partially Ammani, but
struggles to embrace that identity fully based on both her loyalty to Palestine and her
feelings that she has different values than many people who live in Amman. For our
interview Ayat was wearing hijab and dressed conservatively, but in fashionable maroon
and gold rich colors in tighter fitting fabrics:
“In West Amman they ignore culture and are disconnected from tradition. In East
Amman youth here don’t feel free; we are constrained by tradition and culture. Money
gives you exposure and education. Rural people say Amman is not Jordanian, the
culture is different in the rural areas, because there are no services or infrastructure.
Living in Amman but having “connected” more traditional values and ideas is what
I try to do with my life. Jordanian values are good, but being modern is good also.
Abdounis wear shorts, etc…. the “horny” repressed men are full of hormones and that is
a bad mix. I don’t feel like a full Ammani- I am mixed, because part of me is
Palestinian.
Ayat’s statement reveals the same tensions between modern versus traditional
values and her judgement that Abdounis have non-Jordanian values makes it hard for her
to associate with that part of an Ammani identity. However, she feels at least partly
Ammani and doesn’t think being modern negates her Jordanian-ness. Instead, it is loyalty
to the Palestinian part of her heritage which she cites as the factor which prevents her
from claiming full Ammaniness.
Riham 28, also discusses cosmopolitanism in her struggle to clearly define
whether someone or something is Ammani:
Amman is its own mix, it is not Jordanian. East Amman is more Jordanian
than West Amman. East Amman is like Jordan, we are a small country, but West
Amman is like our outer shell that we can’t keep up with, it is growing too fast.
By stating that West Amman is growing too fast and that they can’t keep up with
it, she is focusing on the changes and growth occurring in the city. Her statement calls to
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mind the comparison I have heard about Jordan itself, which imagines it as a local “Mom
and Pop” type shop which is being converted into a large impersonal chain store. To be
Jordanian is to be more like the personal and unique Mom and Pop store, while Amman
is growing too fast to stay that way for long. For Talal, 40, the rapid growth of the city
also impacts his perception of Ammani culture:89
“I am not Ammani, because there is not one Ammani culture. We are the last
regional melting pot, full of sub-cultures who don’t identity with one another. I am an
outsider.”
Despite being born in Jordan, Talal spent much of his youth in Saudi Arabia and
only recently returned to Jordan for University and to look for a Jordanian wife to marry.
Although he had fond memories of Amman growing up, he felt shocked by the amount of
change the city of his childhood had undergone. For him, the new sub-cultures which
swirl into the melting pot make it difficult to identify one Ammani culture and his time
away prevents him from identifying with this changing place of mixed cultures. Sam, 24,
also uses the English term ‘melting pot’ to describe Amman:
“Amman is Jordanian but those in West Amman (where he lives) need to look
out the palace window to see the slums of East Amman. No one is from Amman, but we
are a “melting pot” now. My stepmom is active in trying to protect the Al Harra
(neighborhood) which she says is disappearing in Amman. I have wasta because we are
from Karak and I am from the Tarawneh tribe- but we are not a rustic tribe, so I can be
both tribal and Ammani. My grandfather made me memorize 9 generations back to
prove my Jordanian lineage to prepare for when the questions which started in
elementary school about ‘where are you from?’ would begin, because he knew I couldn’t
89

Talal was part of my cross-generational interviews and represents the previous
generation.
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say I was from Amman.”
Once again, the English term ‘melting pot’ was used by Basher, 22:
“Amman is about nostalgia, but also a melting pot. It is like the “Great Gatsby.” West
Amman is not very Jordanian since it is so Iraqis and full of Abdounis and the nouveau
riche. This changed after the Iraq war. East Amman is lower class and more industrial,
but that didn’t change. West Amman is more vibrant with “high-end” individuals. I am
Ammani but my parents are Madabi (from Madaba).”
This is the first time that the term nostalgia came up in an interview, but Basher’s
use of the term is evocative of how East Amman and wasat al balad (downtown) are
portrayed as unchanging, while West Amman is spoken about as in flux and constantly
changing. Noting that his parents still claim their identity from Madaba, while he is
Ammani again indicates that some young people are adapting to the idea that it is
possible for people to be from Amman. This seed of a changing mentality is difficult for
most Jordanians to enforce due to the regimented social process of identifying by
locations outside of the city. Yet, it is not just “outsiders” who are precluded from
claiming to be ‘pure Jordanian” who are starting to nurture this seed of an Ammani
identity. In the next section I explore further how the concept of an Ammani is being
contested.
8.2 CONTESTED IDENTITIES: CLAIMING AN AMMANI IDENTITY DESPITE
“NO-ONE BEING FROM AMMAN”
At the beginning of the chapter Hateem stated that no one is from Amman and
that no one from here would even understand what that would mean:
“Amman is not Jordanian, it is Middle Eastern. I am not Ammani, I don’t even know
what that is—no one would even be clear what that would mean. Amman was built by
Circassians, no one is from here.”
Hatem 22
Indeed, the previous section illuminated the myriad of sometimes contradictory
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definitions of Amman and Ammanis. Simply being born in or living in Amman was
never cited as the definition of an Ammani, and Hateem is expressing the perspective that
no one is from Amman since he has been raised with the Jordanian mental mapping
which excludes the city and instead bases identity on patrilineal heritage. However, many
respondents disagree with his conclusion that no one who is from here would even know
what an Ammani would mean. First, I will present the perspectives of four East Bank
Jordanians who make claims to being Ammani in a variety of ways- starting with Sally,
25:
“Amman is not Jordanian, it is a unique combo of cultures- it has a lot of
“fake” people. East Amman is more Jordanian. There are no formal attempts to make
an Ammani identity it is a confused place because there are so many types of
Ammanis: 1. very open-minded 2. very closed minded 3. closed parents but open kids.
My parents are proud of their heritage (both are from well-known tribes) but they are
beginning to be proud of being Ammani, They have even changed their accents to
Ammani. I am fully Ammani and identify as urban and only tribal by name.”
Coming from the minority group of native Jordanians who maintain social power
via their status as ‘pure Jordanian” Sally acknowledges that there is no formal attempt to
create an Ammani identity. Yet, despite this her parents appear to be straddling both a
tribal identity and an urban identity. Sally identifies herself as fully urban, which she
places on a dichotomy in opposition to being fully tribal. Although she has the privileges
associated with belonging to prominent tribes, she prefers to embrace an urban sense of
belonging. However, since Sally comes from the more powerful identity, she can
embrace the lesser Ammani identity while still retaining the strength of her tribal name
alternatively and based on specific circumstances. Conversely, Shireen talks about other
tribal Jordanians using the Ammani identity as a form of social advantage:
“Amman is a masculine space and her more “modern” neighbors became urban
“isolated” after the Iraqis came in 1993. The differences between Amman and Tefileh are
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so severe that people from rural areas lie about where they come from to get a job.
The accountant in her office said he was from Amman for years to get hired. She feels
Ammani, she is open-minded and part of the “pot” of people where not everyone
knows on another.
In this circumstance Shireen again talks about being Ammani as representing
more open-mindedness. For her being part of the “pot” of mixed cultures and values is a
positive attribute as evidenced by the accountant in her office who lied and claimed an
Ammani identity in order to better position himself within the private sector. The
derogatory term walad/bint MoHafatha (boy/girl from the governorates) would be
applied to this accountant to imply that he is less well educated (lacking access to the
parallel and more prestigious private schools found in Amman) and less classy than
someone who was raised and educated in Amman. For this situation the reputation of
being less educated and less refined since he is coming from the countryside would have
been more harmful than his attempt to use his East Bank status for wasta to work in the
private sector. Thus, a member of the more powerful social group (a Jordanian-Jordanian)
hid his ties to his tribal roots in order to embrace a private sector career, which required a
more educated and open-minded person than the stereotypes about people from tribal
areas would imply. While this accountant pretended to be Ammani in order to further his
career, Sanna, 26, also comes from Tefileh and talked about how her friends sarcastically
assign each other and themselves as being from the city:
We live in North Amman (which is socially more East Amman) and we make fun
of Abdounis- if someone from Tefileh gets something new at all we joke:
“I am not from here I am an Abdouni!”
She associates those from West Amman with arrogance and doesn’t like to be
provoked by yastize (arrogance).
“I don’t like to think of people from East Amman as being generalized and
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labeled as having “poor manners” but I know that they are thought of that way. I am
applying for my master’s degree in the United Kingdom and am being encouraged
to list my Amman address in the scholarship competition.”
When Sanna and I met at the University of Jordan she almost immediately asked
me if I recognized her accent. Unfortunately, I had to confess that I couldn’t place her
dialect. She proudly said, “I am Tefileh!” Then she sheepishly explained that everyone
loves her accent and that anyone from her town can be expected to be the butt of
Jordanian jokes. They are portrayed as rural, backwards, but innocent and harmless.
When she walks into class or a group of people, they gently greet her by saying, “There is
Tefileh" in an affectionate but playful manner. Although she jokes about the perceived
differences between someone from Tefileh and Abdoun, to become more competitive in
her scholarship application she is considering claiming an association with Amman. Yet,
in her mind claiming an Ammani identity would likely be to East Amman, where she
says people are not arrogant, so she identifies with them more closely.
However, Ramzi, 25 comes from a wealthy area of West Amman and identifies
with Amman more broadly:
“I have a STRONG Ammani identity which comes from our shared set of values
and our Ammani mindset.”
Despite his father serving as a doctor in the military for 30 years, Ramzi never
considered military service himself. Instead he is pursuing his dream as an architect.
When we meet at a café in Jabal al Webdeih he carried himself confidently and our
interview was conducted in English. He had completed his education at the German
Jordanian University and had spent his required year living in Germany. Although he was
offered higher paying positions to stay in Germany upon graduation, he was anxious to
return to Amman and to move into the home his father was building for him on the
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family property. He stated that he knows this is quite unusual and that most young men
have to build their own homes, he still strongly feels that Jordanians can make it in
Amman if they are loyal to and committed to working to improve the city. Ramzi was
perhaps the most optimistic young person I interviewed and from his perspective, it was
not only possible to claim an Ammani identity, but a duty for him to pass up better
paying positions abroad to return home and to build up what he stated are “shared
Ammani values.”
In the four cases above it is clear that some youth who have the prestige
associated with being among the minority of native Jordanians are experimenting with
different ways of adding an Ammani identity to their repertoires. Being Ammani allows
them to claim a sense of modernity and education which is exclusive to the city.
Simultaneously, however they can still call upon the wasta associated with their tribal
heritage when it is advantageous. However, some other young people do not have the
option of claiming a Jordanian-Jordanian identity are also negotiating ways of using this
same sense of belonging to the city.
The following four quotes come from West Bankers who have Jordanian
citizenship and who not only were born in Amman, but their parents were also born in
Amman. The first statement on embracing Amman was given by Fadiah, 18 who stated:
“Amman is like a second mother to me, I feel Ammani. I was raised here and
have community here. I have never really left the city.” 90
Fadiah's identity as an Ammani is rooted in her neighborhood and the fact that she
has very limited experiences outside of Amman. Yet, as a Jordanian who would be
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Her neighborhood is a small area which is limited in size by its location adjacent to the
Citadel. Jabal al Qala. This area is identified as East Amman culturally.
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labeled aslyn min Palestine she does not self-identify primarily by her paternal roots.
Particularly, her use of the imagery of Amman as a mother figure reveals a loving bond
in which she feels taken care of in the city. Compellingly, Fadiah is using verbiage which
has only recently been introduced by the Jordanian government in her description of her
relationship with the city. I will explore the new Amman is Our Mother campaign further
in the next section. However, this echoing of the government's statement does appear to
show a connection between a new state discourse about the city and a changing youth
perspective. Farrah, 30 describes a more complex and contentious relationship with the
city:
“I feel like I am in a “bad relationship” with the city. I love it so much, but it
doesn’t love me back. Amman is Jordan- part of the embroidery of the country. The
spaces are masculine and tribal, I have to take what is left-over for me, but that is all I
have- I am an Ammani, but not embraced as such.”
The relationship described by Farrah as a bad one, is based on her placement in
the social hierarchy as a woman without claims to the tribal hierarchy. She is restricted in
where and when she can go in the city. We met for our interview in an upscale coffee
shop in West Amman since she is from West Amman. She drove to meet me and has her
own car, but she stated that she could not have met me after dark and would not have
been able to meet me in other areas of the city. While she loves the city and feels she
belongs to it more than any other location, she does not feel that as a PalestinianJordanian woman that she is entitled to being loved back by the city, and instead she
needs to be content with the “leftovers” available to her as an Ammani constrained by
ethnicity and gender. Ruba, 25 also struggles with her placement in the national
imagination of being Jordanian, while still identifying as Ammani:
“We Ammanis belittle other Jordanians and act higher than they are since we
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are raised in Amman to have higher ambitions than other Jordanians from the
governorates. My family came to Amman from Palestine and I am grateful to be in the
most modern Jordanian city, but I don’t like how other Jordanians are talked about
by Ammanis.”
Again, for Ruba the tension between being Ammani or Jordanian has to do with
rural/urban tensions which portray those from rural areas as less ambitious than those
from the city. While this generalization is pervasive, it did not match with the focus panel
I conducted in Ma’fraq in which virtually every participant had career ambitions beyond
working for the state and most were willing to leave Jordan in order to pursue those
ambitions. Yet, for Ruba, being Ammani is in direct opposition to being from a rural
Jordanian spot instead of in a dichotomy with locations in Palestine, where her family is
originally from. Despite the dance of introductions with which she is quite familiar, Ruba
identifies herself as Ammani. Instead of comparing being an Ammani with being a
Palestinian, she compares herself to rural Jordanians. Meanwhile, Nadar, 24, also
identifies as Ammani, but he defines Amman as belonging to more than just Jordanians:
“Maybe Amman used to be Jordanian, but now is it the capitol of the Arabs
who are lost. It is multi-national. My family is originally from Palestine, but I have
friends who are originally from Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Libya. None of us will be able
to go “home” in our lifetimes. We have been raised here, Amman is our home. I am
Ammani by default. My friends are also, who else could we be?”
This perspective is perhaps the most threatening one to East Bankers who may
want to prevent an Ammani identity. The sheer volume of migrants in the city, who are
unlikely to return to any other home, is such that if this massive population cohesively
claimed an Ammani identity they could conceivably fulfil this “Amman used to be
Jordanian” statement. Yet, Nadar’s conclusion that he and his friends are Ammani by
default because they can’t go anywhere else is a logical conclusion.
While logically, Palestinian-Jordanians who are third generation in Jordan may
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have less to lose as they are already often situated as less Jordanian than Jordanians who
are aslyn min Jordan, they were not the only respondents who claimed an Ammani
identity. Indeed, as I showed above other respondents who state they have wasta and
belong to a tribe state they are Ammani. For them, being Ammani is more urban and
modern than being from the rural areas and they want to be judged on their own merits
instead of a system of wasta. Notably while some identified themselves as being
Ammani, not all felt their parents would also feel Ammani. There is a generational
component to embracing a positive Ammani identity.
8.3 YOUTH GEOPOLITICS: THE GENERATIONAL PERFORMANCES OF
AMMANINESS
Embracing an Ammani identity reflects a growing youth perspective breaking
from previous generations’ perspectives which kept identities tied firmly to their preAmman roots. While Ababsa and Daher write about an intentional extraterritoriality of
Amman in the official nation-building process as a way of securing the tribal backbone of
regime support (Ababsa, 2011), Kassy explores the personal motivations for not
embracing an Ammani identity (2011). He links older memories of “being part of the
crowd in the Ottoman Empire to…the second feature that lends to the city’s uniqueness is
that, by and large, Amman is composed of people that view someplace else as “home” as
strong personal reasons why Amman’s residents do not think of themselves as Ammani”
(Kassy, 2001, 259). With both internal and external motivations preventing an Ammani
identity and given the social composition of the city, it is remarkable that a number of
young people in my study are breaking from this mentality by identifying themselves as
“Ammani.”
If the key lesson Ammani youth learned from the Arab Spring was fear of
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instability and this potential instability appeared to the country like a spaceship which
“made their fighting over pebbles"91 seem insignificant (Chapter 6), this period of
uncertainty also created space for Amman to become part of the national identity. In 2013
at the height of fear about DAESH infiltrating Jordan, the Great Amman Municipality
(GAM) introduced the “Ummana Amman” (Amman is our mother) slogan. Billboards
began appearing in an effort to strengthen the bond between the residents of Amman with
their city and to encourage positive attitudes towards the capital (Freij, 2016). An annual
festival was also created to support the slogan which takes places in Wasat al Balad
(downtown).
Although the electoral gerrymandering of the government continues unabated, as
rural/tribal representation in the government continue to be disproportionate, this
campaign represents the first official attempt to create positive associations and maternal
connections with the city. Faced with a city of people with low levels of attachment to
place and a terrorist organization on its doorstep actively recruiting disaffected people,
the slogan and shift in the official discourse about the city is imminently logical.
Fostering a sense of belonging without changing the structure of the government is
clearly a less risky proposition than continuing to alienate a large population who could
be considered ideal candidates for DAESH’s recruitment.
Several ways of creating and performing Ammaniness emerged during my
research. These include distinct styles of Ammani: dialect, dress, and employment.
Notably, these performances are enacted quite differently across gender lines. Just as
King Abdullah is portrayed in the ubiquitous photos throughout the country in a variety
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Referring to struggles between Palestinian Jordanians and Jordanian Jordanians.
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of staged outfits including Western dress in Amman and in Traditional Dress in the
suburbs and villages, residents of Amman also play particular roles dependent on their
settings. I will begin with exploring the new Ammani dialect, before discussing Ammani
style of dress and Ammani employment.

Figure 8.2 Translation- “Amman is our mother.” Grass sign at the Roman Amphitheater
during the Amman is Our Mother Festival. Published in Al Ghad 29 March 2016
Ammani Dialect:
One auditory example of how Ammanis navigate social belonging became clear
when one of the translators I used for a focus panel, Hamzeh, a highly educated young
man with two brothers also educated in the United States, asked me which dialect I
wanted him to use for our session. Since our focus panel was made up entirely of young
women, we decided the softer Ammani accent would be most appropriate. He chuckled
and said, since I am not Jordanian-Jordanian they expect the Ammani accent from me,
but my older brother is big into sports and likes to drive our father crazy by using the
Jordanian accent to play up his masculinity. As a woman and a “blonde” foreigner the
expectation would almost always be for me to use the softer Ammani dialect, however
when I conducted research with young men outside of the city the distinction was quite
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clear, and I tried to mirror their pronunciation as a sign of respect.
One of the ways youth perform their Ammaniness is by creating an Ammani
dialect. According to Al Wer’s linguistic study “in the modern history of Jordan, Amman
is a new city. Strictly speaking it had no native population and no native dialect” (Al
Wer, 2002, 63). Yet despite this lack of a native dialect, he outlines distinct
pronunciations and vowelizations young people use that are not emulations of their
parents or of other groups in the city. Instead, he states the youth have created new dialect
specific to Amman based largely on contact between the Palestinian and Jordanian
dialects. By embracing that they are natives to the city, and through affiliating themselves
with Amman linguistically “these youngsters are giving Amman, for the first time in its
modern history, a native population and a regional identity. The symbol of this new
identity is represented in the youngsters’ linguistic divergence from the dialects spoken
by their parents” (Al Wer, 2007, 1).
As I stated in Chapter 6, the majority of first generation of Ammanis referred to
themselves as either Jordanian or Palestinian and they used their local dialects
accordingly. The second generation referred to themselves in a hyphenated manner:
Jordanian-Jordanian or Palestinian-Jordanian, and their speech still largely reflect their
roots as being from either Jordanian or Palestinian roots. Yet, the new Ammani dialect
being created by the third generation of Ammanis flattens these distinctions, erasing the
audible traces of previously hyphenated lineages and replacing it with a new Ammani
dialect with new social rules understood by Ammani youth.
While paternal lineage is erased by the new Ammani dialect a complex linguistic
dance performed unevenly by both genders in a variety of circumstances has been created
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instead. In many cases entirely new words have been created for the new Ammani
dialect, however in the context of this chapter a clearer way to trace Amman’s linguistic
transformation can be found in the gendered and rural/urban pronunciation differences
between the “G92” and the hushed “A?93” sounds. In contemporary social settings
Jordanian men perform their native identity using a harsher “G” pronunciation while
women, and mainly Ammani men pronounce words by substituting a hushed “A?” for the
“G.” Men working in the security forces almost exclusively use the “G” sound.
The use of dialect and pronunciation is complicated in particular social
circumstances to assert more: masculinity/Jordanian-ness, (based on situated citizenship
which imagines this as tribal/rural), or more modernity/urbanity. As previously outlined,
older generations of Palestinian-Jordanian men often use (A?) which is socially labeled as
“softer” as it comes from urban areas, while the harsher pronunciation comes from the
rural tribal areas and is labeled as more masculine. The Ammani dialect exists in a
dichotomy which on one side is derogatorily labeled feminine and on the other side is
elevated as a marker of higher education and modern urbanity. Both PalestinianJordanian and Jordanian-Jordanian men who want to appear refined and more highly
educated will use the hushed “A?” variation. Yet, when these men want to appear
masculine or to exert some claim to belonging to the national idealized Bedouin image of
a Jordanian-Jordanian they will often switch to the harder “G” sounds.
Tracing the Arabic word for coffee through a variety of settings gives insights
into how the new Ammani dialect is used:
92

The tribal pronunciation of the letter qaaf is pronounced as a G sound instead of a K
sound.
93
The hushed ‘A?’ sound is created by transferring the sound of the G made at the back
of the mouth to the front of the mouth and replacing it with a hushed ‘a.’
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-rural Jordanian men = Gahwa
-Jordanian Women = A?’hweh
-Ammani men with women or with other Ammani men= A?’hweh
-All men among mixed groups of men, with government officials, or when
machismo is required = Gahwa
Compellingly, men do not receive the most scorn for using the softer (A?)
pronunciation, since the Ammani dialect is socially acceptable in many daily
circumstances. Instead, as Al-Wer notes the most scorn is used against a “tant94 [which]
is not a boy who uses [A?], but one who does not, or cannot, make the situational switch
to [g], i.e. one who is incapable of appropriating the full range of variations (Al Wer,
2007, 10).
The creation of an Ammani dialect means that a young man with tribal roots may
speak in a Jordanian dialect with his family (Gahwa) and then switch to the Ammani
dialect (A?’hweh) in situations which require more refinement or advanced social skills.
Likewise, a young man who lives in the secondary city of Salt may use the Jordanian
dialect (Gahwa) when at home in Salt, but if he commutes to Amman for work, he will
often switch to the Ammani dialect (A?’hweh) while in the city. If he uses the softer
pronunciation in Salt, he may be teased as being effeminate or asked why he is talking
like an Ammani. Yet, in Amman the bigger social mistake would be if he fails to switch
based on the setting and audience. In both of these circumstances native Jordanian men
are transforming their behaviors to fit into Ammani culture.
For women, the distinction is less stark as they generally are expected to use the
softer Ammani style as it is considered more feminine. However, in some tribal settings
women may also use the harsher pronunciation to exert their native roots. Through the
creation of an Ammani dialect, including a plethora of Ammani words and clear social
94

From the French for Aunt.
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rules for pronunciation, Ammani youth claim and perform Ammaniness differently than
their parents and grandparents. Indeed, this generation uses a shared urban judgement and
implicit agreement concerning what is and what is not Ammani.
This generational difference is made even more obvious by Al Wer’s statement
that, “the adult population of Amman, including many who were born in the city,
continue to affiliate themselves with the towns and villages of their forefathers. The
youngsters, on the other hand, call themselves 'Ammanis', by which they mean that they
are native to the city” (Al-Wer, 2007, 1). He argues that although Jerusalemites, Irbidis,
and Damascenes are well established terms to describe linguistic groups, the derivation
ammaniyyiin- ‘Ammanis’ was only recently coined and is just now being used by
linguistic scholars. While men are more affected by the social rules of using an Ammani
dialect, women are more impacted by the social rules of identifying as Ammani through
their clothing and makeup.
Style of dress
The majority of Ammanis dress in western styles and often have an affinity for
name brands. However, some obvious distinctions exist between dress in East and West
Amman. West Ammanis are often able to style themselves more liberally and may have
access to more elite name brands. Particularly women in East Amman face social
pressure to dress more conservatively. Upon arrival in Jordan I was given the advice to
cover to my wrists and ankles when going to East Amman, but to feel free to wear shorts
in West Amman. Although it never became necessary, I also included a scarf in my bag
whenever going to East Amman in case it would be appropriate to cover my hair.
Virtually all women in East Amman are hijabis (wearers of hijab hair coverings) and
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dress conservatively. Meanwhile, West Ammani’s makeup can include dramatic ‘cat
eyes’ which would be judged in East Amman or in the governorates. As Rima who
commutes from Salt explains:
“I put on my Ammani eyes at home, but rush to work in the city so that I won’t
damage my brother or father’s reputations. I couldn’t wear this makeup in East Amman,
but I work in West Amman and it is expected. I wear the hijab for them as well, but as
soon as I return home to the ashura (tribe), I take off my Amman eye makeup.”

Figure 8.3 Advertisement for a makeup class in Amman. “Cat eyes” are very popular in
Amman but are not as socially acceptable and could be judged in the rest of Jordan.
https://www.sajilni.com/event/the-makeup-master-class-helder-marucci-5138.
For men the distinction is less noticeable as family reputations are not based on
male clothing choices. Both traditional clothing and modern western style clothing is
acceptable in Amman. However, the vast majority of young Ammani men dress virtually
identically to American or European youth. Men wearing traditional clothing are often
making an intentional statement about belonging to Jordan. A hybrid outfit of jeans, tshirt, and shmag (red and white male head covering) is often worn during holidays or for
celebrations.
Images of the Royal family provide clear examples of Ammani style clothing. As
in other areas of the global south, the adaptation of clothing in Amman to a more
globalized western style of dress was facilitated by access to lower cost western products
and access to the internet- particularly social media. However, despite access to internet
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Figure 8.4 Royal family photo Facebook. Three females wearing knee length skirts and
three males wearing western business casual attire. Published in People magazine:
http://people.com/royals/queen-rania-and-jordan-royal-familys-photo-2016.
throughout most of the Kingdom, social expectations outside of Amman dictate
adherence to more traditional and conservative fashion- predominantly for women. The
resulting Ammani style of dress mirrors the urban/rural distinction young Ammanis
(particularly women) experience in the work force.

Figure 8.5 Casually dressed Royal family. Shared on Queen Rania’s Instagram account.
The logos of branded clothing is visible as are jeans and t-shirts which are standard
western wear for teenagers.
Work culture
The role of gender on employment in Jordan has been studied by several noted
scholars (Adely, 2004; 2012; Hijab, 1998; Miles, 2002) however the nexus between
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geography, particularly the urban/rural divide, and cultural implications for youth
employment is less well studied. Yet, during my research young people reported a clear
relationship between where they live or work, and the opportunities for the particular
types of work they can pursue. Indeed, young people routinely express that their daily
lives are impacted by the culture of being an Ammani at work. The primary differences
young people describe between working in Amman and the rural areas are: the relative
availability of transportation in Amman comparted to rural areas, diversity of
employment options in Amman, and the impact of the cosmopolitan culture on work
culture. Being an Ammani opens opportunities for youth to work which are often closed
to them outside of the city.
As a developing nation Jordan’s transportation infrastructure is limited. Mass
transportation doesn’t exist and personal vehicles dominate. In Amman the solution to
transportation issues including the lack of a public mass transportation system and
burdensome traffic are elusive and seem intractable. Although a Rapid Transit Bus (RTB)
system has been technically in the works for ten years it has been beset by delays and is
more associated with fasade (corruption) than with a potential viable option for
expanding youth opportunities to work.
While some buses already operate in the city they are privately owned and do not
follow posted routes. The RTB system is being partially funded by the French
Development Agency and is projected to be a fleet of 150 hybrid buses owned by the
Government of Jordan which will follow posted routes (Oxford Business Group, 2015).
In the meantime, both busses and taxis are notoriously difficult for young women who
often complain of having to navigate inappropriate behavior by male drivers or other
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passengers. 95 Cultural expectations dictate that women sit in the back of taxis while male
fares are expected to sit in the front passenger seat. During the course of my research I
personally experienced harassment when in taxis and opted to switch to using the new
ride hailing application Careem instead, Uber has also started operating in Amman, but
neither option is widely available outside of the capital. 96
Although transportation options are problematic in Amman, being an Ammani
can allow young people relatively better options to get to work than are available in rural
areas. The comparative availability of transportation, however problematic it is, is more
advanced than outside of the city. However, the transportation options in Amman still
constrain the lower class and women. Poorer Ammanis are unable to afford ride hailing
apps or taxis and thus they are dependent on buses which often fail to reach their desired
destinations. Women face additional cultural restraints to using public transport. As Miles
notes:
“Cultural proscriptions on female mobility, for example, are a significant constraint, a
finding that has not been documented for Jordan before; a recent study that explicitly
measured women's mobility constraints in Jordan failed to include leaving home for
work/economic activities as a mobility indicator” (DoS & Fafo, 1998, 310).
In addition to women facing more challengers to mobility throughout the country,
they are also much more limited by the types of work available to them. Prior to SAP in
the 80s female employment in Jordan was on the rise. However, women’s work was
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Drivers are virtually all male in Amman. 5 “pink taxis” being driven by women who
would only pick up female fares were reported in the local news; however, I never
personally saw one. Additionally, rumors of female Careem or Uber drivers excited many
young female Ammanis on social media. Again, either they were so rare as not to be seen
personally by the author, or they simply didn’t exist.
96
Careem and Uber created new opportunities for educated women to move around the
city in more comfort. However, this service was objected to by taxi drivers who fought
the competition.
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largely in the public sector, which was hit the hardest by the contraction of the
government in the wake of the oil bust and Jordan’s agreements with the IMF and WB.
Thus, women were disproportionately exposed to obstacles to work when Jordanian men
returned from the Gulf no longer able to find work there which would allow them to send
remittances home to Jordan (Miles, 2002). Men were immediately given preference in
both the public and private sector as they are culturally deemed the primary
breadwinners. “Squeezed by a large external debt and high male unemployment, the
Jordanian government adopted an implicit policy of discouraging female employment;
the national policy-making body for women was placed back where it had been in 1977
and new labor legislation was stalled" (Hijab, 1988, 114).
Yet, are still earning educations despite their receding opportunities. These
conditions create Adely’s paradox (2012) in which young Jordanian women are educated
but unable to work. Indeed “according to the World Bank, Jordan, with the lowest female
labor force participation rates of 15.3%, has the fifth lowest female participation rate
among 185 countries and territories that report such data (World Development
Indicators). As the center of private sector employment, Amman offers more paid
employment opportunities for the small group of Jordanian women who continue to work
after marriage and having children than secondary cities or rural areas. As Shireen states:
“In Irbid I wouldn’t be able to talk with male colleagues without it bringing
shame to my family - in Amman I can just do my job.”
While she moved to Amman from a village in the governorate as a young girl, she
explained that her female cousins who stayed in the village are not achieving the same
level of career success that she is able to attain in Amman. Although they have been
educated at university they are constrained by limited opportunities and by social
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conventions. However, being an Ammani allows her to “simply do her job.” Notably the
percentage of women who stay in the workforce after marriage drops significantly.
Ammani men also have different options for work in Amman than outside of the
city. Again, the private sector is larger in Amman than in other parts of the country,
offering different types of jobs than available in other parts of the country. While
Ammani women in the middle class have benefited from being able to use ride sharing
apps in the city, young men are also benefiting from being able to work as drivers.
Despite drivers’ work being precarious as they risk getting traffic tickets while the legal
battle between the taxi drivers’ and new government regulations are being debated,
thousands of new drivers have joined this workforce.
Being a Careem “captain” or an Uber driver is one new viable work option for
educated Ammani men of this generation which wasn’t available to their parents or
grandparents. Many drivers describe the position as allowing them to earn more than
work as a starting engineer at 300JDs per month ($423 in 2018), allowing them to
practice English skills, and to meet all sorts of new people. All of which are aspects of
work which are primarily available to Ammani men in Jordan. This type of work fits
within the description from youth in Chapter 7 who have “expectation gaps” with
available employment in Jordan. Indeed, being Ammani allows youth access to a variety
of new types of private sector work much less available outside of the city.
My focus panel in Murfraq dispelled the myth that young people outside of the
city have lower ambitions than Ammanis. While conventional wisdom said that rural
youth are content to work for the state as they have wasta perhaps it is more accurate to
say that they are limited by their rural geography and that being an Ammani doesn’t
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change young peoples’ dreams, just their access to them. If people coming from outside
of Amman learn the rules of Ammani dialect and style of dress they can also access these
Ammani work opportunities. However, like Shireen’s accountant these opportunities are
made easier for those who claiming and performing Ammaniness. However, as discussed
in Chapter 4, just as more young people are claiming Ammaniness, a ‘new city’ is being
proposed which could further complicate the mental mapping of belonging in Jordan.
8.4 CONCLUSION:
In this chapter I showed how some of Amman’s youth are making claims to their
new Ammani identities as they defy being limited by older labels. These young people
are claiming a new primary Ammani identity in an interconnected cosmopolitan space
which is rapidly transforming. However, they often still call upon other forms of identity
as their social situation dictates. By looking at the processes of nation-building and the
complicated and contested history of expressing an Ammani city identity I built upon
Daher and Ababsa’s research into how Amman was an intentionally extraterritorial space
by showing that the uncertainties of the Arab Spring and the aging of the factors which
tie young people to external locations have allowed youth to assert their Ammaniness.
I have also highlighted the multiple and sometimes contradictory meaning of
being an Ammani and explored how spaces within the city are defined as more or less
Jordanian in a fluid manner based on who is defining the spaces. This fluidity allows
Jordanians to alternatively assert themselves as being more authentically Jordanian in
specific social settings or to claim Ammaniness when wanting to appear more modern or
educated, in a dichotomy which places the rural and urban in contestation with one
another. Likewise, citizens of Amman whose lineage comes from outside the borders of
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Jordan are performing their belonging to the city through the newly created Ammani
dialect, Ammani fashion, and work habits which the young people themselves are
defining as distinctly Ammani.
Although the regime’s largest and most assured support base is still identified
with rural locations outside of the city, and the Jordanian government remains
gerrymandered to benefit these spaces, Amman is beginning to assert an independent
identity which is less threatening to stability than geopolitical pressures surrounding
Jordan. Despite this emerging authenticity of a non-threatening Ammani identity, the
state has proposed a ‘new city’ in line with many other nations in the global south as a
utopia which will allow for greater infrastructure development and wealth creation. Since
many government services are envisioned as being moved to the new city, it is likely that
should the city be built that Amman will become a secondary city and its nearly 4 million
residents will be placed in the predicament of defining themselves in relation to the new
city and not just to Amman or tribal spaces in Jordan.
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CONCLUSIONS
The case of Amman exposes the ways in which young people are situated in the
Jordan’s national discourse due to their urban citizenship. As a result of the historical
processes (outlined in Chapter 1) that produced a strong tribal system and moved the
capital city of Jordan from Salt to Amman, being "of" Amman situates a young person as
Jordanian yet not quite as Jordanian, as people from other areas of the country.
Analyzing the data, I gathered in my research demanded a conceptual shift away from
established geographic approaches to political identity, particularly those grounded in the
conventional framework of the nation-state. This research raised new questions about
how to consider the role of urban environments in processes of political belonging that
also depend upon relational links to places and geographic imaginaries beyond the city.
The concept of situated citizenship accommodates this complexity.
My research with Ammani youth indicates several formative, spatial factors in
their political identities, including the geographic dichotomy between JordanianJordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians, the impact of Amman serving as a home of refuge
for generations of migrants, and new multi-scalar modes of belonging. Throughout my
research, these key markers surfaced repeatedly as youth situate themselves in ways that
relate to national identity, but that national identity does not frame. While national
identity is peripheral to young Ammanis' core understandings of self and belonging, their
elective and ascribed identities are inherently political. The implications of this
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politicized geographic identity contribute to some Ammanis’ having a low sense of
attachment to the city.
9.2 FIGHT OR FLIGHT: JUXTAPOSING RIGHTS TO THE CITY WITH
ASPIRATIONS OF ELSEWHERE
Young Ammanis struggle as they weigh their own levels of attachment to the city.
A primary finding reported by youth in my study is the lessening of the tensions between
types of Jordanians. While not everyone in this generation agrees that this specific social
tension is on the decline, the majority reported to me that other tensions are more relevant
in their daily lives. Although they stated that their parents and/or grandparents likely will
still list the Palestinian cause as their most immediate concern, young Ammanis in my
research point to the passing of time and new pressing economic troubles, based on
regional instability, as reasons that this is no longer the penultimate struggle of their
generation. The political act of claiming Ammaniness or being Urdustini illuminates the
shift within this generation. Instead of identifying as purely Palestinian /Jordanian like
their grandparents might, or by a hyphenated sense of belonging PalestinianJordanian/Jordanian-Jordanian, which their parents might experience, this generation is
pioneering new identity labels. Despite the fact that inter-Jordanian tensions emanating
from the social hierarchy created between East Bankers and West Bankers are no longer
the most pressing concerns among the young people I interviewed, there are still spaces
within the city which perpetuate these tensions.
The concept of “figured worlds” reveals the spatial contingency of which
behaviors are considered appropriate in which places: actions at the University of Jordan
and when engaging with Amman’s soccer rivalry would not be acceptable in all parts of
the city (Gee, 2014, 29). The university and the soccer spaces are key geographies
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through which young people navigate belonging in Amman. Despite the fact that they
experience tensions in space more than adults, most feel their lives are less influenced by
issues of national identity than in the past. Instead they describe wanting to experience
more than just the safety which draws so many migrants to Amman.
Young people want to achieve dreams generally not attainable in the city. While
many talk about needing to leave the city to pursue economic goals, others point to
cultural frustrations including the increasing period of waithood, not being listened to by
elders, and careers which neither aligns with their education nor cost of living needs.
Thus, Amman is a space in which (social, generational, gendered) tensions are
simultaneously abating and exacerbating. Here, locale matters.
Due to the existence of both these realities - a low level of attachment based on
many residents having split allegiances, and many young people feeling they must leave
the city to reach their dreams - very few young people are fighting for their ‘right to make
the city’ (Harvey, 2008). These factors (lack of commitment to the city and feeling
obligated to leave Amman) have an important impact on Amman’s development. In
addition to not having a strong group of youth actively seeking to make the city, Amman
has also been undergoing a rapid transformation into a neoliberal city. This
transformation is not only changing spaces within the city, it is also testing Jordan’s
original social contract.
9.3 TESTING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
Amman’s rapid transformation from a small village to a booming metropolitan
center fundamentally shapes contemporary Ammani culture. In conjunction with these
physical changes, Jordan’s social contract is also transforming. To understand the
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fundamental nature of these shifts I began by outlining how the royal family, as outsiders
to Jordan, established a social contract built on tribal allegiances being exchanged for
patronage. I traced the efficacy of the contract from this foundational period through the
mandate period and into independence.
While the intertwining of the newly created tribal elite with the fate of the
Hashemite regime is acknowledged as one of the nation’s primary sources of stability, the
growth of Jordan’s population and global neoliberal trends have made this system of
patronage difficult and undesirable to maintain. With population shifts increasingly
shrinking the number of Jordanians able to participate in Jordan’s original social contract,
and the cost of living negating much of the benefit of public sector employment, I
illuminate how the contract is being tested. Young people are facing a period of
uncertainty without the same set of rights and privileges afforded to their elders.
I outlined within the context of this uncertainty how social messages are filling
the void that the social contract used to occupy by directing youth along new acceptable
paths. The message youth repeated most during our interviews was a version of the
governmental rhetoric extoling, “Stability First.” While this discourse predates the Arab
Spring, it has been amplified by contemporary regional instability. Young Ammanis
overwhelmingly report that the main sentiment generated by the Arab Spring for them is
fear and that Jordan should focus on remaining stable. Thus, stability is a more immediate
issue for this generation, more immediate than the need to resolve the Palestinian issue
which seems larger than they are able to resolve.
Additional attempts to guide youth, who can no longer rely on the security of
public sector work, include those delivered by an assortment of neoliberal actors
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including NGO’s and international organizations encouraging Ammanis to become
entrepreneurs. While the government is not driving this effort alone, the King has
repeatedly embraced entrepreneurism as a way for young people to solve their own lack
of employment opportunities. This underscores a key rift in the social contract, where the
welfare of the public was intrinsically tied to the success of the government. By instead
pushing youth towards private sector employment, the presence of neoliberalism places
the onus of survival/success on the individual, not the state. And thus, the individual feels
less tied to the state, less vested in the state, and the Jordanian social contract continues to
erode.
The final theme young people reported en lieu of the failing social contract
centers around activism. However, as I highlighted, the extent of this social activism is
restricted to approved topics. Ammani youth are themselves implicated by their
participation in these actions since participation in: stability first, entrepreneurism, and
social activism extend the failing social contract, while preventing them from taking
radical political actions. They are effectively being contained by these alternative actions.
While each of these activities is framed as empowering, they each paradoxically extend a
system which is failing the majority of Amman’s youth. Their transformation from Royal
Citizens (a citizen who, in Jordan, was able to rely on public sector patronage) into
neoliberal citizens (who are expected to provide for themselves) is a key generational
transformation I uncovered in my research.
9.4 GENERATIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS AND CLAIMING AMMANINESS
Finally, my last findings chapter tackled the question, “What is an Ammani?” The
answers to this question varied not only based on who was answering the question, but
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also the social circumstances of the query. A budding trend of resisting their assigned
citizenship also emerged amongst my study participants. Certain areas of the city, and
particular social practices with positive connotations, are permitting some youth to
embrace their Ammaniness.
While different regions within the city are viewed along a scale of Jordanianness,
(which is not uniformly agreed upon), new Ammani identities that contest Amman’s
subordination in Jordan’s shared mental mapping of the country are emerging. These
include the new Ammani dialect, style of dress, work habits, and positive connections to
cosmopolitanism. My research revealed a diverse cross section of Jordanians who
selectively employ their Ammaniness for advantages, but who also take pride in being
from, and thus a part of, Jordan’s most modern and advanced city. I argue that the ability
to embrace an Ammani identity is being facilitated in part due to the arrival of new
“others.” These new populations bring new social challenges, particularly the high
number of Syrian refugees living in the city. The relative “brotherhood” of Jordanians
who are aslyn min either Palestine or Jordan compared to their new “cousins” aslyin min
Syria or Iraq has created space for an Ammani sense of belonging to emerge among some
youth.
9.5 IMPLICATIONS
My research provides a window into the turbulent experiences of urban youth in
the MENA region, youth who are currently facing unpredictable and unprecedented local,
regional, and global pressures and transformations. While images of young people from
the MENA region are often presented negatively in western outlets, my work uses a
geographic lens to present their lives through their daily lived experiences. Bringing their
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voices to the forefront can help policy makers and analysts (both from within and from
outside of the region) who not only largely missed the Arab Spring, but who also still
have little concept of the goals and dreams of this generation, to begin to understand
them.
By locating my project in Amman, I have chosen a geography deeply impacted by
regional instability, but thus far not contributing to additional instability. As a center of
refuge for many of the regions’ migrants, Jordan’s stability is central to many nations and
vested stakeholders. Should Jordan become unstable, it would have implications far
beyond the region. Therefore, it is critical to understand not only Jordan’s current (and
somewhat unique) stability, but how likely Jordanian youth feel this is to continue in their
current lives and in the future. The stress on Jordan’s social contract requires immediate
and further examination, so that it can be adated to current realities.
Area studies specialists can also apply the lessons learned from my research to
expand their knowledge of the emerging field of critical youth geopolitics. While
Ammani youth experience particular cultural norms based on the city’s history, their very
middleness and interconnectedness ensures that their experiences impact youth
elsewhere. Viewing youth through this multi-scalar sense of belonging allows
stakeholders to not only better understand, but also critically analyze, the needs of young
people. Most of the youth I spoke with do not feel that they are being heard: this a
primary driving factor for their desire to leave the city. Giving voice to these young
people is the first step of allowing young Ammanis to foster greater connections to
Amman. Providing resources and opportunities is the larger challenge, but one that
cannot be achieved without first knowing what young people feel.
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9.6 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
At least three future directions could emerge from this research. Firstly, while this
research focused on urban youth, it became clear during my research that youth in
secondary cities and rural areas in Jordan are also impacted by new regional and global
pressures. While Ammanis experience these through their daily lives in the city, how
other Jordanian young people are experiencing these events is worth exploring.
Another future research project became apparent in my last weeks in Jordan as the
border with Syria began to tentatively be reopened. At that point, very few refugees were
crossing the border to return home, but commerce between the two nations was in the
nascent stages of resuming. Jordanian officials optimistically view the opportunity to
rebuild Syria’s infrastructure as an opportunity to export Jordanian labor. It is too early to
tell if this will unfold as Jordanian officials hope, but the potential exodus of refugees and
a regional outlet for Jordanian employment will certainly impact young Ammanis. Each
of these areas of research would provide additional information on new and emerging
youth perspectives as Jordan’s geopolitical situation changes.
A third direction is a larger variation seeking to gather information from youth in
Palestine, who have connections to young people in Jordan. Throughout my interviews,
tensions between Jordanian-Jordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians were readily apparent,
but also somewhat flat. Many of the youth talk about a homeland which they have never
seen, and some seem quite uncertain about “returning” to when all they have known in
their lifetimes is Jordan. In a few interviews it became clear that this divide causes
concerns even within families. To further understand the youth in this region I would like
to pursue research with young people in Palestine who have families in Jordan.
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Understanding their perspective would provide new insights into how cultural norms in
Palestine are developing differently than they are developing for Palestinian-Jordanians
in Jordan. It would also address the other side of the imagined home which many young
Ammanis are required to claim belonging to while living in Amman.
While Jordan’s participation in the Arab Spring is often dismissed an anticlimactic, it nonetheless exposed how little is known about Jordanian youth. This group
of young people are part of a generation forever marked as having witnessed dramatic
social changes, which distinguishes them from their elders. The spirit of openness and
generosity with which I was welcomed by young Ammanis made this research a project
sustained by their willingness to share. However, it is my sincere hope that by writing
some of their experiences and perspectives that I will be able to in a small way contribute
to them finally being heard.

300

REFERENCES:
Ababsa, Myriam. Mapping the Social Disparities in Amman. Amman: French
Institute for the Near East, 2010.
---. Social Disparities and Public Policies in Amman: 2011, p. 205–32.
Abouchedid, Kamal, et al. “The Limitations of Inter-Group Learning in Confessional
School Systems: The Case of Lebanon.” Arab Studies Quarterly, 2002, pp. 61–
82.
Abu El-Haj, Thea Renda. “‘I Was Born Here, but My Home, It’s Not Here’:
Educating for Democratic Citizenship in an Era of Transnational Migration and
Global Conflict.” Harvard Educational Review, vol. 77, no. 3, 2007, p. 285–316.
Abu-Lughod, Janet L. Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco. Vol. 615., Princeton
University Press, 2014.
---. “The Islamic City–Historic Myth, Islamic Essence, and Contemporary
Relevance.” International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 19, no. 02, 1987,
p. 155–176.
Abuqudairi, Areej. “Jordan: ‘We Are Tired of Living like the Dead.’” Al Jazeera,
2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/jordan-tired-living-dead160728105144182.html.
Acheraïou, Amar. Questioning hybridity, postcolonialism and globalization. Springer,
2011.
Achilli, Luigi. “Disengagement from Politics: Nationalism, Political Identity, and the
Everyday in a Palestinian Refugee Camp in Jordan.” Critique of Anthropology,
vol. 34, no. 2, 2014, p. 234–257.
Adely, Fida. Gendered Paradoxes: Educating Jordanian Women in Nation, Faith,
and Progress. University of Chicago Press, 2012.
---. “The Mixed Effects of Schooling for High School Girls in Jordan: The Case of
Tel Yahya.” Comparative Education Review, vol. 48, no. 4, 2004, p. 353–373.
Agnew, John. Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics. Routledge. 2004.
---. “The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations
Theory.” Review of International Political Economy, vol. 1, no. 1, 1994, p. 53–
80.
Agnew, John, and Virginie Mamadouh. Politics: Critical Essays in Human
Geography. Ashgate, 2008.
http://www.narcis.nl/publication/RecordID/oai:uva.nl:294644.
Aitken, S. C. He Geographies of Young People: The Morally Contested Spaces of
Identity. Routledge, 2005.
Ajaka, Nadine. Waiting Longer to Marry in Jordan.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/02/waiting-longer-marryjordan-201421972546802626.html. Accessed 26 Nov. 2017.
301

Al Hindi, Dala. How Long until Jordanian Women Can Pass Their Nationality onto
Their Children? /news/12888/2017-12-14. Accessed 16 Jan. 2018.
Al Huniti, Hana. The Power of Real Estate in Shaping Urban Realities in Amman:
A Critical Discourse Analysis of Abdali. German Jordanian University, 2016.
Al Oudat, Mohammed Ali, and Ayman Alshboul. “‘Jordan First’: Tribalism,
Nationalism and Legitimacy of Power in Jordan.” Intellectual Discourse, vol. 18,
no. 1, 2010.
Al Rabady, Rama, and Shatha Abu-Khafajah. “‘Send in the Clown’: Re-Inventing
Jordan’s Downtowns in Space and Time, Case of Amman.” Urban Design
International, vol. 20, no. 1, Jan. 2015, p. 1–11. www.palgrave-journals.com,
doi:10.1057/udi.2013.27.
Al Tal, Raed. Structures of Authority: A Sociopolitical Account of Architectural and
Urban Programs in Amman, Jordan (1953-1999). State University of New York,
2006,
alaraby.co.uk. “Jordan Plans New City near Amman to Ease Overcrowding.” The
New Arab, 6 Nov. 2017.
Al-Husseini, Jalal. The Evolution of the Palestinian Refugee Camps in Jordan.
Between Logics of Exclusion and Integration. Collections électroniques de
l’Ifpo. Livres en ligne des Presses de l’Institut français du Proche-Orient, 2011.
6. 181-204.
Aljafari, Mais. Emerging Public Spaces in the City of Amman, Jordan: An Analysis of
Everyday Life Practices. German Jordanian University, 2014.
Alon, Yoav. Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State. Vol. 61,
IB Tauris, 2007.
Al-Ramahi, Aseel. “Wasta in Jordan: A Distinct Feature of (and Benefit for) Middle
Eastern Society.” Arab Law Quarterly, vol. 22, no. 1, 2008, p. 35–62.
Al-Wer, Enam. “Jordanian and Palestinian Dialects in Contact: Vowel Raising in
Amman.” Contributions to the Sociology of Language, vol. 86, 2002, p. 63–80.
---. “The Formation of the Dialect of Amman.” Arabic in the City: Issues in Dialect
Contact and Language Variation, vol. 55, no. 5, 2007.
“Amman Most Expensive Arab City, 29th Worldwide.” Forbes Accessed 5 May
2018.
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. Verso London, 2004.
Antonsich, Marco. “Searching for Belonging–an Analytical Framework.” Geography
Compass, vol. 4, no. 6, 2010, p. 644–59.
Assaad, Ragui, et al. “Gender and the Jordanian Labor Market.” The Jordanian
Labour Market in the New Millennium, vol. 172, 2014.
---. The Jordanian Labour Market in the New Millennium. Oxford University Press,
2014.
Bank, André, and Oliver Schlumberger. “Jordan: Between Regime Survival and
Economic Reform.” Volker Perthes, Arab Élites Negotiating the Politics of
Change, Lynne Reinner Publishers, Londres, 2004, p. 35–60.
Bayat, Asef. “Globalization and the Politics of the Informals in the Global South.”
Urban Informality: Transnational Perspectives from the Middle East, Latin
America, and South Asia, vol. 83, 2004.
302

Bayat, Asef, and M. de Koning. “The Making of Muslim Youths.” ISIM Review,
2005, p. 16.
Bayat, Asef, and Linda Herrera, editors. Being Young and Muslim: New Cultural
Politics in the Global South and North. Oxford University Press, 2010.
Bayloumy, Anne Marie. “Militarizing Welfare: Neo-Liberalism and Jordanian
Policy.” Middle East Journal, vol. Vol. 62, no. No. 2 Spring, 2008, p. 277–303.
Benwell, Matthew C., and Peter Hopkins. Children, Young People and Critical
Geopolitics. Taylor & Francis, 2017.
Bhabha, Homi K. The Location of Culture. 1994. London: Routledge.
Bondokji, Neven. “The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan: Time to Reform.” Policy
Brief. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, April, 2015.
Brand, Laurie A. “Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity.” Journal of
Palestine Studies, vol. 24, no. 4, 1995, p. 46–61.
Brenner, Neil. “Theses on Urbanization.” Public Culture, vol. 25, no. 1 (69), 2013, p.
85–114.
Cantini, Daniele. Youth and Education in the Middle East: Shaping Identity and
Politics in Jordan. IB Tauris, 2016.
Caprotti, Federico. “Critical Research on Eco-Cities? A Walk through the SinoSingapore Tianjin Eco-City, China.” Cities, vol. 36, 2014, p. 10–17.
Ceritoglu, Evren, et al. “The Impact of Syrian Refugees on Natives’ Labor Market
Outcomes in Turkey: Evidence from a Quasi-Experimental Design.” IZA Journal
of Labor Policy, vol. 6, no. 1, 2017, p. 5.
Cirolia, Liza Rose. “(W) Escaping the Challenges of the City: A Critique of Cape
Town’s Proposed Satellite Town.” Urban Forum, vol. 25, Springer, 2014, p.
295–312.
Cole, Juan Ricardo. The New Arabs: How the Millennial Generation Is Changing the
Middle East. First Simon & Schuster hardcover edition, Simon & Schuster,
2014.
Cooke, Miriam. Tribal Modern: Branding New Nations in the Arab Gulf. University
of California Press, 2014.
Côté-Roy, Laurence. New City-Building in Morocco: Policy Transfer as an
Entrepreneurial Venture. 2018.
“‘Critical Thinking, Reading Can Arm Children against Extremism.’” Jordan Times,
17 Nov. 2016, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/critical-thinking-readingcan-arm-children-against-extremism%E2%80%99.
Culcasi, Karen. “Cartographies of Supranationalism: Creating and Silencing
Territories in the ‘Arab Homeland.’” Political Geography, vol. 30, no. 8, 2011,
p. 417–428.
---. “Warm Nationalism: Mapping and Imagining the Jordanian Nation.” Political
Geography, vol. 54, 2016, p. 7–20.
Daher, Rami. “Amman: Disguised Genealogy and Recent Urban Restructuring and
Neoliberal Threats.” The Evolving Arab City. London: Routledge, 2008, p. 37–
68.
---. Cities, Urban Practices and Nation Building in Jordan. Understanding Cultural
Change and Urban Transformations: Qualifying Amman–The City of Many
Hats. Edited by Myriam Ababsa, Institut Francais du Proche-Orient, 2011.
303

Daher, Rami Farouk. “Gentrification and the Politics of Power, Capital and Culture in
an Emerging Jordanian Heritage Industry.” Traditional Dwellings and
Settlements Review, 1999, p. 33–45.
---. “Neoliberal Urban Transformations in the Arab City: Meta-Narratives, Urban
Disparities and the Emergence of Consumerist Utopias and Geographies of
Inequalities in Amman.” Environnement Urbain/Urban Environment, vol. 7,
2013, p. 99–115.
---, editor. The Politics and Practices of Cultural Heritage in the Middle East:
Positioning the Material Past in the Contemporary Present. IB Tauris, 2014.
---. Tourism in the Middle East: Continuity, Change and Transformation. Vol. 9,
Multilingual Matters, 2006.
---. “Welfare Genocide: Rentierism, Neoliberalism, and the Corporatization of the
Public Sector in Jordan.” Neoliberal Governmentality and the Future of the State
in the Middle East and North Africa, Springer, 2016, p. 45–59.
Deeb, Lara. An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi’i Lebanon.
Princeton: Princeton University Press., 2006.
Deets, Stephen. “Reimagining the Boundaries of the Nation: Politics and the
Development of Ideas on Minority Rights.” East European Politics & Societies,
vol. 20, no. 3, 2006, p. 419–446.
Delgado, Melvin. Social Youth Entrepreneurship: The Potential for Youth and
Community Transformation. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004.
Department of Statistics (DoS) (Jordan) and Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science,
and Fafo Oslo. Jordanian Society: Living Conditions in the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan-1998. 30. 3 413-427, World Development, 2002, p. 413–27.
Dittmer, Jason. “Captain America’s Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture,
and Post-9/11 Geopolitics.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers,
vol. 95., no. 3:,2005, p. 626-643.
Dixon, Deborah P. Feminist geopolitics: material states. Routledge, 2016.
Dodds, Klaus, et al. The Ashgate Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics.
Ashgate, 2013.
Eilon, Joab B., and Yoav Alon. The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the
Modern State. Vol. 61, IB Tauris, 2007.
El-Sharnouby, Dina. "In absence of a Hero Figure and an Ideology: Understanding
new political Imaginaries and Practices among revolutionary Youth in
Egypt." Middle East-Topics & Arguments 9 (2017): 84-95.
Elsheshtawy, Yasser. The Evolving Arab City: Tradition, Modernity and Urban
Development. Routledge, 2008.
Esson, James. “Escape to Victory: Development, Youth Entrepreneurship and the
Migration of Ghanaian Footballers.” Geoforum, vol. 64, 2015, p. 47–55.
Evans, Bethany. “‘Geographies of Youth/Young People.’” Geography Compass, vol.
2, no. 5, 2008, p. 1659–80.
Fahmi, W. S. “Bloggers’ Street Movement and the Right to the City. (Re) Claiming
Cairo’s Real and Virtual ‘Spaces of Freedom.’” Environment and Urbanization,
vol. 21, no. 1, 2009, p. 89–107.
Fanek, Fahed. “Debt under IMF Programme.” Jordan Times, 27 Sept. 2017.
Fathi, Schirin H. Jordan-an Invented Nation?:Tribe State Dynamics and the
304

Formation of National Identity. Dt. Orient-Inst., 1994.
Fawaz, Mona. “The Politics of Property in Planning: Hezbollah’s Reconstruction of
Haret Hreik (Beirut, Lebanon) as Case Study.” International Journal of Urban
and Regional Research, vol. 38, no. 3, 2014, p. 922–934.
Feldblum, Miriam. Reconfiguring Citizenship in Western Europe. Oxford University
Press, 1998.
Feldman, Ilana. “What Is a Camp? Legitimate Refugee Lives in Spaces of Long-Term
Displacement.” Geoforum, vol. 66, 2015, p. 244–252.
Football’s Greatest Rivalries: Al Faisaly v Al Wehdat.
http://www.worldsoccer.com/features/footballs-greatest-rivalries-al-faisaly-v-alwehdat-366655. Accessed 26 Nov. 2017.
Fregonese, Sara. “The Urbicide of Beirut? Geopolitics and the Built Environment in
the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1976).” Political Geography, vol. 28, 2009, p.
309–18.
Freij, Muath. “‘Ummuna Amman’ Activities to Start next Week Jordan Times, 21
Mar. 2016.
Frisch, Hillel. “Fuzzy Nationalism: The Case of Jordan.” Nationalism and Ethnic
Politics, vol. 8, no. 4, 2002, p. 86–103.
Fruchter-Ronen, Iris. “The Palestinian Issue as Constructed in Jordanian School
Textbooks, 1964–94: Changes in the National Narrative.” Middle Eastern
Studies, vol. 2, no. 49, 2013, p. 280–95.
Gabiam, Nell. “When ‘Humanitarianism’ Becomes ‘Development’: The Politics
of International Aid in Syria’s Palestinian Refugee Camps.” American
Anthropologist, vol. 114, no. 1, 2012, p. 95–107.
Galonnier, Juliette. “The Enclave, The Citadel and the Ghetto: The Threefold
Segregation of Upper-Class Muslims in India.” International Journal of Urban
and Regional Research, vol. 39, no. 1, 2015, p. 92–111.
GAM, et al. A Walk around Al-Balad Downtown Amman. 2017,
http://international.visitjordan.com/Portals/0/Al-Balad_Brochure.pdf.
Gamlen, Alan. “The Emigration State and the Modern Geopolitical Imagination.”
Political Geography, vol. 27, no. 8, 2008, p. 840–56.
Gee, James Paul. An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method.
Routledge, 2014.
Ghafour, H. “Survivor Jordan: How King Abdullah Has Kept His Crown amid the
Arab Uprisings.” The Star, 2013Gharaybeh, Ibrahim. “Jordan, Brotherhood:
Reluctant Partners in the Political Dance.” Al Monitor, 3 Dec. 2014.
Ghazal, Mohammad. “Gov’t Completes Preliminary Design for New Amman City.”
Jordan Times, 23 Oct. 2017.
---. “Plots Nearby ‘New City’ to Be Distributed to Civil Servants, Military Retirees.”
Jordan Times, 19 Apr. 2018.
Glesne, C. Becoming Qualitative Researchers: An Introduction 4th Ed. Pearson
Education, Inc., 2011.
Goldberg, Jeffrey. “The Modern King in the Arab Spring.” The Atlantic, vol. 18,
2013, p. 139.
Goldman, Michael. “Speculative Urbanism and the Making of the next World City.”
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, vol. 35, no. 3, 2011, p.
305

555–581.
Gough, Katherine, et al. “Youth Employment in a Globalising World.” International
Development Planning Review, vol. 35, no. 2, 2013, p. 91–102.
Goussous, Suzanna. “‘2016 Was Marked by Rise in Student Activism.’” Jordan
Times, 29 Dec. 2016.
Gov’t Completes Preliminary Design for New Amman City.
Grant, Richard. “Sustainable African Urban Futures: Stocktaking and Critical
Reflection on Proposed Urban Projects.” American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 59,
no. 3, 2015, p. 294–310.
Habib, Randa. “Jordan Tribes Break Taboo by Targeting Queen.” Agence FrancePresse, 9 Feb. 2011.
Hacker, Jane M. Modern ʻAmman: A Social Study. Vol. 3, Durham Colleges in the
University of Durham, 1960.
Haddad, Fadi G. When Monaliza Smiled. Royal Film Commission, 2012.
Hague, Euan, and John Mercer. “Geographical Memory and Urban Identity in
Scotland: Raith Rovers FC and Kirkcaldy.” Geography: Journal of the
Geographical Association, vol. 83, no. 2, 1998, p. 105.
Hamed, Muhammad. “At Least Three Militants, Four Security Personnel in Jordan
Killed in Raid After Bomb Attack.” Haaretz, 12 Aug. 2018.
Hannoyer, Jean, and Seteney Shami. “Amman: The City and Its Society.” Identity,
Self and the Other among Palestinian Refugees in East Amman, Beirut:
CERiMOC, 1996, p. 347–357.
Harvey, David. “The Right to the City.” The City Reader, vol. 6, 2008, p. 23–40.
Hentschel, Christine. “Postcolonializing Berlin and the Fabrication of the Urban.”
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, vol. 39, no. 1, 2015, p.
79–91.
Herbert, Steve. “The Trapdoor of Community.” Annals of the Association of
American Geographers, vol. 95, no. 4, 2005, p. 850–865.
Herrera, Linda. “It’s Time to Talk about Youth in the Middle East as The Precariat.”
Middle East-Topics & Arguments, no. 9, 2017, p. 35–42.
High Tech Desert Utopia Rises from the Sands: Jordan Announces New Mega-City
Built among the Dunes to Overcome Overcrowding in Its Capital Read More:
Http://Www.Dailymail.Co.Uk/News/Article-5158655/Jordans-Plan-Shiny-CityDesert-Met-Skepticism.Html#ixzz5EGPjlvZJ Follow Us: @MailOnline on
Twitter | DailyMail on Facebook - May 2018.
Hijab, Nadia. Womanpower: The Arab Debate on Women at Work. Vol. 16,
Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Hobsbawm, Eric. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality.
1990.
Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Ranger. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge
University Press, 2012.
Holston, James. Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in
Brazil. Princeton University Press, 2008.
---. “Insurgent Citizenship in an Era of Global Urban Peripheries.” City & Society,
vol. 21, no. 2, 2009, p. 245–67.
Home, Robert. Of Planting and Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities.
306

Routledge, 2013.
Homepage:News : Jordan Plans New City near Amman to Ease Overcrowding
Accessed 1 May 2018.
Honwana, Alcinda. “Waithood’: Youth Transitions and Social Change.” Development
and Equity: An Interdisciplinary Exploration by Ten Scholars from Africa, Asia
and Latin America, 2014, .p. 28–40.
Hooker, Juliet. “Indigenous Inclusion/Black Exclusion: Race, Ethnicity and
Multicultural Citizenship in Latin America.” Journal of Latin American Studies,
vol. 37, no. 2, 2005, p. 285–310.
Hörschelmann, Kathrin. Dissent and Youth Citizenship. Springer Singapore, 2015.
link.springer.com, http://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-9814585-94-1_30-2.
---. “Populating the Landscapes of Critical Geopolitics–Young People’s Responses to
the War in Iraq (2003).” Political Geography, vol. 27, no. 5, 2008, p. 587–609.
Hyndman, Jennifer. "Whose bodies count? Feminist geopolitics and lessons from
Iraq." Feminism and war: Confronting US imperialism (2008): 192-204.
Inge, Sophie. “High Tech Desert Utopia Rises from the Sands: Jordan Announces
New Mega-City Built among the Dunes to Overcome Overcrowding in Its
Capital.” Mail Online, 8 Dec. 2017.
Isin, Engin F. Theorizing Acts of Citizenship. 2008.
Iveson, Kurt. “Cities within the City: Do-It-Yourself Urbanism and the Right to the
City.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, vol. 37, no. 3,
2013, p. 941–956.
Jabal El-Hussein Camp | UNRWA. https://www.unrwa.org/where-wework/jordan/jabal-el-hussein-camp. Accessed 26 Nov. 2017.
Jacobson, David. Rights across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship.
Brill, 1996.
Jankowski, James P., and Israel Gershoni. Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle
East. Columbia University Press, 1997.
Janoschka, M., et al. “Gentrification in Spain and Latin America—a Critical
Dialogue.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, vol. 38, no.
4, 2014, p. 1234–65.
Johnston, C. “Politics in the Informalizing Metropolis: Displacement, Resettlement
and Unstable Negotiations in Uncivil Ahmedabad.” International Journal of
Urban and Regional Research, no. 38, 2014, p. 539–557.
Jones, Calvert W. Bedouins into Bourgeois: Remaking Citizens for Globalization.
Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Jones‐Correa, Michael. “Under Two Flags: Dual Nationality in Latin America and Its
Consequences for Naturalization in the United States.” International Migration
Review, vol. 35, no. 4, 2001, p. 997–1029.
“Jordan Plans New City near Amman to Ease Overcrowding.” The New Arab, 6 Nov.
2017.
“Jordanian Youth: Crown Prince Conveyed Our Message Loud and Clear at UN.”
Jordan Times, 23 Sept. 2017, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/jordanianyouth-crown-prince-conveyed-our-message-loud-and-clear-un.
“Jordanians’ Best Reactions to the ‘New Amman’ Project.” Roya News, 29 Oct. 2017.
307

Jordan’s Arab Spring: The Middle Class and Anti-Revolution | Middle East Policy
Council. http://www.mepc.org/jordans-arab-spring-middle-class-and-antirevolution. Accessed 22 Jan. 2018.
Jordan Plans Shiny New City Daily Mail Accessed 1 May 2018.
“Jordan’s Young and Global Leader.” Jordan Times, 23 Sept. 2017,
http://www.jordantimes.com/opinion/barik-mhadeen/jordan%E2%80%99syoung-and-global-leader.
Jureidini, Paul A., and Ronald De McLaurin. Jordan: The Impact of Social Change on
the Role of the Tribes. Praeger Publishers, 1984.
Kapitsa, Larissa. “Youth Entrepreneurship Policies and Programmes in the UNECE
Member States.” Paper for the Youth Employment Summit Alexandria, Egypt,
2002, p. 7–11.
Kassay, Ali, et al. “The Exclusion of Amman.” Cities, Urban Practices and Nation
Building in Jordan, Institut Francais du Proche-Orient, 2011.
Katz, Cindi. Growing up Global: Economic Restructuring and Children’s Everyday
Lives. U of Minnesota Press, 2004.
Khaldun, Ibn. The Muqaddimah: An Intro. Translated by Franz Rosenthal, 1967.
Khalidi, Rashid. The Origins of Arab Nationalism. Columbia University Press, 1991.
Khalili, Laleh. “Places of Memory and Mourning: Palestinian Commemoration in the
Refugee Camps of Lebanon.” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the
Middle East, vol. 25, no. 1, 2005, p. 30–45.
Khirfan, Luna, and Bessma Momani. “(Re) Branding Amman: A ‘Lived’City’s
Values, Image and Identity.” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, vol. 9, no.
1, 2013, p. 49–65.
Kitchin, Rob. “Making Sense of Smart Cities: Addressing Present Shortcomings.”
Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, vol. 8, no. 1, 2015, p.
131–136.
Knowles, Warwick. Jordan since 1989: A Study in Political Economy. Vol. 47, IB
Tauris, 2005.
Kösebalaban, Hasan. “Turkish Media and Sport Coverage: Marking the Boundaries of
National Identity.” Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 13, no. 1,
2004, p. 47–64.
Kraidy, Marwan. Hybridity, or the cultural logic of globalization. Temple University
Press, 2005.
Kymlicka, Will. Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights.
Clarendon Press, 1995.
Larzillière, Pénélope. Activism in Jordan. Zed Books Ltd., 2016.
Latif, Nadia. “Space, Power and Identity in a Palestinian Refugee Camp.” REVUE
Asylon (S), no. 5, 2008.
Latour, Bruno. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory.
Oxford University Press, 2005.
“Law Should Be Applied to All Indiscriminately Says King.” Jordan Times, 6 Aug.
2017.
Lefebvre, Henri. “The Production of Space.” Ox-Ford: Blackwell, translated by
Donald Nicholson-Smith, vol. 30, 1991.
Ley, D., and S. Y. Teo. “Gentrification in Hong Kong? Epistemology vs. Ontology.”
308

International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, no. 38, 2014, p. 1286–
1303.
Lister, R., and J. Campling. Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives. Macmillan
International Higher Education, 2017.
Loader, Brian D. Young Citizens in the Digital Age: Political Engagement, Young
People and New Media. Routledge, 2007.
Loewe, Markus, et al. The Impact of Favouritism on the Business Climate: A Study on
Wasta in Jordan. 2007.
MacBride, Elizabeth. Arab Spring 2.0: The Rise of Women Entrepreneurs. CNBC, 19
Nov. 2013, http://www.cnbc.com/id/101179963#.2013.
MacClancy, Jeremy. Sport, Identity and Ethnicity. 1996.
Maffi, Irene. “The Emergence of Cultural Heritage in Jordan: The Itinerary of a
Colonial Invention.” Journal of Social Archaeology, vol. 9, no. 1, 2009, p. 5–34.
Maffi, Irene, and Rami Daher. The Politics and Practices of Cultural Heritage in the
Middle East: Positioning the Material Past in Contemporary Societies. IB
Tauris, 2014.
Makhamreha, Zeyad, and Almanasyeha Nazeeh. “Analyzing the State and Pattern
of Urban Growth and City Planning in Amman Using Satellite Images and GIS.”
European Journal of Social Sciences, vol. 24, no. 2, 2011, p. 225–64.
Malkawi, Fuad. The New Arab Metropolis: A New Research Agenda." The Evolving
Arab City: Tradition, Modernity and Urban Development. 2008, p.27–36.
Marcińczak, Szymon, et al. “Urban Geographies of Hesitant Transition: Tracing
Socioeconomic Segregation in Post-Ceauşescu Bucharest.” International Journal
of Urban and Regional Research, vol. 38, no. 4, 2014, p. 1399–1417.
Marie Baylouny, Anne. “Militarizing Welfare: Neo-Liberalism and Jordanian Policy.”
The Middle East Journal, vol. 62, no. 2, 2008, p. 277–303.
Masri, Munther, and et al. Entrepreneurship Education in the Arab States. A joint
project of United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) and the StratREAL Foundation, 2010, p. 4–130.
Massad, Joseph A. Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan.
Columbia University Press, 2012.
Massey, Doreen. “Places and Their Pasts.” In History Workshop Journal Oxford
University Press, vol. 39, 1995, p. 182–92.
---."The spatial construction of youth cultures." In Cool places, pp. 132-140.
Routledge, 2005.
Maxwell, J. A. Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach. Sage
Publications, Inc., 2012.
McDowell, Linda, et al. “Precarious Work and Economic Migration: Emerging
Immigrant Divisions of Labour in Greater London’s Service Sector.”
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, vol. 33, no. 1, 2009,. p.
3–25.
McFarlane, Colin. “The Entrepreneurial Slum: Civil Society, Mobility and the CoProduction of Urban Development.” Urban Studies, vol. 49, no. 13, 2012, p.
2795–816.
Miles, Rebecca. “Employment and Unemployment in Jordan: The Importance of the
Gender System.” World Development, vol. 30, no. 3, 2002, p. 413–427.
309

Miller, Catherine, et al. Arabic in the City: Issues in Dialect Contact and Language
Variation. Routledge, 2007.
Mills, Amy. Streets of Memory: Landscape, Tolerance, and National Identity in
Istanbul. 2010.
---. “The Cultural Geopolitics of Ethnic Nationalism: Turkish Urbanism in Occupied
Istanbul (1918–1923).” Annals of the American Association of Geographers,
2017, p. 1–15.
Minola, Tommaso, et al. “Are Youth Really Different? New Beliefs for Old Practices
in Entrepreneurship.” International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation
Management 2, vol. 18, no. 2–3, 2014, p. 233–259.
Montague, James. “Football’s Greatest Rivalries: Al Faisaly v Al Wehdat World
Soccer.” World Soccer, Dec. 2015, www.worldsoccer.com/features/footballsgreatest-rivalries-al-faisaly-v-al-wehdat-366655.
Murphy, Alexander B. “Identity and Territory.” Geopolitics, vol. 15, no. 4, 2010, p.
769–772.
Nieberg, Henry. Public Transportation in the Middle East: A Study on the
Sustainability and Efficacy of Taxis in Amman and the Future of Public
Transportation. Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection. 2665, 2017.
Oxford Business Group. 2015, https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/news/buses-cuttravel-times- and-around-amman.
Parker, Christopher. “Tunnel-Bypasses and Minarets of Capitalism: Amman as
Neoliberal Assemblage.” Political Geography, vol. 28, no. 2, Feb. 2009, p. 110–
20. ScienceDirect, doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2008.12.004.
Patton, M. Q. Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods (3rd Ed.). Sage
Publications, Inc., 2002.
Peck, Jamie, and Adam Tickell. “Neoliberalizing Space Antipode 34.3 380-404.”
Peters, John D. (1999). Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of
Communication, 2002.
Perthes, Volker. Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change. Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2004.
Pilder, Andrew David. Urbanization and Identity: The Building of Amman in the
Twentieth Century. Miami University, 2011.
Piro, Timothy J. The Political Economy of Market Reform in Jordan. Rowman &
Littlefield, 1998.
Plots Nearby ‘New City’ to Be Distributed to Civil Servants, Military Retirees
Accessed 2 May 2018.
“Police Launches Suicide Hotline as Numbers Rise.” Jordan Times, 12 Oct. 2017,
http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/police-launches-suicide-hotlinenumbers-rise.
Potter, Robert B., et al. Darmame, Khadija, et Al. An Introduction to the Urban
Geography of Amman, Jordan. Geography, the University of Reading, 2007.
University of Reading, 2007,
Pryke, Michael, et al., editors. Using Social Theory: Thinking through Research.
Sage, 2003.
Qudah, Nama’a Abdullah. “Urban Identity in the Age of Globalization Assessing the
Abdali Project in Amman, Jordan.” Transformation of the Urban Character of
310

Arab Cities since the Late Last Century, vol. 63, 2015, p. 63.
Razzaz, Omar. “Contested Space: Urban Settlement around Amman.” Middle East
Report, no. 181, 1993, p. 10–14. JSTOR, doi:10.2307/3013015.
Rech, Matthew F. “Recruitment, Counter-Recruitment and Critical Military Studies.”
Global Discourse, vol. 4, no. 2–3, 2014, p. 244–62.
Ren, Julie, and Jason Luger. “Comparative Urbanism and the ‘Asian City’’:
Implications for Research and Theory.’” International Journal of Urban and
Regional Research, vol. 39, no. 1, 2015, p. 145–156.
Riyad, Hussein F., et al. “The Language of Shop Signs in Amman: A Sociolinguistic
Study.” International Journal of Educational Research and Reviews, vol. 3, no.
2, 2015, p. 155–64.
Robehmed, Alexandra. Developing Apps, Developing Jordan? ICT Startup
Entrepreneurs as Subjects of International Development in Amman’s’ Silicon
Wadi.’. Georgetown University, 2015.
Robinson, Jennifer. “Cities in a World of Cities: The Comparative Gesture.”
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, vol. 35, no. 1, 2011, p.
1–23.
Rogan, Eugene, and Tariq Tell. Village, Steppe and State: The Social Origins of
Modern Jordan. British Academic Press, 1994.
Rose, Gillian. “Researching Visual Materials: Towards a Critical Visual
Methodology.” Dies., Hg., Visual Methodologies. An Introduction to Interpreting
Visual Materials. London: Sage, 2007, p. 1–32.
Roy, Ananya. “Civic Governmentality: The Politics of Inclusion in Beirut and
Mumbai.” Antipode, vol. 41, no. 1, 2009, p. 159–179.
---. “The 21st-Century Metropolis: New Geographies of Theory.” Regional Studies,
vol. 43, no. 6, 2009, p. 819–830.
Ruddick, Sue. “The Politics of Aging: Globalization and the Restructuring of Youth
and Childhood.” Antipode, vol. 35, no. 2, 2003, p. 334–62.
Salibi, Kamal S. The Modern History of Jordan. IB Tauris, 1998.
Salkowitz, Rob. Young World Rising: How Youth Technology and Entrepreneurship
Are Changing the World from the Bottom Up. Vol. 13, John Wiley & Sons,
2010.
Samain, Rula. “Jordan’s History as Refugee Host Entitles It to Be Peacemaker,
Senator Says.” Jordan Times, 1 Dec. 2016.
Sassen, Saskia. “The Global City: Strategic Site, New Frontier.” Moving Cities–
Contested Views on Urban Life, Springer, 2018, p. 11–28.
Saswan, Tabazah. “Jordanians Feel Less Safe since Syrian Refugee Crisis Started —
Survey.” Jordan Times, 09 2017,
http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/jordanians-feel-less-safe-syrian-refugeecrisis-started-%E2%80%94-survey.
---. “Police Launches Suicide Hotline as Numbers Rise | Jordan Times.” Amman,
Jordan, 12 Oct. 2017, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/police-launchessuicide-hotline-numbers-rise.
Scharfenort, Nadine. “Urban Development and Social Change in Qatar: The Qatar
National Vision 2030 and the 2022 FIFA World Cup.” Journal of Arabian
Studies, vol. 2, no. 2, 2012, p. 209–230.
311

Schenker, David. Taxing Times in Jordan. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policyanalysis/view/taxing-times-in-jordan. Accessed 22 Jan. 2018.
Schroeder, Christopher M. Startup Rising: The Entrepreneurial Revolution Remaking
the Middle East. St. Martin’s Press, 2013.
Schwedler, Jillian. “Political Dissent in Amman, Jordan.” Rethinking Neoliberalism:
Resisting the Disciplinary Regime, 2017.
---. “The Political Geography of Protest in Neoliberal Jordan.” Middle East Critique,
vol. 21, no. 3, 2012, p. 259–70.
Scott, Allen J., and Michael Storper. “The Nature of Cities: The Scope and Limits of
Urban Theory.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, vol. 39,
no. 1, 2015, p. 1–15.
Secor, Anna. “‘There Is an Istanbul That Belongs to Me’: Citizenship, Space, and
Identity in the City.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol.
94, no. 2, 2004, p. 352–368.
Shami, Seteney. “Amman Is Not a City: Middle Eastern Cities in Question.” Urban
Imaginaries. Locating the Modern City, 2007, p. 208–235.
Sharp, Jeremy. Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations Washington DC
Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress, 2017.
---. Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations Washington DC Congressional Research
Service. Library of Congress, 2018.
Shatkin, Gavin. “Reinterpreting the Meaning of the ‘Singapore Model’: State
Capitalism and Urban Planning.” International Journal of Urban and Regional
Research, vol. 38, no. 1, 2014, p. 116–137.
Shawash, Janset. Al-Balad as a Place of Heritage: Problematising the
Conceptualisation of Heritage in the Context of Arab Muslim Middle East.
University College London University of London, 2011.
Shryock, Andrew. “Bedouin in Suburbia: Redrawing the Boundaries of Urbanity and
Tribalism in Amman, Jordan.” The Arab Studies Journal/ﻣﺠﻠﺔ اﻟﺪراﺳﺎت اﻟﻌﺮﺑﯿﺔ,
1997, p. 40–56.
---. Nationalism and the Genealogical Imagination: Oral History and Textual
Authority in Tribal Jordan. Vol. 23, Univ of California Press, 1997.
Skelton, Tracey. “Taking Young People as Political Actors Seriously: Opening the
Borders of Political Geography.” Area, vol. 42, no. 2, 2010, p. 145–151.
---. “Young People, Children, Politics and Space: A Decade of Youthful Political
Geography Scholarship 2003–13.” Space and Polity, vol. 17, no. 1, 2013, p.
123–136.
Skelton, Tracey, and Gill Valentine. “Cool Places” In Cool Places. Routledge, 2005.
Skrbis, Zlatko, Ian Woodward, and Clive Bean. "Seeds of cosmopolitan future?
Young people and their aspirations for future mobility." Journal of Youth
Studies 17, no. 5, 2014, p. 614-625.
Smith, Jackie, et al., editors. Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics:
Solidarity beyond the State. Syracuse University Press, 1997.
Smith, Michael Peter, and Luis Eduardo Guarnizo. Transnationalism from Below.
Vol. Vol. 6, Transaction Publishers, 1998.
Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu. Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational
Membership in Europe. University of Chicago Press, 1994.
312

Spiro, Peter J. “Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship.” Immigration &
Nationality Review, vol. 18, 1997, p. 491.
Staeheli, Lynn A. “Citizenship and the Problem of Community.” Political Geography,
vol. 27, no. 1, 2008, p. 5–21.
Staeheli, Lynn A., Kafui Attoh, et al. “Contested Engagements: Youth and the Politics
of Citizenship.” Space and Polity, vol. 17, no. 1, 2013, p. 88–105.
Staeheli, L. A., Ehrkamp, P., Leitner, H., & Nagel, C. R et al. Dreaming the
Ordinary: Daily Life and the Complex Geographies of Citizenship. Progress in
Human Geography 36, No. 5. 628-644. 2012.
Staeheli, Lynn A., and Daniel Hammett. “‘For the Future of the Nation’: Citizenship,
Nation, and Education in South Africa.” Political Geography, vol. 32, 2013, p.
32–41.
Staeheli, Lynn, Eleonore Kofman, and Linda Peake. Mapping women, making
politics: Feminist perspectives on political geography. Psychology Press, 2004.
“Start-up Spring.” Economist, 2013,
https://www.economist.com/news/business/21581737- clusters-internet-firmsare-popping-up-all-over-region-start-up-spring.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. Globalization and Its Discontents. Vol. 500, New York Norton,
2002.
Swedenberg, Ted. Imagined Youths | Middle East Research and Information Project.
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer245/imagined-youths. Accessed 23 Aug. 2015.
Tedong, Peter Aning, et al. “Governing Enclosure: The Role of Governance in
Producing Gated Communities and Guarded Neighborhoods in Malaysia.”
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, vol. 39, no. 1, 2015, p.
112–128.
“The World’s Conscience Seems to Be on ‘Silent’ Mode –– Crown Prince.” Jordan
Times, 22 Sept. 2017,
http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/world%E2%80%99s-conscience-seemsbe-silent%E2%80%99-mode-%E2%80%93%E2%80%93-crown-prince.
Toal, Gearóid. Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space. 1. publ,
Routledge, 1996.
Tobin, Sarah A. “Jordan’s Arab Spring: The Middle Class and Anti-Revolution.”
Middle East Policy, vol. 19, no. 1, 2012, p. 96–109.
U.CityGuide Online Travel Adviser. Top 10 10 Uglliest Cities in the World -the Third
Ugliest City in the World. 2013,
United, Nations. “Amman Youth Declaration Adopted at Global Forum on Youth,
Peace and Security.” Www.Un.Org,
http://www.un.org/youthenvoy/2015/08/amman-youth-declaration-adoptedglobal-forum-youth-peace-security/. Accessed 3 Dec. 2015.
---. August of 2015 the UN’s “Global Forum on Youth, Peace and Security.
https://www.un.org/youthenvoy/2015/08/amman-youth-declaration-adoptedglobal-forum-youth-peace-security/.
United Nations. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in
the Near East. UNRWA, https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/jordan/ammannew-camp.
van Noorloos, Femke, and Marjan Kloosterboer. “Africa’s New Cities: The Contested
313

Future of Urbanisation.” Urban Studies, 2017, p. 0042098017700574.
Varsanyi, Monica W. “Interrogating ‘Urban Citizenship’ Vis-à-Vis Undocumented
Migration.” Citizenship Studies, vol. 10, no. 2, 2006, p. 229–49.
Watson, Vanessa. “African Urban Fantasies: Dreams or Nightmares?” Environment
and Urbanization, vol. 26, no. 1, 2014, p. 215–231.
Weinstein, Liza. “Mumbai’s Development Mafias: Globalization, Organized Crime
and Land Development.” International Journal of Urban and Regional
Research, vol. 32, no. 1, 2008, p. 22–39.
Weller, Susie. “Situating (Young) Teenagers in Geographies of Children and Youth.”
Children’s Geographies, vol. 4, no. 1, Apr. 2006, p. 97–108. CrossRef,
doi:10.1080/14733280600577517.
---. “‘Teach Us Something Useful’: Contested Spaces of Teenagers’ Citizenship.”
Space and Polity, vol. 7, no. 2, 2003, p. 153–171.
Wickham, James, and Ian Bruff. “Skills Shortages Are Not Always What They Seem:
Migration and the Irish Software Industry.” New Technology, Work and
Employment, vol. 23, no. 1–2, 2008, p. 30–43.
Winkler, Tanja. “For the Equitable City yet to Come 1.” Planning Theory & Practice,
vol. 10, no. 1, 2009, p. 65–83.
Work4Youth. ILO: Youth in Jordan Face Difficult Transition from School to Decent
Work. 21 July 2014, http://www.ilo.org/beirut/mediacentre/news/WCMS_249778/lang--en/index.htm.
World Development Indicators. World Bank, 2018,
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators.
Zada, Jude Al Issa. Place Attachment of Different Influx Groups in West Amman,
Jordan. University of Stuttgart, 2015.
Zaghmout, Fadi, and Ruth Ahmedzai Kemp. “The Bride of Amman.” Signal, vol. 8,
2015.

314

APPENDIX A:

APPENDIX OF STARTER QUESTIONS
1. Can you describe Amman?
2. If you are in a new setting, how do you talk with people your age about where you are
from?
3. What words of phrases do you use to describe your neighborhood?
4. How do people from your neighborhood feel about being from that place?
5. What do you consider the advantages and disadvantages of being from your
neighborhood?
6. What opportunities do you have which are particular for people from your
neighborhood?
7. What opportunities would you have if you lived in another neighborhood?
8. How do you describe people from other parts of the city?
9. Are there places in the city you feel most at home or able to reach your potential?
10. Are there places in the city where you would feel unwelcome?
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